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Abstract
This thesis explores the use of the border in governing on the China-Laos frontier. By 
focusing on the notion of ‘frontier’, the thesis breaks with views of border regions as 
sites of anomie and state avoidance. It presents the frontier not simply as a field of 
confrontation between state and society but instead, as a “middle ground” (White 1991), a 
socio-economic and cultural space where the practices of peripheral subjects intersect with 
central powers, producing heterogeneous scenarios of manoeuvring, negotiation, 
collaboration, and resistance. By embracing a view of power as simultaneously totalising 
and individualising, the thesis also stresses the ongoing significance of the nation-state 
as a regulatory agent of human, capital and goods mobility across borders. It questions 
the dissolution of borders suggested by some globalisation theories and highlights the 
current paradox of the simultaneous reinforcement of state authority and the re-opening 
of international borders in mainland Southeast Asia. It argues that the practices enacted 
by border dwellers are not to be attributed to a waning of state power on the periphery 
due to the inroads of globalisation. Rather, they are the product of an ongoing governing 
pattern of “experimentation under hierarchy” (Heilmann 2008). This is a mechanism 
whereby the margins are allowed to experiment autonomously under the scrutiny of the 
Lao and Chinese centres. In this sense, local experimentation flourishes like ‘roses’. When 
these bloom into a centrifugal vortex, they are contained by an authoritarian backlash 
which, in extreme cases, resorts to ‘rifles’.
Through a historical account and four contemporary ethnographic case studies, the thesis 
critically interrogates four main themes raised in the literature on theories of globalisation: 
“graduated sovereignty” (Ong 1999, 2000), unconstrained cross-border mobility, cross- 
border ethnic re-connectedness, and marginal resistance to the centre of power. First, an 
analysis of Chinese-driven rubber investments in north-western Laos demonstrates that the 
circulation of capital across the borders does not translate into an anomalous variegation of 
sovereignty. The historical account suggests that graduation in sovereignty is a governing 
model which, despite many changes from pre-colonial, to colonial and post-colonial times, 
has been variously applied throughout history by the major political entities in the Upper 
Mekong region. A second case study argues that the socio-economic initiatives of ethnic 
Akha villagers in Laos across the border are not an effect of “zomia” (Scott 2008, 
forthcoming; van Schendel 2002), a mechanism whereby unruly peripheral subjects repel
central power. They are an expression of an incomplete process of modem state formation 
and the remnants of pre-colonial patterns of governing. A third case study examines how 
the notion of belonging among a group of Tai youth in a border village in China is not 
articulated through a trans-frontier pan-ethnic sentiment of resistance to centralising 
policies. Rather, it is expressed through social and cultural identification with the Chinese 
government’s agenda of development and modernisation. A final case study argues that the 
struggles of a group of Tai traders to assert themselves as “flexible citizens” (Ong 1999) of 
the frontier demonstrate that mobility of subjects and objects across the border remains 
constrained by the structuring system of the state, despite the claims of regional economic 
integration. Therefore, in contrast with the fluidity of the ‘frontier’, the ‘border’ continues 
to maintain its binding significance and remains the focal point of state regulation.
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A N o t e  o n  La n g u a g e s  a n d  N a m e s
Languages
The four languages most often transliterated in this thesis are Chinese, Lao, Tai Lue, and Akha. 
Usually these transliterations are given in parentheses, preceded by an indication of the 
language (Ch. for Chinese, L. for Lao, T. for Tai Lue, and A. for Akha). All transcriptions in 
these languages except for personal or place names are written in italics. Tone markers in all 
languages are omitted.
Chinese Orthography
All transcriptions of Mandarin Chinese, including the Yunnan dialect, follow the standard 
pinyin official Romanisation system. Chinese transcriptions are preceded by the corresponding 
Chinese character the first time they are used.
Lao Orthography
There is no universally agreed upon system for the transcription of Lao terms into Romanised 
script. To transcribe Lao words I followed Mayes (2007)’ orthography based on Kerr 
(1972:viii-ix)’s system in Lao-Engj-ish Dictionary with some modifications. Like Mayes’, my 
orthography abandons Kerr’s use of the International Phonetic Alphabet. It does not indicate 
tonal differences or variations between long and short vowels. I use the following approximate 
vowel distinctions:
u pronounced as a shortened £oo’ in lock (e.g. him = festival) and also a longer sounding 
‘oo’ (e.g. luk = child)
eu has no equivalent in English (it approximates peu in French)1 
i is pronounced as the ‘i’ in sin (e.g. kin = eat) or the ‘ee’ in meet (e.g. ck = good) 
e is pronounced as the ce’ in ten (e.g. pen = to be)
a is pronounced as the ‘u’ in cut (e.g. rmk = like) or the ‘ari in rmrk without pronouncing 
the Y (e.g.fak = send)
ae is pronounced ‘airi as in hair without pronouncing the Y (e.g. rme = mother)
1 An exception is the word rreuang which I transliterate as muang. See detail on the next page.
2
0 is pronounced as the ‘oL in Nonmy without pronouncing the Y (e.g. nong =younger 
sister)
eh is pronounced as the ‘er’ in rumber without pronouncing the Y (e.g.peht =‘open’)
While it is not possible to indicate variations between all consonants, the following 
approximate consonant distinctions should be noted:
k, ng ch, s, ny, d, t, n, b, p, f, m, y and / are similar to the English pronunciation 
kh is pronounced as an aspirated ‘L (e.g. khai = egg) 
ph is pronounced as an aspirated ‘p’ (not Y) 
tb is pronounced as an aspirated Y (not ‘th’ as in think)
When v and y form part of complex vowels or final consonants, I convert them as follows:
1 is used as a final consonant replacing y (e.g. pai = sign, not pay)
o is used as a final consonant replacing v (e.g. neo = method, not need) 
u replaces v when it forms part of a diphthong (e.g. tua = lie)2
Tai Lue Orthography
Similarly for Lao, there is no universally agreed upon system for the transcription of Tai Lue 
terms into Romanised script. Based on similar arguments for the scheme I have used for Lao, I 
use the same transliteration scheme for consonants and vowels, except for the following:
I render ch as ts (e.g. tsao = prince, ruler)
Akha Orthography
The few Akha terms used are transcribed to illustrate the local pronunciation. Exceptions are 
the following terms:
ahhazan (Akha custom or way of life); and miXan (Akha universe-disc), that I 
transliterate following Alting Von Geusau (1983, 1988);
dzöma (spiritual village leader) and gylan (potency) that I transliterate following 
Tooker (1996).
2 Personal communication with Mayes, 17/01/2009.
3
Place Names and Ethnic Groups
I adopt the official transcription in Mandarin Chinese for all names of places within the 
territory of the People’s Republic of China, including the names of places that Tai speaking 
people of Xishuangbanna refer to by using Tai Lue spelling. An exception is when I refer to 
these places in the pre-People’s Republic of China period, in which case I follow common 
usage at that time. Exceptions apply also to commonly used place names such as Hong Kong, 
and personal names that have been published elsewhere using Wade-Giles.
Place names in Laos are written, where possible, according to the spelling used by Evans in A 
Short History of Laos (2002) omitting the tone markers, and where it is not possible, by following 
the most common usage. Most provinces and district level towns in Laos are referred to with a 
prefix which is normally transcribed in the Tai literature as müang, rrnng, or rriing. For 
convenience, I always transcribe this prefix as rmang or Muang. Although being aware of the 
different spelling in Lao and Tai Lue, for practicality I use the same orthography for this term 
in both languages. For the Lao capital, I used the French spelling Vientiane. To protect 
confidentiality the name of the Akha village focus of Chapter Four has been changed. To refer 
to the state of the Union of Myanmar I use Burma and Myanmar interchangeably.
For spellings of the ethnic categories and names of ethnic groups in Laos I follow, where 
possible, the orthography used by Evans in Laos: Culture and Society (2000). For the names of 
ethnic groups in China I use the spelling in Mandarin Chinese. To refer to the Tai Lue 
speaking people of Xishuangbanna I use the terms Tai and Dai interchangeably. The spelling 
Thai refers to the citizens of Thailand. To refer to the Yunnanese who populated the frontiers 
of the Upper Mekong since the pre-colonial period and today are included in the official ethnic 
classification of Laos I use the spelling Haw and Ho interchangeably.
Personal, and Company Names
The names of all informants have also been changed in order to protect confidentiality. 
Personal names of young Tai Lue people are preceded by Ai or Yi, respectively the prefix to 
address an unmarried male and an unmarried female person. Following the common Lao and 
Tai Lue custom for addressing some elder persons or with a close relationship with the speaker,
4
names of married women with children are preceded by the title of Mae (mother) and names 
of married men with children are preceded by Phoh (father). The names of female elders can 
be preceded by the title Mae Thao and the names of male elders by the title Phoh Thao. All 
these prefixes are not italicised. Business names have not been changed, though the source of 
confidential or controversial information provided by businesses is disguised where necessary.
5
Measure and  Currency Conversions
nru Chinese unit of land area; 0.0667 hectares (ha)
yuan Chinese unit of currency. The official exchange rate was set at 7.6
yuan =US$ 1.00 in July 2005.
kip Lao unit of currency, the official exchange rate was set at 9,000 
&zp=US$ 1.00 in July 2005.
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Map 1. Southeast Asia, highlighting Laos, China and Yunnan
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Introduction
W h e n  I CROSSED T H E  CHINA-LAOS BO RDER at the Mohan international crossing
point (Map 4) in early 2004, a bus driver from the nearby city of Mengla alerted me to big 
changes. “This is China’s century! Development and economic growth are also reaching the 
border areas now”, he said in reaction to my surprise about the ostentatious, newly-built, duty­
free shopping area along the road to the check-point. Continuing onto no-man’s land between 
check-points, my attention was captured by a concrete building that stood out right by the 
highway under construction. The building stood solitary, with the blinds shut and the doors 
locked. Empty. Like a ghost house. Neither the driver nor the passengers sitting next to me 
could explain the purpose of that construction at the margins of the Lao and Chinese 
territories. On my return to the field in 2005,1 took the enigma of that building as my starting 
point for investigating the socio-political and economic dynamics of the China-Laos frontier. 
By solving the riddle of the building I assumed I could gain an understanding of how states 
govern in the era of regional integration.
In April of the same year, I returned to the international border crossing. This time, the van 
driver that took me from Mengla to Mohan was quite outspoken. He told me that the 
mysterious building was the project of an investor from an unidentified wealthy region of 
China who had obtained the permission from the provincial administration to set up a casino. 
The investor, the driver revealed, had planned to build the casino at the junction of the Lao 
and Chinese territories, away from Beijing’s gaze. And yet, perhaps a change in the leadership 
or a mutation in the decision-making process in the higher echelons of power had thwarted his 
ambition. The initial flexibility showed by the government had been frozen by renewed fixity. 
Hence, the building had been constructed but never used for its initial purpose. In May 2005, 
the construction still stood empty, as it had the year before.
Crossing the border into Boten in 2005,1 was presented with other pieces of the borderlands’ 
socio-economic puzzle. The design to de-territorialise the casino, considered by the Chinese 
government as a symbol of moral pollution, had been stretched from no-man’s land into Lao 
territory. Some local residents hinted that the idea of the casino, materialised in a new
12
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Figure 3. Failed deterritorialisation: the casino that 
was never open in no-man’s land between Mohan and Boten
Figure 4.The newly-built shopping area at the 
Mohan international border crossing
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magnificent building, was to be integrated into a larger development, Golden Boten City. This 
was a border Disneyland or, as otherwise defined, a “Laos Vegas” (Nivelle 2007).
The project was conceived of as having a global economic scope. A booklet (BGCB n.d.) by 
the developers, clandestinely circulated in Vientiane and Bangkok, tmmpeted that Golden 
Boten City would be a commercial hub for the exchange of services and goods between the 
ASEAN countries1, plus Japan, China and the Republic of Korea. Above all, it would be a 
showcase of the Lao Government’s opening up to the world by attracting foreign direct 
investment. Located right on the planned Kunming-Bangkok highway, the ambitious plan 
would include an entertainment area—centred around the casino— with luxury hotels, 
restaurants, shopping malls, ethnic theme parks, a golf course, an international meeting centre 
and even an international school and hospital. Most importantly, a ‘special economic zone’ 
with a “free trade area” was to be established. In the Golden Boten Gty, trade, investment and 
amusement were meant to prosper in a zone of administrative and economic “exception” 
(Agamben 2000, 2003; Ong 2006) where socialist authoritarian rule would be ‘suspended’ to 
accommodate foreign capital and goods. Golden Boten G ty had been attributed the status of a 
‘special national area’ and guaranteed flexible policies by the Lao government.
When I went past Boten in a car in February 2007, the fantasy of Golden Boten G ty had partly 
materialised. The casino had been the first construction to spring up on the horizon inside a 
five-star hotel, the Royal Jinlun. The previous landscape of modest wooden huts had been 
replaced by a monumental building whose architectural style reminded me of a European 
medieval citadel because of its sloping-roofed towers. It was Chinese New Year’s Eve. Two 
rows of red lanterns were hanging outside the palatial hotel. In the nearby square, a small 
crowd of traders were selling some goods on stalls. My fellow passengers told me that both 
people and products were Chinese. Further up, across from the Lao border check-point was a 
newly-built petrol station. The sign in Chinese script indicated “China Oil”. All these signifiers 
gave the impression that Boten now belonged more to the Chinese semiotic field rather than 
to the Lao one. By mixing the cultural boundary between China and Laos, the signs were, at 
the same time, seemingly blurring the territorial and political boundaries of the two states.
1 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) includes: Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, 
Thailand, Laos, Burma, Brunei, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Laos became a member of ASEAN in 1997.
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However, on my last trip to Boten in February 2008, the concept of exception and flexibility 
had again been reversed. The pompous construction of the Golden City had come to a halt. 
The thriving economic developments promised by the brochure had not taken place. The only 
vibrancy of the place was produced by hordes of Chinese gamblers that at night animated the 
halls of the casino. The exceptionality of Boten seemed to be reverting to normality. A 
representative of the Namtha provincial administration told me that the central government in 
Vientiane was considering the closing of the casino. The reasons provided were corruption, 
chaos and illegal activities. No further details were revealed, but fear of an uncontrolled 
Chinese takeover in north-western Laos seemed to be an underlying factor for the new 
directives. The Laos state’s territorial flexibility and ‘exceptional’ legal arrangements trumpeted 
through both Chinese and Lao rhetoric had been again frozen by nationalising territorial and 
administrative fixity.
This thesis explores the use of the border in governing. By ‘governing’ I mean the “conduct of 
conduct” (Foucault 1982:220-221), which is not limited to elite state actors, but potentially 
includes anyone who manipulates the border while attempting to influence others. The driving 
assumption of my study is that power does not come into being as a set of raw rules and 
superimposed disciplinary technologies, but only “when it is put into action” (Foucault 
1982:220-221). Power exists when the actions of governors occur in relation to the actions of 
people upon whom power is exercised. This view questions a commonly held theory that 
envisages centre and margins as two opposed and disjunct poles. Rather than focusing 
attention on the border as marker of separation, this study locates the frontier as a “middle 
ground” (White 1991) between centres and margins. Specifically, the focal point of the thesis is 
the frontier at the junction of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR) and the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC).
15
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Figure 5. Boten village prior to the building of Boten Golden City
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This study represents both the Chinese and the Lao states not as monolithic entities, but as 
multifaceted ruling bodies characterised by a wide variety of administrative forms and agents. 
At times, power is exerted through authority and given administrative effect through the 
imposition of taxes, quarantine, identification papers, and household registration among other 
regulations. At other times, power allows niches for negotiation, appropriation and even 
subversion from the multiplicity of border dwellers. This thesis explores how traders, farmers, 
entrepreneurs, brokers, state agents and a group of educated youth manipulate, contest, and 
enforce the national border, through their socio-economic and cultural practices.
By embracing a notion of power as simultaneously totalising and individualising (Foucault 
1982), I stress the ongoing significance of the nation-state as a regulatory agent of human, 
capital and goods mobility across borders. This approach questions the dissolution of borders 
suggested by some globalisation theories. It highlights the current paradox of the simultaneous 
reinforcement of state authority and the re-opening of international borders in mainland 
Southeast Asia (Walker 1999). I argue that the various adjustments to the exercise of power by 
border dwellers are not to be traced back to a fading away of central powers on the periphery. 
Rather, they are the product of an on-going pattem of “experimentation under hierarchy7’ 
(Heilmann 2008) whereby the Lao and Chinese states manage their interactions with the 
frontier.
The Myth of a Borderless World
Since the end of the 1980s, the idea that we live in an increasingly borderless world has gained 
ground in academic writing as well as in the collective imaginary of the West. The dissolution 
of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the political 
detente in East and Southeast Asian countries which were part of the Communist block are 
some of the historical facts that have forged this view. The intensified transnational movement 
of people, goods, and capital across borders has contributed to an impression of political and 
economic liberalisation. Such transformations in the world order have found elaboration in 
theories of globalisation and transnationalism. Economists and political scientists who 
advocate a more radical view of globalisation have predicted that the new topography of “an 
increasingly borderless economy” has caused the nation state, artefact of the 18lh and 19th
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centuries to become an obsolete political entity (Ohmae 1995:6)2. State authority, it is argued, 
“has leaked away, upwards, sidewards, and downwards” and in some cases “just evaporated” 
(Evans 1997:65). The emergence of the European Union as a supra-state economic reality has 
been seen as the first manifestation of state weakening. In Mainland Southeast Asia, the official 
opening of interstate frontiers to form economic corridors between neighbouring countries 
has fostered similar views. In 1992, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) initiated an all-round 
economic cooperation plan among the six states traversed by the Mekong Riven Thailand, 
Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Burma and China’s Yunnan Province. Implied in the program was 
the disappearance of national particularisms for the communal good in a liberalised regional 
economy. These hopes were fuelled by the loosening of the rigid central planning system of 
the three Socialist countries in the region, namely China, Laos, and Vietnam, following the 
implementation of economic reforms in the domestic sphere. In 2005, the rhetoric of a 
borderless regional economy resonated even in the remotest comer of north-western Laos, 
where farmers dreamt of having a single Asian currency to trade freely across states.
A more moderate perspective on globalisation has been put forward by some anthropologists, 
sociologists and cultural studies theoreticians. Although they have not declared the final demise 
of nation-states, these scholars have stressed the “fluidity” and “porosity” of borders and 
increased mobility across them. They suggest that more rapid modes of communication, along 
with an intensified movement of people and commodities across the world have been 
challenging the fixity of political boundaries (Castells 1996). Appadurai (1996), for instance, 
argues that transnational flows of people, capital, images, technologies, and ideas have 
constituted “ethnoscapes,” “finanscapes,” “mediascapes,” “technoscapes,” and “ideoscapes” 
respectively, that by-pass borders bringing spatially distant places together. Diasporic subjects 
and immigrants travelling between developing and wealthier countries are thought to thwart 
the territorial integrity and legitimacy of geographically bounded nation-states. The result is the 
emergence of de-territorialised, transnational, and flexible forms of cultures and identities 
(Appadurai 1986, 1990, 2001; Gupta and Ferguson 1992).
2 A similar argument about the disappearance of the nation-state with an increasingly globalised economy has 
been put forward by Chai-Anan (1995) and Naisbitt (1995).
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Central to this perspective on globalisation is the notion of interconnectedness. The picture 
proposed is that of a world where borders and boundaries become progressively more porous 
and people and cultures are allowed to be in more intense and immediate contact with each 
other (Inda and Rosaldo 2002). In the context of China and Southeast Asia, this idea has been 
particularly adopted to explore cross-border ethnicity. After being separated for decades by 
artificial borders as a consequence of the formation of modem nation-states, ethnic minority 
groups are said to have now re-connected across borders, reviving old linguistic, religious and 
social ties (Cohen 2000b; Davis 1999, 2003, 2005; Horstmann and Wadley 2006; Keyes 1992; 
Wasan 2005). Ethnic groups, it is assumed, have regained control over their cultural 
determination and finally found new ways to resist centrist, homogenising forces (Cohen 2000a; 
Davis 2005; Horstmann and Wadley 2006). Mackerras (2003), writing about China’s reaction to 
the US-hegemonic world agenda, emphasises that while the Chinese state resorts to a new 
form of nationalism, minority ethnic groups develop local forms of resistance and cultural 
revivals encouraged by the new flows of globalisation.
Flexibility is considered another defining feature of the global age (Harvey 1990, 1993; 
Jameson 1991). It is the outcome of the contemporary multi-interconnected world, where the 
time-space compression generated by new modes of production and consumption (Harvey 
1990) has annihilated the clear distinction and distance between wealthy centres and poor 
peripheries (Walker 1999). The flexibility of late capitalism breaks with the previous rigid 
Fordist model of centralised mass-assembly production (Harvey 1990). It creates a system of 
production, marketing and finance based on decentralisation and delocalisation across different 
sites. Ong (1999) adopts the notion of flexibility to describe the re-adjustment of governments 
to the new forms of capital accumulation in the current era of high modernity. She 
characterises as “flexible” those ad Ar-designed strategies and practices whereby states 
opportunistically create a variegated application of power on territories and people, to meet 
particular economic ends. Flexibility is, in her view, the offspring of neo-liberal governance 
(Ong 2006) and refers to a mode of governing unforseen in the period of early modernity. 
Furthermore, bringing human agency into a commonly assumed hegemonic view of social and 
cultural practices, Ong applies flexibility to the making of new subjectivities. Like states, 
individuals endowed with multiple passports manoeuvre and devise strategies to position
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themselves in relation to the changing pattem of capital accumulation. This enables increased 
mobility across borders and swings between different types of citizenship.
In brief, the theories of globalisation, whether in the more radical or moderate mode, bring 
about two main correlated ideas. First, in the current era of high modernity, otherwise defined 
as late capitalism or post-modernity, the state is gradually loosening control over its territorial 
sovereignty (Rosenau 1997; Sassen 1996). It is also losing its capacity to regulate the 
transnational movement of subjects and objects. This marks a shift from a “national” to a 
“post-national” world order. Second, a new type of flexible subject whose actions are freer 
from the structuring forces of a state system than in the past is emerging. However, what is 
overlooked in this analysis is consideration of the fact that mobility, connectedness, and 
flexibility are uneven phenomena that still involve only a small percentage of the global 
population. Moreover, these people remain inscribed within institutional structures of various 
sorts. The post 9/11 system of surveillance has re-erected barriers to mobility. That such 
barriers wax and wane itself is nothing new. This thesis focuses on the shifting patterns of 
regulating mobility rather than mobility itself. It draws attention to the complex power 
structures that intertwine the global with the local, the national with the transnational, and the 
centres with the margins.
To elucidate the intricacy of power dynamics in relation to borders, my work focuses on the 
notion of ‘frontier5. While keeping in mind the fixed political significance of the ‘border5 in the 
contemporary world order, I add to it the fuzzy and modifiable connotation of the frontier. I 
consider the frontier as a “middle ground” (White 1991), a socio-economic and cultural space 
where centres meet or grapple with the margins producing heterogeneous scenarios of 
manoeuvring, negotiation, collaboration, and resistance. My frontier of reference is that created 
by the contact between Lao PDR and PRC, including both the two governments and the 
people living along and across the contemporary political border. By focusing on this frontier, 
I intend to dismantle some of the tenets of the existing literature on globalisation. I suggest 
that cross-border mobility, flexibility of state sovereignty, revitalisation of cross-border ethnic 
ties and peripheral resistance to the centre are not to be seen as emerging out of an eclipse of 
the states (Evans 1997), but rather as part of an ongoing pattem of fluidity and impermanence 
intertwined with the exercise of authority inherent in the governing of this frontier region of
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Asia. Before I analyse in detail each of the above points, the concept of the frontier itself 
deserves some discussion.
The Frontier
Even in the contemporary world dominated by nation-states, frontiers continue to exist as 
distinctive socio-economic and cultural spaces overlapping clearly demarcated borders. The 
border is a fixed and defined entity, a line indicating separation between adjacent states. It is a 
marker of statehood, an instrument through which the modem state identifies its sovereignty 
over its members and before the international community. As such, on the one hand, the 
border continues to maintain its bounding significance and remains the focal point where state 
regulation is concentrated. Through the device of the border, states still regulate population 
mobility and immobility and define citizenship. Bureaucratic forms of identity developed by 
nation-states through passports and visas are asserted through the persistence of borders. 
Borders continue to direct the flow of capital across the globe and structure labour in late 
capitalism. They still divide the world into zones of wealth accumulation and zones of 
underpaid production, often perpetuating mechanisms of domination and exploitation similar 
to those of early capitalism (Fernandez et al. 2006). 'The frontier, on the other hand, is an 
unstable, indeterminate and ever-changing zone (Zanini 1997:10-14), where multiple centres of 
power interact. It is a space where various social, political, ethnic, and cultural forces come into 
contact and overlap. Such fluidity enables local agents to manoeuvre the fixity of the border to 
feed personal interests.
In early studies (Turner [1920J1996), frontiers have been conceptualised according to a “linear” 
model of development whereby they exist only temporarily before being “inevitably 
incorporated into the core” (Gaubatz 1996:13). This paradigm may apply to the history of the 
American West, Australia, or South Africa, but not necessarily to the south-western region of 
China bordering with Southeast Asia (Cliff 2005; Gaubatz 1996:20). This frontier area has 
always been in flux. It was never completely culturally integrated into any of the mighty 
political centres that surrounded it. Fluctuation varied according to the succeeding ruling 
entities throughout history, various waves of migration from the centres to the periphery and 
exposure to cultural influences from central China as much as from India. Up until the 1890s
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this region was a transitional buffer zone where an array of small polities ruled mainly by Tai 
speaking people prospered between the Qing Empire and the Burmese and Siamese kingdoms. 
As a general rule, the Tai-speaking peoples inhabited the fertile valley areas and were the 
dominant socio-political groups of the frontier, while the Kha, covering Mon-Khmer and Sino- 
Tibetan speaking people as well as Miao-Yao populations, lived in the mountain and hill 
regions.
Few clearly demarcated political boundaries existed between the Qing and other large states, 
and between the empires and the small polities (Giersch 2006; Leach 1960; Lieberman 1997; 
Thongchai 1994; Wyatt 1984). Instead the latter often maintained some degree of autonomy 
from the empires, pledging allegiance to one and then the other power through a tributary 
system (Giersch 2006). Even when boundaries were defined, they were unstable and subject to 
overlapping sovereignties. In his work on the Sino-Southeast Asian borderlands, Giersch 
(2006:4) notes that despite the efforts made to bring some of the south-western neighbouring 
polities under central rule through military occupation, Han migration and bureaucratic 
sophistication, “the Qing could not completely master indigenous societies nor rid them of 
political influences from Southeast Asia.” Rather, the Qing were often forced to negotiate with 
local populations, especially Tai rulers, over frontier defence and resource control (Giersch 
2006:4). In sum the “borderlands” between China and Southeast Asia were “persistent 
frontiers” (Gaubatz 1996:20; Giersch 2006:9) that were never completely assimilated into the 
cores of power.
The semi-autonomous status of these frontiers or peripheries in relation to the cores is also 
reflected in the cosmological representation of both the Chinese and the Tai world views. The 
traditional Chinese ordering of the universe was graphically organised into three main 
concentric zones. An innermost zone (Ch. ilk rmdi) expanded between the limits of the 
Chinese agricultural settlements to the east and the areas inhabited by non-Chinese 
populations. An outermost zone (Ch. biammi) (Cliff 2005; Millward 1998:20; Waley- 
Cohen 1991:33) stretched as far as the Chinese conceived of the borders of their empire and to 
where they gained control by establishing military settlements. In between the inner and the 
outer areas was “a zone of continued, intensive and intercultural contact” between the Chinese 
core and local populations (Gaubatz 1996:24). The zone in between was undetermined and in
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continuous flux. It varied according to the extent to which the centre expanded or shrank 
outwards but was never fully part of the core.
Similarly, the Tai and Burmese world view, based on the Hindu-Buddhist cosmology, 
conceived the centre of power as being loosely interconnected to surrounding territorial 
entities. This idea found expression in the mandala, an iconographic representation of the 
superhuman cosmos (Tambiah 1976:109). In the simplest form, the mandala is a figure divided 
into five sections: a central image, representing the Buddhist sacred mountain, Mount Mem, 
linked to four symbols each corresponding to one of the cardinal points. In the most complex 
elaboration, the mandala is composed of nine, seventeen or thirty-three units (Tambiah 
1976:102-09). However, any variant constitutes a centre-oriented construct (Tambiah 
1976:108). The political organisation of Southeast Asia was modelled on the superhuman 
cosmological order encapsulated by the mandala figure. The traditional polity was a mandala 
composed of concentric circles, usually three in number. At the centre were the king’s capital 
and the region under its direct rule (T. rrnan^, which was surrounded by a circle of smaller 
muang or territories governed by princes or rulers appointed by the king. These were, in turn, 
surrounded by minor polities. Each lesser unit was the reproduction and imitation of the larger 
(Condominas 1980). Together, the concentric circles formed a “galactic” structure where a 
central planet was surrounded by differentiated satellites (Tambiah 1976:112-13). Territorial 
jurisdiction of the various polities was not defined by permanent boundaries, but by fluid and 
flexible borders. Rather than being based on a view of centralising power, the relationship 
between the central planet and peripheral satellites was defined by a “concept of territory as a 
variable sphere of influence that [diminished] as royal power [radiated] from [the] centre” 
outwards (Tambiah 1976:112). In sum, like in the Chinese cosmological model, the peripheries 
of the Tai world maintained a variable degree of autonomy from the centre. As such they were 
never entirely absorbed into the latter. Borders between centre and peripheries were loci of 
contact, often of friction, but never of absolute control.
Today, even with clearly demarcated political borders, the region between south-western China 
and Mainland Southeast Asia is a ‘persistent frontier5. Here, the centralising thrusts of modem 
nation-states are still under negotiation by the actions of the multiple agents that inhabit it.
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Figure 7. Marking the frontier territory in Lao: 
border pillar n. 42 on the China-Laos border
Figure 8. Marking the frontier territory in Chinese: 
border pillar n. 42 on the China-Laos border
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The China-Laos Frontier
The border dividing China and Laos stretches for 677 kilometres (YMXZBWB 1994:551). The 
current demarcation and length of the line traces back to the treaties signed between the Qing, 
French and British empires in the 1890s. On the Chinese side, the area surrounding the border 
includes Mengla County, the southernmost tip of Yunnan’s Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous 
Prefecture. The Lao provinces bordering with China are Luang Namtha to the west, 
Oudomxai at the centre, and Phongsali to the east if we are to consider the border as a point 
of reference (Map 4). The frontier territory as a whole lies in a strategic position between 
Thailand (to the southwest), Myanmar (to the west), and Vietnam (to the east) (Map 2; Map 3; 
Map 4).
The region is characterised by a sub-tropical climate with three main seasons: a temperate 
winter (from October to February), a dry season (from February to Ma>) and a rainy season 
(from June to September). Morphologically, the region is dominated by mountains and hills 
alternated by valleys formed by river basins. The mountain range that separates the two 
countries is part of the Annam Cordillera, a mountain system emerging out of the Himalayan- 
Tibetan complex (Epprecht 1998:2). On the Lao side, the mountains were until recently 
heavily forested but the rubber boom that has hit the region since the early 2000s along with 
commercial logging and shifting cultivation has resulted in widespread forest destruction. On 
the Chinese side of the border, extensive rubber planting also decimated forest coverage 
between the 1960s and 2000s, leaving only a few patches of jungle.
The main river flowing across the area is the Mekong. In Chinese territory, the Mekong is 
named Langcang Jiang while in Laos it is called Mae Namkhong. A series of tributaries drain 
from both Xishuangbanna and north-western Laos into the Mekong. On the Chinese side, the 
main tributaries are the Mengyang and the A in Jinghong County, the Liusha in Menghai 
County, the Luosuo in Meng Lun and the La flowing through Mengla town and Mengpeng. In 
Lao territory, the Tha and the Beng rivers traverse respectively Luang Namtha and Oudomxai 
provinces. Many other minor tributaries run through the region (Map 4).
The rice plains in the upper reaches of the tributaries are the sites of the major settlements in 
the region (Walker 1999:19). In China, in the immediate proximity of the border, the main rice
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plains are located at Mengla, Mengpeng and Mengman. In north-western Laos, the major rice 
plains are situated in Luang Namtha, Muang Sing and Oudomxai. Smaller rice valleys are 
located at Viang Phukha, Muang Beng, Muang Hun and Muang Long (Walker 1999:19).
In the past, the mountainous geography heavily affected transportation and communication, a 
fact that accounts for the myth of isolation and remoteness of the area in most historical and 
scholarly sources (Walker 1999:18). The Mekong River, navigable for most of the year in the 
upper course, constitutes the main fluvial transportation route serving as a vital conduit of 
trade between Thailand, Myanmar, Laos and China. Road transport infrastructure in the 
frontier strip was quite poor until it underwent some improvement between 2005 and 2008. 
However, the current thoroughfare system remains based on the roads built by the Chinese 
Army between the early 1960s and the early 1970s which, in turn, followed pre-existing 
caravan routes (Map 4).
There are two main arteries that connect Xishuangbanna to north-western Laos. The first is a 
section of the Kunming-Bangkok highway, one of the transportation routes sponsored by the 
Greater Mekong Sub-region economic plan. Originating in Kunming, the highway links 
Jinghong to Mengla, cross-cutting Luang Namtha in Laos via the Mohan-Boten border 
crossing before reaching the Mekong entrepot of Huayxay and entering Thailand over a newly- 
built bridge. The same highway divides into a secondary road linking Mengla to the most 
important commercial centre in northern Laos, Oudomxai, and continuing southward to 
Luang Phrabang. The second major artery runs from Menglun, intersecting with the Mekong 
port of Guanlei, to Mengpeng, Mengman, and enters Laos via Muang Sing town before 
bifurcating into two roads: one, partly unpaved, leads to the Xiangkok port on the Mekong via 
Muang Long; the other connects Muang Sing to the provincial capital of Luang Namtha. 
Phongsali Province remains linked to China through the narrow road constructed by Chinese 
troops in the 1970s. Apart from these major routes, the inter-village road network is usually 
poor, taking the form of narrow dirt roads in most of northern Laos and making 
communication difficult, especially during the rainy season.
Although many local dwellers still cross the border through mountain paths formed by human 
meanderings across the area throughout the centuries, there are a few officially designated
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border crossing points that currently regulate the flow of people and goods between the two 
countries. Mohan in China and Boten in Laos are the main international gateways via which 
large scale trade and non-border residents flow across the border under a more articulated and, 
in theory, stricter regulatory framework. Local residents cross the border by using special 
border passes or identification papers at secondary crossing points. The main secondary 
crossings are Pangthong-Chahe located between Muang Sing and Mengman, and Man Zhuang- 
Ban Bun Neua linking Shangyong to Phongsali Province. These check-points allow much of 
the petty trade between northern Laos and Mengla, particularly in resources such as rice, com 
and various kinds of processed and manufactured goods. To the west, a smaller amount of 
these goods goes through the small Ban Mom-Mengrun check-point located to the west of 
Muang Sing town, and at Sopla, a tiny crossing exactly where Myanmar, China and Laos meet 
by the Mekong. To the east, small officially opened crossings are located along the border 
between Phongsali and Oudomxai Provinces and the south-eastern territory of Mengla (Map
4).
Like many Southeast Asian borderlands, the China-Laos frontier strip presents considerable 
ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity. This contributes to making the area a ‘persbtent 
frontier5, where dominant national cultures continue to coexist with local ethnic cultural and 
social forms. Yet, the two nation-states that it straddles differently classify and manage the 
ethnic frontier amalgam according to national legitimation needs, though both China and Laos 
define themselves as unitary multinational and multiethnic states.
The Lao government classifies its population into three main groups according to an ethno- 
linguistic and ecological distribution3. The lowland Lao (L. loo Inn) are groups of people that 
live mainly in the lowland wet-rice areas that surround most of the towns and larger villages. 
People belonging to this category include the Lao, the Tai Lue, Tai Neua, Tai Dam, and Shan. 
They speak various versions of the Tai-Kadai family of languages and mostly practice 
Theravada Buddhism (Evans 2000; LeBar et al. 1964:206-223). The midland Lao or Lao of the 
mountain slopes (L. laothemig) category includes groups speaking Mon-Khmer languages. As a 
broad generalisation, most laotheung groups are animists and cultivate dry-rice in hill swiddens
3 As with any rigid state standardisation, the Lao ethnic classification system is quite contentious. For more details, 
see Evans (2000: 23-27) and Stuart-Fox (1986:44-48).
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while maintaining close trading relations with lowland people (Evans 2000; LeBar et al. 
1964:206-223; Walker 1999:20). In north-western Laos the Khmu make up the largest lao theung 
group followed by the Lamet. The Khmu preceded the lao htm in the settlement of the region 
(Walker 1999:20). The third ethnic category, the highland Lao or Lao of the mountain tops (L. 
laosimg), comprises Tibeto-Burman and Miao-Yao speaking groups practicing animism. In the 
north-western strip of Laos, the Akha are the largest highland Lao group, followed by the 
Hmong and small communities of Yao, Lahu and Landen. Overall, the Losung practice shifting 
cultivation on high hills but they have close trading and labour relationships with lowland 
communities. However, as explained below, given that ethnic formation and identification is a 
process, the rigid state-designed ethnic tripartition cannot capture all practices of ethic 
differentiation. Many people belonging to the lao theung and lao sung categories have adopted 
cultural and farming patterns of lowland groups. Moreover, due to various migration waves 
and policies enforced by the Lao government, many midland and highland communities have 
resettled in lowland areas.
The Chinese government formally recognises fifty-six nationalities (Ch. rrinzu) or ethnic 
groups within its territory (Mackerras 2001:251; 2003:1). The Han is the largest group, 
accounting for almost 91.59 per cent of the total national population (Mackerras 2003:135). 
Minority nationalities (Ch. shaoshu rrinzu) constitute the remaining 8.41 per cent and
reside in 60 per cent of China’s territory, mainly in sensitive border regions (Mackerras 
2003:135)4 5. Mengla County is home to thirteen of the 56 ethnic groups included in the national 
ethnic classification (YMXZBWB 1994:74). In line with the broader demographic pattem of 
the Xishuangbanna Prefecture, in Mengla the Han make up the largest population, followed by 
the Dai, the Hani, the Yi and the Yao. Other ethnic groups make up the remainder of the 
population. Eleven of the ethnic groups populating the China-Laos frontier span the border 
(Zhou 2002:132-33)3. Most of the people belonging to the same ethnic group cross the frontier 
on a regular basis through both official and unofficial routes.
4 On China’s ethnic classification and controversial ethnic question, see Gladney (1998), Harrell (1995a, 2001), 
Heberer (1989), Mackerras (1994, 1995), Tapp (2002) and Tapp and Cohn (2003).
5 The ethnic groups that straddle the frontier are the Dai (Tai), the Hani (Akha or Ko), the Haw, the Zhuang 
(Ying or Phu yai), the Miao (Hmong), the Yi (Lolo), the Lahu (Gui or Mossur), the Jing, the Bulang; and the 
Khmu (Zhou 2002:132-133).
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The Frontier as a Middle Ground
How are we to conceptualise the contemporary transformations of the China-Laos frontier in 
relation to globalisation? What does the recent re-opening of borders tell us about governing in 
the region, the interaction between centres and margins, and more broadly, about states in 
relation to society? To respond to these questions I will focus my attention on four main issues 
raised by literature on globalisation: flexible sovereignty, unconstrained cross-border mobility, 
cross-border ethnic re-connectedness, and resistance to the centre of power.
A not so exceptionally “graduated sovereignty”
In modem political governance, sovereignty refers to the state’s supreme authority over a 
territory. This definition still finds use in contemporary international relations scholarship that 
characterises sovereignty as an attribute of “territorially defined, fixed and mutually exclusive 
enclaves of legitimate dominion” (Ruggie, quoted in Ong 2006:18). In response to such rigidity, 
Ong puts forward an idea of territorial flexibility applied to Asian countries that she terms 
“graduated sovereignty” to refer to a process whereby the state creates special zones within its 
territory that “are subjected to different kinds of govemmentality and that vary in terms of the 
mix of disciplinary and civilising regimes” (Ong 1999:6-7). In China, she maintains, sovereignty 
has become “variegated” since the establishment of special economic and administrative areas6 
as part of Deng Xiaoping’s post-1979 Reform and Open Door policies (Ong 2004:70). Ong 
envisions these special areas as zones of economic and administrative “exception” that enjoy a 
degree of autonomy higher than that allowed in the rest of the country whose administration 
continues to be under normalised socialist rule. Ong’s application of the concept of exception 
finds explanation in the neoliberal rationale of what she terms the post-developmental state 
(Ong 2006). In so doing, she twists the conventional notion of exception as a suspension of 
the rule of law that the state invokes in extreme circumstances of political crises (Agamben 
2000, 2003; Schmitt 1985). Rather, she thinks of China as strategically suspending the rule of 
law to attract foreign capital and resources into selected areas of the country.
6 These include the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) created in the late 1970s in the border coastal regions 
(Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen, and Hainan island); the Open Coastal Qties (Dalian, Shanghai, Wenzhou, 
Guangzhou, Beihai, and others) and ‘open coastal belts’ established in the 1990s; the Special Administrative 
Regions (SAR) created in the mid-1990s under the ‘one country, two systems’ policy for re-absorption of the ex 
colonies of Hong Kong and Macao (Ong 2004:77-78).
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Ong’s rationalisation of territorial flexibility as being linked with neo-liberal practices of the 
post-Mao market-oriented economic modernisation does not take into account that territorial 
exception is embedded in the history of China’s Communist rule, as well as in pre-modem 
power relations between centres and margins. In the history of the PRC, the genealogy of 
exceptional economic and governmental rule can be traced back to a recurrent pattem of 
“decentralised experimentation” undertaken by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since the 
revolutionary period in the 1930s with the land reform and the creation of “model for 
emulation” areas for mass mobilisation after the founding of the PRC (Heilmann 2008). 
Conceptualised by the formula “proceeding from point to surface” (Ch. lid youdian
daomian), this mode of governance refers to a process whereby local officials are encouraged 
to experiment with new policies and then “feed the local experiences back into national policy 
formulation” (Heilmann 2008:1-2). When efficacious, local experiments are subsequently 
integrated into national-level policies after further revision. Therefore, local initiatives remain 
subject to the scrutiny of higher-level policy-makers. The result is a model of governance that 
Heilmann (2008:29) describes as “experimentation under hierarchy”, that is, a “volatile yet 
productive combination of decentralised experimentation with ad hoc central interference.” It 
is a form of centralised decentralisation.
Territorial exception formalised in terms of autonomy has also been a ‘normal’ feature of 
governance attributed to various peripheral regions of the PRC inhabited by minority 
nationalities in the constitution. For instance, since it was founded in 1950 under Communist 
Party rule, the Dai Xishuangbanna Prefecture has administratively enjoyed an autonomous 
status. Autonomy of the prefecture concerns ethnic, economic, educational and agricultural 
affairs. Responding to the “experimentation under hierarchy” pattem adopted by the Chinese 
state, policies formulated at the prefectural level are ultimately subject to the Yunnan 
provincial government’s endorsement and, in turn, to the central administration in Beijing7.
7 Xishuangbanna is subdivided into three counties: Jinghong (named after the capital of the prefecture), Menghai, 
and Mengla. Each county is further administratively divided into townships (Ch. zhen and Ch. % xiang larger 
and smaller in size respectively). Territorially, the majority of the townships of Xishuangbanna roughly 
correspond to pre-PRC rmang areas or to settlements formed during the Commune period in the 1960s. Under 
the township jurisdiction are the villages (Ch. FflÜ cunzhai), which constitute the smallest administrative units. 
Independent from the standard bureaucratic hierarchy are the various settlements of the State Farm that are
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It is through the lens of the long-deployed model of centralised decentralisation that I see the 
contemporary governing of the China-Laos frontier. Certainly, as Ong maintains for the 
Special Economic Zones, China’s south-western border regions have, since the early 1990s, 
been given an exceptional status in the national development agenda. South-western 
administrations have received from the central government more autonomy in implementing 
regulations and policies to control the development of the borderlands (Kuah 2000:75; Xu and 
Tang 1989). The rationale for this was to encourage the import of natural resources from 
neighbouring countries and export Chinese capital and services beyond the borders. In 1992, 
along the Yunnan and Guanxi border, fifty-six border towns were opened to trading (Kuah 
2000:75). Following a new Yunnan government’s policy, in 2000, Mohan was chosen as one of 
the three “special international economic regions” of the province to officially mark the 
provincial and prefectural government’s opening up to the outside world and becoming part of 
the GMS economic cooperation (MBM 2008). Yet, such developments should not be 
translated as an unbundling of state sovereignty simply responding to broader global economic 
thrusts. Rather, this graduation in sovereignty should be inscribed within the above-mentioned 
pattem of centralised decentralisation. Furthermore, variegated sovereignty is an ongoing 
pattem of governance in this frontier region where central power has been since the pre­
nation-state period subject to local reworking. The relationship of power between centre and 
periphery opens up a whole field of responses, reactions and possible inventions by various 
actors. Autonomy granted by the centre often allows bureaucrats at lower levels to manipulate 
power. These state agents negotiate domestic and cross-border regulations not only with 
higher-level agencies but also with local residents.
Similarly, in Laos, various attempts to strengthen the power of the national administration over 
the periphery are constantly subject to negotiation by provincial and district bureaucrats. 
Although they are the primary focus of central government rule in the provinces, Provincial 
Governors and various Provincial Departments are key regulatory bodies in the management 
of the country’s northern periphery. This derives not only from a high degree of autonomy 
granted from the central government in Vientiane to the provinces through the principle of 
“democratic centralisation” (DPPDRPLLA 2003), but also from divided loyalties that e me rye
directly administered by the Yunnan provincial government. On the other hand, counties, although enjoying some 
degree of autonomy, are under the direct control of the Prefectural government.
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from the simultaneous interaction of local bureaucrats with the Provincial Governors, 
Ministries in Vientiane, the Army, and local residents.
Yet, “graduated sovereignty” does not translate into obliteration of central authority on the 
periphery. Since the rubber boom in Luang Namtha Province in the early 2000s, the Lao Army 
has started to establish rubber plantations along the border with China to prevent a possible 
territorial encroachment by the neighbouring giant. This was a demonstration that a clear 
boundary definition was still a paramount issue in the relations between the two countries even 
after the border was ‘re-opened’. In fact, political decentralisation has not translated into 
eradication of authoritarianism on the periphery. Rather, decentralisation in both China and 
Laos is often inscribed within an experimental framework of governing that remains subject to 
the endorsement of the centres. Whenever experimentation of frontier state agents and 
residents is considered detrimental to national interests, such policies are frozen by central 
authoritarianism. A clear example of the centre’s application of authority on peripheral 
experimentation was the building of Boten Golden City. When Chinese investors’ 
experimentation threatened the hold of power for the Lao state, the Lao authorities froze the 
investment plan.
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Regulated cross-border flows
Centralised decentralisation explains also why in this frontier region the re-opening of borders 
has not resulted in a reduction of regulation or amplification of liberalisation as maintained by 
many globalisation theorists. On the contrary, I accept Walker ’s view (1999) that the re­
opening of borders for states’ participation in regional economic blocs such as the GMS and 
ASEAN has paradoxically fostered an increased regulation of flows of people and goods 
across the border. Comparing the 1960s-1990s period to the 2000s, we can see that human and 
goods cross-border mobility in the China-Laos frontier has increased. Yet, it has remained 
subject to state scrutiny. In fact, if we accept that life is at the basis of today’s politics 
(Agamben 2000, 2003; Foucault 1979), it is inconceivable that people are allowed to move free 
from the state’s reins. Human movement continues to occur within structures of power, 
whether these structures be those of the state centre, local state agents, or society at large.
The picture of the frontier that I put forward is neither that of a liberalised and deregulated 
zone undermining centralised state power, nor that of a space delimited by an artificially- 
constructed line completely obstructing people’s movement along and across it. Rather, it is a 
space where the border becomes a dimension ‘enabling’ social and economic experimentation 
within the constraining forces of the state regulatory system (Walker 1999). The Chinese and 
Lao centres allow ad hoc niches of capital, human and resources mobility across the border to 
guarantee national economic growth and speed up the process of national modernisation, 
while maintaining their rein of power upon their peripheries. Within these niches of mobility, 
border dwellers and state officials opportunistically manoeuvre the paradoxical interplay of 
liberalisation and regulation. They strategically embrace liberal policies and appeal to or subvert 
regulations whenever it suits their interests. Therefore, I see the governing of the frontier as an 
interactive and fluid process between various agents rather than as an imparting of authority 
along a unilateral trajectory from the centre out to the periphery.
Ethnicity as a process
The idea of interactive process should also be applied to analyse the relationship between 
ethnicity and states in the frontier context. Scholars of Southeast Asian frontiers often criticise 
the artificiality of modem borders created by colonialism (Leach 1960). The creation of
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modem international borders is often blamed for marginalisation of ethnic groups living in 
peripheral areas of nation-states (Horstmann and Wadley 2006).
Many scholars denounce the way ethnic groups from the margins have been “othered” as 
tribal, backward, and uncultivated and therefore regarded as in need of civilisation from the 
nation-states into which they have been incorporated. For instance, the Chinese state’s relation 
with some of the 55 officially recognised minority groups living in the border regions has been 
depicted as an uneven one, conceptualised into a set of dichotomies (civilised/uncivilised; 
developed/backward; educated/uneducated) by which the peripheral people are ‘minoritised’ 
to the advantage of the Han majority group (Gladney 1994; Harrell 1995b; Schein 1997). One 
view suggests a “monolithic sinicisation model”, whereby the expansive power of the centre 
progressively acculturates and assimilates the ethnic groups at the margins, and transforms 
them into state subjects by dispensing the Flan majority’s world of values. Such a top-down 
perspective, synthesised by Stevan Harrell (1995b) as a “civilizing project”, envisages the Han 
centre and the ethnic periphery as two opposed and disjunct poles. State power is unilaterally 
projected from the centre outwards to disenfranchised peripheral objects that almost 
ineluctably receive the homogenising central “civilising” rhetoric. From this perspective, ethnic 
groups are considered as passive subjects acting in the background of the dominant cultural 
scene, instead of being seen as vital participants on the stage.
Inspired by Crossley, Siu and Sutton’s influential work Empire at the Margins. Culture, Ethnicity 
and Frontier in Early Modem China (2006), my thesis instead presents a picture of dynamic 
interaction between ethnic margins and state. I suggest that centre and periphery stand in 
dialectical relation with each other. The centre is not an irresistible and expansive force 
(Crossley et al. 2006:6). Rather, the periphery absorbs the rules from the centre as much as the 
ruling agents from the centre appropriate cultural patterns from people at the margins. I argue 
that the homogenising and objectifying narrative of the centre which aims to forge fixed 
identities is counterbalanced by complex and diversified forms of identity grounded in the 
social and cultural practices of local agents (Crossley et al. 2006). Various frontier agents 
strategically embrace different identities to assert themselves in diverse contexts and gain 
economic and social benefits. By emphasising local agency, I put forward a constructivist and 
dynamic view of ethnicity. Embracing Barth’s seminal theory (1969), I interpret ethnicity “not
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as an objective, static, primordial condition, but as a subjective process” (Crossley et al. 
2006:34, emphasis in the original) characterized by fluidity and variability. I dismantle the 
notion of ethnicity as the result of a sense of oppression felt by those at the periphery in 
reaction to the “civilising” power of the centre. Instead, I regard ethnicity as “the social 
organization and political assertion of difference” (Crossley et al. 2006:34) which is 
contextually variable and contingent.
Such an approach enables me to dismantle a second commonly held tenet that envisions cross- 
border ethnic re-connectedness spurred by globalisation as a form of resistance to central 
homogenising practices. What the proponents of this view argue is that transnational practices 
of marginalised and oppressed groups spanning national borders stand in opposition to the 
bounding power and hegemonic cultural agendas of nation-states. The ‘transnational’ is 
therefore seen as the antithesis of the ‘national’. On the contrary, I suggest that the 
transnational cross-border field may coexist with and, at times, even encompass the national 
domain rather than simply by-pass it. As a subtext, ethnicity may at times coincide with the 
political and cultural agendas of the nation states that it is commonly assumed to simply 
circumvent.
The Intersection of resistance and consensus
The processual approach to power dynamics between centre and periphery explains the 
intersections of resistance and consensus in governing the frontier. Anthropological literature 
is replete with references to international borders as places of transgression, anomie, 
abnormality and resistance. In fact, the basis of the border being an appealing topic of 
investigation seems to be the illegal activities associated with it. We are all familiar with the 
stereotypical descriptions of the Golden Triangle region (where Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and 
China meet) as a locus of perdition, anarchy, prostitution, sexual freedom, HIV transmission, 
and drug smuggling (Lyttleton 2004; Porter 1997). Ethnographic accounts of the border 
usually contain stories of undocumented migrants, smugglers (French 2002), drug dealers and 
refugees who are either resisting or succumbing to state authority, and through that depiction 
these accounts convey an idea of frontiers as dominated by tension, strife, and struggle. 
Alvarez (1995:448) sees the “’borderlands’ as a region and set of practices defined and 
determined by [the] border that are characterized by conflict and contradiction, material and
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ideational.” The picture of transgression, resistance and anomies has two limitations: first, it 
enforces an idea of state power as separated from local power webs at the margins (Walker 
1999); second, it prevents us from seeing the less criminal aspects of everyday life at the border.
In contrast, my thesis explores how various people manipulate state authority to their own 
advantage (French 2002; Sturgeon 2004, 2005) often in collaboration with state agents. This 
collaboration does not imply harmonious coexistence. It can lead to conflict and contestation. 
I try to capture strategically-devised modes of compliance, resistance, illegality, legality, 
regulation and bribery. Violence and resistance frequently erupt in a situation in which power 
over people, land, or other resources is at stake. And resistance and violence often see 
individuals from disadvantaged social positions or less politically influential ethnic groups as 
protagonists. This thesis presents the frontier not as a site of mere consensus from or direct 
challenge to central authority, but rather, as a field where these two opposite manifestations of 
power intersect, overlap and at times collide according to class, ethnicity and citizenship 
differentials.
Methodology
My research falls within the “literalist” stream of border studies. This approach treats borders 
as “distinctive kinds of territorial places” (Cunningham and Heyman 2004:290; Vila 2000) as 
opposed to the postmodern “a-literalist” perspective that focuses on borders in a metonymic 
or metaphorical sense to question the modemist notions of bounded cultures, time, space, 
place and identity (Alvarez 1994). Rather than focusing on the various kinds of borders that 
pervade all aspects of social life (Rosaldo 1989; Rouse 1991), I have restricted my research to 
the frontier as a specific site found near and around the international border of Chin and Laos 
to investigate the actual socio-cultural and economic dynamics at the margins of two these two 
nation-states (Cunningham and Heyman 2004:290).
To investigate borders anthropologically, I began by using myself as an instrument of knowing 
another life world (Ortner 1995:173). I entered the China-Laos frontier world with my “whole 
self physically and in every other way” (Ortner 1995:173) for a total of sixteen months. My 
fieldwork was conducted over the course of three visits: the first from December 2004 to 
January 2006, the second between January and February 2007 and the third between January
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and March 2008. To gain closer contact with the cross-border life world, I organised my 
research on both sides of the international border. In 2005, visa restrictions in Laos forced me 
to spend most of my time on the Chinese side of the border from where I took a few one- 
month research trips to Laos. However, my affiliation with GTZ on the subsequent trips 
allowed a more stable and officially recognised stay in Laos.
While in China, I resided in Mengman, the administrative seat of one of the townships under 
the administration of Mengla county, in southern Xishuangbanna (Map 5). Mengman town is 
located 13 kilometres from the Chahe-border crossing, 52 kilometres from the county capital, 
and about a 150 kilometres from the Xishuangbanna Prefecture’s capital Jinghong. Inhabited 
by about two thousand people, Mengman is, after Mengpeng, the most important commercial 
and trading town on the eastern end of the Laos-China frontier. Sprawling along the road to 
Laos, Mengman town comprises two adjoining villages, namely Shang Jinglong and Xia 
Jinglong, whose development has merged with government buildings and newly-built shops, 
hotels, bars and restaurants (Map 5).
People officially classified as ethnic Dai (Ch. datzu) make up the majority of Shang
Jinglong and Xia Jinglong villagers. Like most of the Tai speaking people of Xishuangbanna 
labelled as Dai by the Chinese government, the Dai of Mengman call themselves ‘Tai Lue’, an 
ethnonym that they share with the dominant Tai speaking population of the twin border town, 
Muang Sing, in Laos. Although Mengman Township as a whole is quite multiethnic, Han 
Chinese (Ch. '/X M hanzu) make up the second largest group populating the township 
administrative centre. Apart from those working in the government administration, Han 
Chinese dominate retail trade by operating more than fifty shops that specialise in merchandise 
of various sorts. Many Han residents are also involved in rubber planting, other types of 
business or work as labourers for local shops, traders or farmers. One portion of the 
Mengman Han population are permanent residents, many of whom are descendants of 
migrants from Hunan, Sichuan and Yunnan to the Xishuangbanna state farms founded in the 
1960s; another portion are temporary residents from various regions of China, mainly Hunan, 
Sichuan, Yunnan, and Zhejiang. Most of the Dai population of Mengman town engages in rice 
farming and rubber planting, which they integrate with the cultivation of other cash crops. 
Apart from a small number of entrepreneurs involved in regular cross-border trade with Laos,
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an increasing number of ethnic Dai have been engaged in occasional business exchanges with 
Lao people since official re-opening of the border.
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Map 5. Xishuangbanna Prefecture, including the town of Mengman in the south of Mengla county. 
Insert shows location of Mengman’ adjoining villages, Shang Jinglong and Xia Jinglong
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Figure 9. The Tai style roofs of Shang Jinglong 
and Xia Jinglong villages in Mengman
Figure 10. Main street of the Mengman township centre
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Figure 11. Tai style houses in Xia Jinglong
Figure 12. Chinese shops decorated for the New Year
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Mengman is not only a magnet of commercial and entertainment attraction for Lao people 
living in the vicinity of the border but also for residents of villages and state farm settlements 
dotting the township territory. The township comprises thirty villages and sixteen settlements 
of the Mengman State Farm. The villages are classified by the government according to the 
dominant ethnic group residing in them. On this basis, there are seven ethnic Hani villages 
(whose residents are indigenous Akha), four Hani villages (whose inhabitants are migrants 
from Mojiang), thirteen Dai (eleven Dai Lue and two Dai Neua), three Yao villages, and two 
Khmu villages and one settlement with mixed Han and Hani population. Various settlements 
of the Mengman State Farm are scattered between the township villages. The population of 
these settlements is predominantly ethnic Han with a minority of residents belonging to 
various sub-groups of Hani who have come from different parts of Yunnan. This ethnic 
diversity and the strong presence of Han Chinese made Mengman the best lens through which 
I could explore inter-ethnic dynamics and the relationship between ethnicity and Chinese 
central power.
Defined by the local cadres as the first Westerner and foreigner (Ch. locum) t as I was 
often addressed, that had ever resided in Mengman township for an extended period of time, I 
could only break the barrier of diffidence and suspicion frequently erected by residents and 
government officials in rural areas of socialist China by becoming part of a local family. 
Consistent with the anthropological tradition, I was ‘adopted’ by an extended Dai ethnic family. 
It was only thanks to this family’s support that I could expand my social networks within the 
town, outward in the township villages and settlements, and in the neighbouring townships of 
Mengpeng and Mengrun (Map 5). Through three members of the family who engaged in trade 
with Laos, I was first introduced to cross-border movements, business and social interactions.
Following the social trajectory woven by my family, I established connections with residents of 
Muang Sing, the closest economic and political centre to Mengman on the Lao side of the 
border (Map 6). Located 12 kilometres from the Pangthong border crossing, Muang Sing is the 
capital of one of the five districts (T. muang) under the administration of Luang Namtha
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Map 6. Luang Namtha Province. Insert shows detail of Muang Sing’s four villages 
of Ban Xiang Lae, Ban XiangYeun, Ban Xiang In and Ban Xiang Jai
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Province8. Muang Sing used to be a vibrant trading entrepot of the Upper Mekong up until the 
end of the French colonial regime in Indochina. After maintaining a marginal economic role 
during the nation-building processes in both Laos and China, since the early 2000s, the town 
has been regaining the status of a vibrant business hub in north-western Laos. Made-up of 
four villages, namely Ban Xiang Lae, Ban Xiang Yeun, Ban Xiang In, and Ban Xiang Jai, 
Muang Sing town has also become an important destination for international tourism (Map 6). 
Muang Sing District has a population of about 29,000 people (Lyttleton 2006:212) and is 
characterised by a striking ethnic diversity. While the Akha make up almost 47% of local 
residents (Grabowsky 2008:234), the Tai Lue, although a numeric minority, have historically 
been the economically and politically dominant ethnic group in the district. Other groups 
inhabiting the district are the Tai Neua, Tai Dam, Tai Daeng, Khmu, Akha, Yao, Hmong, 
Phunoi, and Haw9. An increasingly high number of Han Chinese have, over the last few years 
also migrated to Muang Sing, enticed by new economic opportunities in rubber planting and 
other types of business. The strong Han Chinese presence along with on-going cross-border 
links between local residents and their ethnic fellows in China made Muang Sing the ideal 
outpost for me to investigate the economic and social fabric of the frontier. Furthermore, the 
town acted as a base from where I expanded my research outwards to surrounding villages, the 
provincial capital, and the neighbouring districts of Nalae10 and Muang Long* 11 (Map 6).
8 Apart from Muang Sing, the other districts making up Luang Namtha Province are: Namtha, Viang Phukha, 
Nalae, and Muang Long.
9 The Tai Lue constitute 32.51% of the Muang Sing District population, while the Tai Neua make up 7.44%, the 
Yao 3.25%, the Tai Dam 1.04%, the Hmong 9.00%, and the Phunoi, the Haw and Khmu constitute the 
remainder of the population (Grabowsky 2008:234).
10 Nalae District borders Viang Phukha District to the west, Oudomxai Province to the south-east, and Namtha 
District to the north. Mon-Khmer people make up 83% of Nalae’s total population while Lao Tai speaking 
people make up the remaining 17%. The district totals sixteen ethnic groups, the largest being the Khmu (64%) 
and Lue (19.5%). Only 4% of the population is Lao Tai, while the smallest groups are the Yang and the Bit 
(Daviau 2006:25).
11 Muang Long borders Muang Sing District to the south-west and neighbours Myanmar across the Mekong. Like 
Muang Sing, Muang Long is inhabited by people of various ethnicities, namely, Tai Lue, Lanten, Hmong, Kui, 
Doi, Akha, Muser, Yao, Tai Khao, Tai Deeng, and Tai Dam. The Akha account for 58% of Long’s 23,594 
residents (Lyttleton et al. 2004:16).
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Figure 13. Muang Sing town
Figure 14. Street of Muang Sing 
with the Museum of Ethnology in the background
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My research combined both a rooted and en route (Clifford 1997) mode of field investigation 
which allowed me to balance the tensions between ‘normality and ‘transgression’ often 
attributed to border areas, and to appreciate the intersection of mobility and stillness of border 
life. The more static forms of investigation included participating in frontier residents’ activities, 
from domestic routines, to those related to farming, market interactions, business transactions, 
weddings, banquets, rituals and religious festivals. These occasions provided the considerable 
insight into the frontier life world. They also helped me to understand trade and business 
networks; interact with investors and government officials, land owners and land losers; and 
leam about locals’ hopes and disillusions, and their contentment and disapproval with the 
rapid transformations occurring in the frontier. Informal conversations in these settings turned 
out to be the best way to collect perceptions of government policies and how these impacted 
on the lives of frontier residents. Selecting villages according to ethnic make-up and taking into 
account social and economic differentiation, I conducted household surveys touching upon 
topics related to livelihood strategies in the past and the present. Furthermore, I collected 
household genealogies and looked at how cross-border kin networks were formed and 
maintained, as well as what motivated contemporary cross-border interactions in comparison 
with the past. I also investigated cross-border marriage practices, inter-ethnic ally and intra- 
ethnically.
‘Static’ field methods also entailed documenting how people not involved in cross-border 
movement were in receipt of cultural influences from across the border. One way to examine 
this was through the range of products sold in the markets, where such products were 
produced, and how they were consumed. Furthermore, I explored the border on a cognitive 
level. I investigated how border space was conceptualised, both in the past and today, in oral 
and written histories, narratives, personal memories, and religious imagination. I asked people 
to draw maps to leam about their notions of geography and space. I further examined how the 
border and the frontier were ‘talked about’ in local dialects.
My en route field research involved travelling to villages and locales around Mengman and 
Muang Sing, but also crossing borders, and visiting towns along the frontier region. I 
accompanied locals to pay visits to friends and relatives throughout the region, and travelled to 
attend festivals and rituals with them. I followed traders on short and long distance trips to
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observe not only their interactions with business partners but also with government officials. 
These journeys provided grounded insight into the effects of import-export policies and 
people’s identification regulations otherwise kept obscure by official government rhetoric. 
However, like my travelling companions, my own mobility was constantly subject to 
surveillance and restrictions. As a non-border resident and foreigner, I was prevented from 
crossing the border at check-points other than those at the Mohan and Boten, turning what 
could have been twenty-minute motorcycle rides between Mengman and Muang Sing via the 
Chahe-Pangthong crossing point into twenty-four hour journeys across the bumpy landscape 
of Mengla and Luang Namtha. It was during these trips that I personally experienced the 
ongoing significance of borders and their constraining effect on mobility. However, like border 
dwellers, I learned that central power in socialist countries could also be negotiated, not only 
feared. Through local connections, I at times succeeded in crossing borders at unofficial or 
unauthorised points. Only by means of compromise or social ‘infiltration’, not open resistance 
or dissent, could I approach officials at various levels of government, army soldiers, police and 
customs agents, and discuss with them policies, regulations, and development interventions.
Similarly, negotiating allowed me to conduct library research and collect written sources in 
China and Laos’ centres of power, respectively Yunnan’s provincial capital, Kunming in China, 
and Vientiane in Laos. In Kunming, I collected material at the Yunnan Provincial Library and 
at the Library of the Yunnan University. In these institutions, my ambition to bring into 
dialogue the frontier’s local historical memories collected in the field with official gazetteers, 
records, and historical sources from the pre-PRC period was often tempered by censorship 
and prohibitions that the socialist regime imposes on foreigners, as well as on their own 
citizens. I was denied access to so-called ‘sensitive’ or ‘undisclosed’ material and sources that 
contained straightforward information on the border region. These restrictions demonstrated 
that in the centre of power, the borderland remains constructed as chaotic and unruly, the 
human activities taking place there as threatening to state sovereignty, and therefore 
compromising the national image of China to the outside world. Social connections (Ch. 
guamci) with academics and friends were invaluable to overcoming these prohibitions, which, 
even if not providing me access to library sources were, nevertheless, always successful in 
guaranteeing my personal safety. Sensed., the Lao counterpart of guana, had the same effect in 
supporting my research of written sources in Vientiane.
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Figure 15. The author’s ‘adoptive’ extended family in Mengman
Introduction
Figure 16. A cross-cultural dialogue: the author celebrates Christmas 
in Mengman with Thaoying Sili, Mae Nan Seu and Phoh Tsang Nan Seu
Figure 17. The author with her research assistant 
and younger sister, Yi Keng Kai, in Mengman
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The Chapters and their Themes
In Chapter Two of this thesis I provide a historical account of governing along the China-Laos 
frontier. I analyse types of sovereignty, the nature of borders and the regulation of the mobility 
of subjects and objects across borders during the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial 
periods. I locate the main changes in governing not in projects of colonial mapping, as the 
standard view of borders in Mainland Southeast Asia maintains, but in post-colonial processes. 
At the same time, I highlight the continuity in the ways in which ‘graduated sovereignty5 has 
been instituted by the major political entities in the Upper Mekong region throughout history.
I argue that contemporary governing is the perpetuation of an old-age pattem of ‘centralised 
decentralisation’.
Chapter Three examines Chinese-driven rubber investments in Laos’ Luang Namtha Province 
to explore the effects of cross-border capital flows on sovereignty and political rule in the mid- 
2000s. Some advocates of globalisation have argued that accommodating to the global market 
has caused Asian authoritarian states to partially shift some components of their sovereignty to 
foreign investors (Sassen 1996). On the contrary, this chapter reveals that on the China-Laos 
frontier, transnational capital flow remains congested by national, institutional and cultural 
boundaries. The result is sovereignty and power status quo of the Lao state.
Chapter Four expands further the ethnographic focus on rubber planting to debunk the myth 
of the resistance of peripheral upland ethnic groups to state central structures in the Upper 
Mekong. I argue that the cross-border socio-economic rubber practices of ethnic Akha 
villagers in the Lao borderlands produce centres of Addia ‘potency5 which are not severed from, 
but strategically imbricate, the Lao and Chinese centres of power. These upland zones of 
potency are neither the effect of zomia (Scott 2009; van Schendel 2002), a mechanism of state- 
repulsion by unruly populations, nor a product of the decline of the nation-state under the 
pressure of globalisation. Rather, they are an expression of the overlapping of pre-modem 
patterns of governing and an ongoing, incomplete process of modem state formation.
Chapter Five critically addresses the topic of cross-border ethnic re-connectedness in the 
global age of the 2000s. It focuses on a group of educated Tai Lue youth living at the periphery
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of China along the border with Laos. Spanning the borders of five nation-states in Mainland 
Southeast Asia, the Tai Lue have been regarded in anthropological literature as a paradigmatic 
ethnic group having a strong sense of belonging to a transnational community that conflicts 
with national cultural and social policies. By contrast, this chapter demonstrates that the 
contemporary Chinese state’s projects of national integration and economic development 
intersect with young Tais’ individual aspirations for prosperity, education and social mobility. 
Paradoxically, China’s increased participation in the global economy forges a stronger sense of 
belonging to the Chinese national community than to a transnational ethnic community.
Chapter Six is dedicated to the mobility of people and goods across the border. I describe the 
temporary, economically profitable mobility of a group of Tai Lue traders from China as 
reliant on two intertwined processes: the state’s experimental regulatory flexibility of trade and 
citizenship, and the traders’ ability to devise what I call ‘tree-zomed’ strategies. Between 2005 
and mid 2006, these Tai traders tried to develop transnational trade with multiple social and 
ethnic links across the border. Yet, in late 2006 state authoritarianism re-emerged, withdrawing 
experimental policies. I conclude that in the contemporary era, transnational mobility of 
subjects and objects across the border is still conditional on an unpredictable state mechanism 
of binding and unbinding, re-binding and re-unbinding.
The conclusion brings together all the main themes of the thesis under the framework ‘roses 
and rifles’. This phrase encapsulates the contemporary experimentation under hierarchy 
governing model applied on the frontier by both the Lao and the Chinese states. It reflects on 
how experimentation of and on peripheral subjects flourishes under the scrutiny of the central 
states. When the metaphoric roses of non-state powers bloom too wildly, they are soon 
clipped back by the symbolic and actual ‘rifles’ of authoritarian states.
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Chapter Two
T h e  F r o n t ie r  i n  H ist o r y
Figure 18. The daughter of the last Tsao Muang Mang, Mae Nan Seu, 
and her husband, Phoh Tsang Nan Seu
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T h e  NATURE OF POLITICAL BORDERS in south-western China and mainland
Southeast Asia has been a topic of animated scholarly debate for a long time. Theorisation 
of borders in this region has swung between two main positions, one that I term the 
‘fragmentation paradigm’ and another, put forward by Walker (1999), that I call the 
“continuity view”. The proponents of the “fragmentation paradigm” argue that the 
peculiarity of pre-colonial polities was undefined and ambiguous boundaries between 
territories. The clear-cut demarcation imposed by colonial powers, these proponents 
maintain, disrupted such fluidity, destabilising indigenous notions of space and statehood. 
Walker (1999) questions this commonly accepted view by putting forward two 
counterarguments: first, pre-colonial borders were not fluid but clearly demarcated lines 
between polities and empires; second, colonial mapping did not produce a de facto 
interruption of the pre-existing borderlands’ commercial and social life.
The pioneer of the fragmentation view was Edmund Leach, who drew on Lattimore’s 
(1951) framework of the “frontier^’ to analyse supra-nation-states’ ecological, socio-cultural 
and economic systems included within a distinctive geographic area of Asia. In his seminal 
article “The Frontiers of ‘Burma’” Leach (1960) contrasted the Burmese indigenous views 
of frontiers with the artificial borders imposed by colonial powers in the 19th century. He 
pointed out that, in the context of Burma, the frontiers that separated pre-modem political 
units were “not clearly defined lines but zones of mutual interest”. Pre-colonial petty 
political entities of mainland Southeast Asia “were not separated from one another by 
frontiers in the modem sense and they were not sovereign Nation-States” inhabited by 
distinct populations but were “interpenetrating political systems” (Leach 1960:50). 
Following the path opened by Leach, other authors have formulated their accounts of 
borders in the upper-Mekong region according to a pre-modem and modem distinction 
(Condominas 1980; Keyes 1992; Reynolds 1991; Stuart-Fox 1997; Tambiah 1976, 1977). 
Advocates of globalisation in the region of Southeast Asia have drawn on this historical 
fracture from pre-modernity to modernity to argue that globalisation has renewed pre­
modem border fluidity (Davis 2003; Horstmann and Wadley 2006). We have entered, they 
argue, a period of post-modernity characterised by more porous borders and weakened 
state power.
Thongchai Winichakul (1994) took Leach’s argument further by adopting a Foucauldian 
approach in SiamMappecb a History c f the Geobody of a Nation Thongchai maintains that the
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“geo-body” of Siam, that is today’s territory of Thailand with clearly demarcated borders, is 
the result of a modem science of space—geography—and its “technology of mapping” 
linked to the Western concept of nation-state. The modem discourse of state space clashes 
with traditional spatial conceptualisations, which were rooted in Thai-Buddhist cosmology 
and in the “indigenous knowledge of local geography” (Thongchai 1994:78). More 
precisely, the artificiality of today’s sharp and clear-cut boundaries replaced the “natural 
corridor borders)” characterising the territory of the rmang, the core political entity of the 
Tai states. Thongchai’s main thesis is that the new spatial knowledge and technology of 
mapping introduced by colonialism have been essential to the construction of the Thai 
nation and instrumental in justifying the existence of the Thai “imagined community” 
(Anderson 1991).
By oversimplifying the rupture between the pre-modem era and the colonial penod, this 
position underestimates the transformations in ideas about borders and sovereignty and the 
regulation of populations and goods in the region that took place in later periods.
Arguing against the mainstream view of borders, Walker (1999:62) refutes Thongchai’s 
theory that “the nineteenth century borderlands were characterised by a territorial 
nonchalance, most clearly expressed in the absence of clearly defined boundaries”. Rather, 
Walker (1999:63) maintains, pre-colonial “ambiguity or fluidity in the borderlands arouse 
out of dispute and conquests, not out of nonchalance”. Through an excursus of trade 
dynamics in the Upper-Mekong in the 19th century, Walker (1999:62) points out that 
“disputes about boundary delineation and enforcement preceded the colonial map­
making”. The neat border demarcation by colonial powers was, in Walker’s view (2008), an 
exercise of authority that remained circumscribed to the map. Where Thongchai with his 
emphasis on mapping sees complete rupture between the pre-colonial and colonial spatial 
organisation, Walker insists on historical border continuity articulated along an ongoing 
regime of regulation. He concludes that the 1990s Economic Quadrangle between China, 
Laos, Thailand and Burma is the “latest in a series of regimes of Upper Mekong 
regulations” (Walker 1999:5). Continuity is therefore extended to the contemporary 
political and socio-economic developments of the Upper-Mekong borderlands.
I use the notion of “persistent frontief’ (Gaubatz 1996), to situate myself between the 
fragmentation and continuity positions. Partly following Walker’s view, “persistent 
frontief’ emphasises historical continuity in the way peripheral agents have, over centuries,
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negotiated power with political centres without being thoroughly integrated into the latter.
I maintain that local populations have always participated in maintaining, contesting, and 
negotiating borders. I also stress that human and goods mobility across borders has been 
subject to more or less strict regimes of regulation throughout history (Walker 1999). I 
assume that control over resources and human life is inherent in the exercise of power by 
any political entity. Yet, far from suggesting stasis or timelessness (Giersch 2006:9), 
“persistent frontier” acknowledges diachronic transformations. I recognise that 
contemporary patterns of governing in the Upper Mekong borderlands differ from those 
adopted in the pre-colonial and colonial periods. But I locate these shifts in governing not 
in colonial mapping but in post-colonial processes. I propose that fixed sovereignty and 
clear-cut borders became a reality not after the colonial treaties in the 1890s but only after 
the nationalist movements that led to the formation of the PRC and Laos PDR. Borders 
became effective technologies of cleavage between political entities through the invention 
of citizenship, identity cards and passports, and projects of ethnic classification and 
education brought about by modem nation-states.
The following discussion is divided into three main sections: the pre-colonial, the colonial, 
and the post-colonial period. Each section addresses how sovereignty, borders and mobility 
were managed, noting both change and continuity.
The Pre-Colonial Period: 1800-1890s
The geo-political scenario of the Upper Mekong Region of the 19th century was dotted by 
an array of small political entities or principalities mostly mied by Tai-speaking chiefs 
surrounded by three large entities: the Qing Chinese Empire (1636-1912) to the North, the 
Burmese Kingdom of Ava to the west, and the Siamese Kingdom to the south-west 
(Map.5). Chiefs of minor polities received legitimation by one or more of these mightier 
political entities. In exchange for such recognition, the smaller polities sent tributes to the 
empires annually. Tributes took the form of precious gems, silver flowers, and other less 
valuable yet symbolic items. The tributary system remained the main mode of political 
legitimation between larger states and smaller polities until the border demarcation put 
forward by the colonial powers in the 1890s.
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Map 7.The Tai states of the Upper Mekong in the pre-colonial period (based on Wasan 2005:39)
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The equilibrium among large empires and small polities depended on changing alliances 
and a varying degree of boundaries. Some borders were fluid, others were fixed, and some 
others were contested zones of influence of overlapping powers. Therefore borders 
existed, but they did not function as neat lines marking absolute and indivisible territorial 
sovereignty. They marked sovereignties that were constantly subject to fluctuation. The 
frontier was also a “middle ground”, a zone where native institutions coexisted with the 
bureaucratic apparatuses and sovereignties of larger empires (Giersch 2001, 2006). It was 
an area “where people from diverse backgrounds negotiated commercial, political, and 
social relationships” with agents of overlapping powers, thus creating multiple patterns of 
interaction (Giersch 2006:73).
Among the small polities of the Upper Mekong between the political giants were 
Sipsongpanna, Chiang Khaeng (later Muang Sing), Lanna or the Kingdom of Chiang Mai, 
Nan, and Luang Phrabang (also called Lane Xang), plus a series of polities in the Shan 
States, most importantly Chiang Tung (Kengtung), Muang Mok Mai, Muang Nai and 
Yawngwe (near present-day Taunggyi), and the Kayah (or Karenni or Red Karen) states 
(Grabowsky and Turton 2003:207-16) (Map. 5). All of these political entities shared similar 
ruling systems and ethnic composition, and maintained political relations with each other 
through intermarriages between ruling families and military alliances. It is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation to address in detail the political dynamic of all the polities. Rather, the 
focus of the next section will be Sipsongpanna and Chiang Khaeng, the two principalities 
that in the pre-modem period occupied part of the area corresponding to the present-day 
China-Laos frontier.
The territory of the Sipsongpanna1 polity roughly extended across present-day China’s 
Xishuangbanna Prefecture, parts of current Phongsali Province in north-eastern Laos, and 
a strip of territories in the current Burmese Shan States (Map.5). Interpretations of the 
political status of Sipsongpanna swing between two main positions. Chinese modem 
historiography tends to depict Sipsongpanna as a region that was always fully integrated 
into the Chinese political domain since the Ming dynasty. Instead, critics of China’s 
nationalistic practices have moved in the opposite direction by defining the Tai polity as an
1 The term Sipsongpanna literally means “twelve thousand rice fields” (sipsong= twelve; /wn=thousand; m= rice fields). 
However, pama (=a thousand rice fields) refers to an administrative unit, a region that grouped several vassal princes of 
the king (T. tsao pbacndm} within an administrative framework that aimed at reinforcing the control of the central power 
over the entire territory of the polity (Lemoine 1997:172). The dimension, location and denomination of the partm 
changed over history. For an account of the panm names and location see Forbes (1987b), Li (1955:1-2) and Lemoine 
(1987, 1997).
57
The Frontier in h is to ry
“independent” or “semi-independent kingdom” from the 12lh century up until its 
incorporation into the People’s Republic of China in the 1950s (Hsieh 1989). From an 
analysis of a wide plethora of historical sources, Giersch (2006:13) has come to a different 
conclusion. He proposes that Sipsongpanna was a confederation of small princedoms or 
rmang each governed by an hereditary prince (T. tsao rmang), and all under the nominal 
sovereignty of a higher authority or “king” (T. tsao phaendin) who resided in Tseng Hung 
(present-day Jinghong) (Lemoine 1987, 1997). Sipsongpanna did not have an independent 
status. Rather, it was a political entity under the loose but significant political jurisdiction of 
the Burmese monarchy while paying also nominal allegiance to the Qing Empire and its 
supreme monarch, the Emperor (Giersch 2006:13; Maxwell Flill 1982:327-28). The 
succession to the throne of the tsao phaendin that occurred through patrilineal inheritance 
was normally ratified by the courts of Ava and Beijing. For this recognition, the tsao 
phaendin paid tribute to the two neighbouring giants, a practice that was perpetuated until 
1885 (Giersch 2006:73). The expression “Burma as a mother and China as a father^’, still 
deployed by Tai Lue people in Xishuangbanna nowadays to refer to the pre-modem 
period, confirms this allegiance paid by the small principality to these two larger political 
neighbours. Yet, for geography, religion, politics and trade, Sipsongpanna was more 
oriented toward Burma than China (Giersch 2006:73).
Similarly to other Tai polities in the valleys of mainland Southeast Asia, the political system 
of Sipsongpanna had a feudal character. The tsao phaendin was the highest authority and 
nominally the owner of all land in the kingdom. At a lower level in the political and social 
hierarchy were various layers of the aristocracy. Among them were the various tsao rmang 
who were enfeoffed by the tsao phaendin (Lemoine 1997:180). Each tsao rmang mied over a 
territory or polity (T. rmang) that included a group of villages (T. ban) inhabited by the 
peasantry. The peasantry, in turn, divided into various substrata and constituted the 
subordinate class of the lords. The relationship of the peasantry with the higher levels of 
the political and social structure was based on various forms of slavery and indebted feudal 
bondage which included the payment of taxes and the performance of oorwes2.
In the late Qing, the number of rmang included in Sipsongpanna ranged between twenty- 
odd and thirty (Lemoine 1997:174; Maxwell Hill 1989:327). Although the tsao rmang^rtxt in 
theory subordinated to the king, being obliged to occasionally participate in the kingdom
2 For an accurate discussion on the socio-political system of Sipsongpanna see Lemoine (1997). For an extensive 
description of slavery in the pre-modem Tai state see Turton (2000:10-12).
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administration and contribute tax levied from their subordinates and tribute to the centre 
of power, the tsaophaendin maintained only nominal supremacy over his subordinate chiefs 
(Carey 1899:378; Lemoine 1997; Maxwell Hill 1989:327)3. The tsaomuang enjoyed a wide 
degree of autonomy in the internal affairs of their own dominions.
Contrary to what is assumed by scholars who depict the pre-modem past as a period of 
unchanged peace disrupted only by colonial rivalry and nation-building socialist turmoils 
(Hsieh 1989), Sipsongpanna was a strife-filled and sometimes unstable polity. Until its 
incorporation into the PRC, the history of the principality was marked by military conflict 
with a multitude of enemies within and outside the confederation’s fluid boundaries 
(Giersch 2006:13). At the basis of these conflicts was often disloyalty of the tsaormangto 
the tsao phaendin, or power struggles for succession within the Tseng Hung court. Upheaval 
and violence were also triggered by incursions of neighbouring polities for control over 
resources, territories, and people, such as the advances by the Burmese Army at the end of 
the 18th century against the Qing, known as the great frontier wars of 1765-1769 (Giersch 
2006:100).
The relationship between Sipsongpanna and the Qing Empire was antagonistic and full of 
transformations. It developed through an alternation of tumult, direct confrontation, 
negotiation and compromise which saw both Qing central officials and peripheral 
inhabitants as equally active participants. When the Qing took power in 1636, they 
inherited the Ming dynasty’s administrative system. In the south-western frontier regions of 
the empire this system took the form of indirect rule. Like its predecessors, the Qing 
administration in Yunnan appointed local indigenous leaders as ‘native officials’ (Ch. i f ]  
tusi) to defend the frontiers, keep peace and collect taxes (Giersch 2006:2; Took 2005). Not 
only was the tsao phaendin one of the native officials, but so were the tsao rrrnng and other 
members of the Tseng Hung court (Maxwell Hill 1989:329). In the early 18th century, the 
Chinese Emperor Yongzheng (1723-1735) promoted the centralisation of Qing supremacy 
over the empire’s periphery by replacing unruly native officials with imperial bureaucrats 
(Giersch 2006). This political change had strong repercussions on the frontier’s society, for 
it involved the intensification of Elan Chinese presence in the south-western periphery 
through the establishment of military and civil colonies (Giersch 2006). The reign of the
3 A detailed account of the Sipsongpanna domestic political system is provided by Hsieh (1989, 1995), Lemoine (1987, 
1997), Maxwell Hill (1989)and in the collection “History and Society of the Dai Nationality” put together in the 1950s 
and 1960s as part of the National Ethnic Classification conducted by the new CGP government (DSLD 1983-1987; YBW 
1983, 1984).
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Qianlong emperor (1736-1795) was characterised by an increasing militarisation of the 
Yunnan south-western frontiers aiming at freezing fluid boundaries (Giersch 2006). At 
times, the centralisation of the margins took the shape of warlike incursions. However, 
these attempts at incorporation were seldom smooth and painless for the Qing centre 
(Crossley et al. 2006). Qing expansionism was often limited by the ambitions of Burma and 
Siam to gain control over the Tai domains in the region (Giersch 2006:98).
Conventional wisdom depicts the last two centuries of Qing dominion in Yunnan as a slow 
and peaceful process of incorporation whereby the margins were assimilated into the centre 
by spreading Chinese bureaucratic practices and by civilising peripheral “barbarian” 
populations through the imparting of Confucian values (Wiens 1952, 1967). This view sees 
the state as a monolithic giant reaching out to the periphery to “sinicise” and assimilate 
most of the alien peoples and cultures encountered (Wiens 1967:xi-xii-332). However, by 
depicting the state as the only historical agent on the frontier, this perspective overlooks 
both the agency of local populations and the new socio-economic processes that were 
sparked by the encounter between the latter and the Chinese migrants (Giersch 2006). 
Recent historical studies on the frontier have revealed that during the process of frontier 
consolidation the Qing were faced with significant losses of troops and, in many cases, with 
the disloyalty of official bureaucrats who would disregard the centre’s dictates to mingle in 
the indigenous social, cultural and political settings (Giersch 2006). Furthermore, as will be 
shown later, Qing imperial officials were more often than not forced to negotiate authority 
and control over resources with local indigenous chiefs. Although throughout this era the 
Qing strategies of incorporation gradually undermined local polities, the indigenous ruling 
system of the tsao muang continued to coexist with the indirect administrative rule of the 
Qing centre until the fall of the Chinese Empire.
Bordering Sipsongpanna to the north, the territory of Chiang Khaeng (later Muang Sing)4 
stretched out on both banks of the Mekong. On the eastern bank, it extended across 
present-day Muang Sing and Muang Long in Laos’ Luang Namtha Province. On the 
western bank of the Mekong it included Chiang Lap and parts of the current Shan States 
(Grabowsky 2008:210). Chiang Khaeng was a “principality under three overlords”, namely 
Chiang Mai and Nan, that were in turn Siam’s tributaries, and Chiang Tung, a tributary of
4 Located initially on the eastern bank of the Mekong, the administrative centre of Chiang Khaeng was transferred to 
Muang Yu on the western bank in 1855. Later on, the capital was moved back to the eastern side of the Mekong in 
present-day Muang Sing.
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Burma. In 1889-90, Chiang Khaeng also became a tributary of Siam (Grabowsky and 
Turton 2003:192). Chiang Khaeng maintained close links with neighbouring Sipsongpanna 
through trade and intermarriages between ruling elites3. Its politically dominant population 
also shared a language (Tai Lue) and culture with the Tseng Hung polity. However, by and 
large, Chiang Khaeng was more under the political sphere of influence of Burma and the 
Shan States than it was of Sipsongpanna and the Qing court (Grabowsky 2008:209). Like 
Sipsongpanna, this small polity was subject to frequent raids from its overlords who 
engaged in wars of supremacy in the region (Giersch 2006:209; Grabowsky 2008). Yet this 
did not always translate into absolute control by the overlords, for Chiang Khaeng leaders 
were able to strategically change allegiances and, when necessary, mobilise troops to 
constrain territorial encroachments (Grabowsky 1999, 2003). In sum, the flexible nature of 
sovereignties in the region was not only dictated by directives radiating from mighty 
polities, but also influenced by the political action of smaller entities. Indigenous rulers 
exercised varying degrees of autonomy and determined the course of politics, economy, 
and society (Giersch 2006:9).
People of the frontier and their mobility
The cultural and social composition of the Upper Mekong borderlands in the pre-colonial 
period was as variegated (Ong 1999, 2000) as the sovereignties of the polities that mied the 
region. Although we cannot attribute indigenous populations the same degree of ethnic 
self-awareness that modem nation-states have forged through ethnic classifications and 
national education projects, we can still assume that a sense of group distinctiveness existed 
among the diverse people of the frontiers in the pre-modem period. Yet we should also 
keep in mind that distinctiveness left space for much cultural and social fluidity among 
groups and individuals. In his seminal work Political System cf Highland Burma: a Study cf 
Kadhin Social Structure, Leach (1954) puts forward a dynamic theory of social systems 
postulating that in the complex socio-cultural reality of Southeast Asia “any particular 
individual can be thought of as having a status position in several different social systems at 
the same time” (Leach 1954:286). To a certain extent, this thesis will demonstrate that such 
fluidity is still present in the contemporary social and cultural dynamics of the ‘persistent 
frontier*.
5 An introduction to the history of Chiang Khaeng is provided by Grabowsky (1999, 2002, 2003, 2008).
61
The Frontier in History
The social organisation of pre-modem polities in the Upper Mekong articulated along the 
interaction and interdependence of two different ecological-cultural adaptations of valley 
and hill groups (Wijeyewardene 2002). By and large, the valley-based populations were wet- 
rice cultivators; spoke Khmer, Tai and Burmese dialects; and had Indian-derived forms of 
religion (Theravada Buddhism), polities (charismatic despotism) and a non-unilinear 
kinship organisation. The hill-based peoples practiced swidden agriculture, had animist 
beliefs, and a patrilineal and hierarchical socio-political system derived from the Chinese 
(Leach 1960:51-53). Hill and mountain dwellers (termed in most Tai languages as Kha, 
meaning “slave” or “servant”), spoke languages belonging to the Mon-Khmer, Miao-Yao 
and Tibeto-Burman families. The Kha included the Akha (Hani in the contemporary 
classification by the Chinese state6), Bulang (Palaung), the Jinuo, Kachin (or Jingpo), Lahu, 
Lisu, and Wa. While Yao-Miao speaking peoples did not always fit the Kha label, they fell 
under the category of hill and mountain groups.
Tai-speaking valley-dwellers were the politically dominant groups, while hill populations 
were subordinate to the valley-dwellers. Tai-Kha interaction was based on a system whereby 
the hill-dwelling chiefdoms paid tribute and taxes to the lowland ruler in recognition of his 
dominion over them (Tapp 1989; Turton 2000). However, at annual rituals the Tai 
accorded “ritual seniority [,]... recognition of prior occupancy of land and associated ritual 
powers” to the Kha and their chiefs (Turton 2000:7)7.
Despite the Kha’s politically subordinated position, control of the valley-mler over the hill- 
subjects was often marginal (Leach 1960:59). The hill areas were only under the nominal 
political suzerainty of valley princes (Leach 1960:62), and enjoyed a high degree of 
autonomy8. Indeed, highland chiefs were appointed as frontier defenders and, as will be 
shown later, they frequently played a central role in controlling strategic trade passages 
across the mountains.
Han settlers descending from Ming-era migrants were also scattered throughout south­
western Yunnan and in the frontier zone between this region and mainland Southeast Asia.
6 The contemporary category ‘Hani’ created by the Chinese government is quite problematic. Under the ‘Hani’ umbrella
are included people with significant linguistic variation and a range of regional cultural diversity. For instance, the Akha 
inhabiting present-day Xishuangbanna, included in the Hani ethnic group (Ch. harnzu) have quite different
cultural patterns and language from people classified as Hani living in Simao and other parts of central Yunnan.
7 On the ritual relationship between Kha and Tai, see also Archaimbault (1971, 1973).
8 An example of the Tai-Kha political inter-relatedness was the dominion of Muang Yun in present-day Mengrun. 
Although Muang Yun was under the political suzerainty of Muang Phung, an Akha leader appointed by the Tsao Muang 
Phung ruled de facto over the dominion where .Akha people constituted the demographic majority.
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Contrary to what some critics of Chinese nationalism (Hsieh 1989) assume, Han people 
have a long history of settlement in the southern Yunnan borderlands. Communities of 
Haw, Yunnanese of Han and Hui ethnicity, have inhabited parts of Sipsongpanna and also 
locales in the Shan states, Chiang Mai and other polities in the Upper Mekong since the 
14th century. However, the influx of Han Chinese to the Empire’s south-west reached a 
peak when the Qing administration attempted to freeze the frontiers in the 18th and 19th 
century. By 1850 the Chinese had become the majority in Sipsongpanna, and remain so 
today (Giersch 2006:2).
It would be hazardous to argue that population mobility across the fluid borders of the pre­
modem Upper Mekong occurred in a completely unrestrained way. Yet, contrary to what 
they have come to signify since the founding of modem nation-states, borders were not 
lines defining citizenship or markers of social cleavages (Kipnis 2008:186). They did not 
categorically constrain human movement and modes of belonging. State power over the 
Tai socio-political system was more directed towards control over labour, rather than 
territory, population and means of identification, which constitute the ideological basis of 
modem nation-states. The importance of labour incorporation to governing is captured by 
the classical Larina Tai saying “gather vegetables to put into baskets, gather [K\ha [slaves] to 
put into muang” (Kraisri 1965:16; Turton 2000). Therefore, borders functioned as lines for 
containing manpower, but not as obstacles to human mobility.
Entire villages or towns were frequently displaced and resettled from one polity to the 
other as a result of wars or spontaneous migration. The most valued war booty was 
territory for the control over resources and slaves for the contribution of corvees and tax to 
the state. Resettlement also affected Tai populations. In the first half of the 19th century, 
numerous Tai lowlanders were forcibly relocated by troops from Nan and Chiang Mai 
(Grabowsky 2008:211). An invasion of the Chiang Mai and Nan armies in 1812-13 led six 
thousand prisoners from Muang La, Muang Phung, Chiang Khaeng, and Muang Luang 
Pukha (present-day Luang Namtha) to Nan (Grabowsky 1999:238). Along the current 
China-Laos frontier, there are innumerable examples of villages founded through the 
resettlement of war captives in the pre-colonial period. Some ethnic Tai Lue settlements in 
Muang Sing trace their founding inhabitants to migrants from Chiang Tung (in the Shan 
States), Muang Ham and Muang Tse (respectively in central and western Sipsongpanna), 
and Muang Phung (present-day Mengpeng on the Chinese side of the border). Tai Neua 
residents of the district originate from Chiang Ku (Jinggu) and Muang Lo in Simao. Their
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ancestors had fled this district when the Qing troops were cleansing the frontier from 
remnants of the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) (Grabowsky 2008:212-213)9. Many villages 
also originated from spontaneous migrations of populations in search for agricultural land. 
Among these are the majority of ethnic Tai villages in the Mengman valley, whose 
inhabitants are descendents of settlers from Muang Wu, the polity that expanded across 
present-day Phongsali eastern region. Aside from forced and spontaneous resettlement, 
human mobility across borders was motivated by trade, bureaucratic and social purposes. 
Such flows were relatively free of regulatory constraints. The movement of goods and 
resources across polities and empires was, on the other hand, subject to a different 
treatment10.
Trade and market interactions
The historiography and travelogues of British and French explorers have placed much 
emphasis on the tributary system as the main mode of taxation in the pre-colonial period. 
Tribute is considered the pivot around which the relationships among lowland populations 
and upland populations and the major empires and petty polities revolved. This emphasis 
has taken attention away from other forms of regulation and control exercised by the 
various political entities over resources and goods traded across borders (Walker 1999:28- 
29). In the pre-colonial period, trade on the frontier between the Tai polities, the Burmese 
Empire, Siam and Qing China was quite intense. Muang Sing, Muang Phung and Muang 
Mang* 11 were located along secondary branches of the major trade routes linking Yunnan, 
Burma, India and Indochina. Drawing on Skinner’s (1977) idea of “macroregions”, 
Chiranan (1989:70) compares the 19th century cross-boundary trade system in the Upper 
Mekong to a “functional body” or a “completely independent functional region” (Chiranan 
1989:66) within which products circulated mostly free of fiscal control. What Chiranan 
suggests is a socio-geographic and commercial structure by-passing the modem limiting 
vision of discrete states that controlled and regulated goods circulation through sharply 
defined borders. This functionalist analysis can be misleading as it denies the important role 
of the various political entities in taxing and regulating key commodity flows across the 
region (Walker 1999:27). It further underestimates the interrelatedness of such a ‘market 
region’ with broader economic hubs in mainland China, Siam, Burma and present day
9 The Taiping Rebellion was led by Hong Xiuquan, the chief of a group of Hakka rebels. Hong Xiuquan was the founder 
of the ‘Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace’.
10 For a detailed account on population migration across Muang Sing, the various muang of Muang La, the Shan States, 
Chiang Mai and Nan, see Grabowsky (1999:247).
11 Muang Mang, the third Muang was integrated into the caravan route trails only in the early 1900s when it was founded 
by migrants from today’s Phongsali Province.
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Laos. However, I take Chiranan’s ‘functional body* as a starting point to provide an idea of 
the intense social and commercial inter-connectedness and interdependence among the 
various neighbouring political entities in the 19th century.
The trading connections in the area spanning Yunnan, Burma, present-day Laos, Siam and 
Tonkin took place mainly along caravan routes across rugged mountain terrains that linked 
a few key market entrepots (Map.7). There were three main caravan routes, all of which 
crosscut Dali-fu (Dali) and Yunnan-fu (Kunming)12. Dali-fu and Yunnan-fu were the two 
main commercial hubs where all of the important roads from Mainland Southeast Asia 
met. They were the principal bases for trade caravans travelling back and forth across the 
region (Chiranan 1989:74). Kunming and Dali were also poles of commercial attraction for 
merchants from Sichuan, Guizhou and other internal areas of the Qing Empire. Contrary 
to their Yunnanese counterparts, these traders would exchange goods in the two central 
Yunnanese market towns and then return home without going further south (Chiranan 
1989:73).
12Caravan routes originating in Yunnan-fu and Dali-fu expanded from Mainland Southeast Asia as far as Tibet and 
Assam. However, discussing the Yunnan-Tibet-Assam trade is beyond the scope of this chapter.
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The first, westernmost route between Yunnan and mainland Southeast Asia originated in 
Dali-fu and cross-cut Tengyue (Tengchung) before reaching the important market town of 
Bhamo on the frontier of the Burmese Shan States13. The second, south-western route led 
from Yunnan-fu (Kunming) to Simao; after passing through Tseng Hung (present day 
Jinghong), it continued to Chiang Tung (Kengtung) in Burma via Muang Hai, and reached 
Zumue (Chiang Mai) to the south via Chiang Saen and Chiang Rai or, alternatively 
intersecting Muang Fang (Chiranan 1989:73; Forbes 1987a:7,l 1). An alternative trail to the 
Chiang Tung route ran eastwards. Linking Chiang Rung to Zumue, this route swung across 
very mountainous terrain. It originated in Simao and passing through Tseng Hung and 
Muang La, it meandered through the salt wells of Bo Hae and Bo Ten. It continued south- 
westwards to Luang Namtha and Viang Phukha to cross the Mekong at Chiang Khong. 
The trail reached Chiang Mai crosscutting Chiang Rai. Lieutenant MacLeod, assistant to the 
Commissioner of the (British-administered) Tenasserim Provinces in southern Burma, 
proceeded through the Chiang Tung route from Moulmein to Yunnan in 1836-37 (Forbes 
1987a:7), with the intent of expanding British control over regional trade routes with 
China. MacLeod had been told by the Chinese merchants residing in Zumue (Chiang Mai) 
that “the Kiang Tung road was the best, [and] that the other [eastern route via Luang 
Namtha] [he] should find very difficult, having ranges of high mountains to cross, and that 
elephants could not travel by it” (MacLeod 1837: 992)14.
The third, easternmost, route connected Yunnan-fu with the Tonkin region crosscutting 
the important market town of Muang Tse (Mengzi). Various minor trading tracks 
intersected with or originated from these major routes. Some trails led from eastern 
Sipsongpanna to Tonkin traversing Phongsali territory. The route linking Sipsongpanna via 
Bo Ten and Bo Hae reached Muang Xai, an important trading centre for minerals, cotton, 
salt and cattle (Walker 1999:40). From Muang Xai the caravan route split into several trails 
southwards: some entered the valley of the Beng River and reached Nan across the 
Mekong; others proceeded south-east towards Luang Phrabang and via Nan, arrived at 
Chiang Mai meandering through Phrae, Lampang, and Lamphun. One route linked Nan to 
Uttaradit (Forbes 1987a:15; Walker 1999:40).
13 For an extensive account of the trade routes and commercial transactions among the various states of the Upper 
Mekong and Yunnan in the nineteenth century, see Archer (1889, 1896), MacLeod (1837), Hallett (1988), Smyth (1895), 
Colquhoun (1885), and Coryton (1875). The edited volume The Gold and Silur Road cf Track and Friendship (Grabowsky and 
Turton 2003) collects the writings of two major British administrators, David Richardson and W.G McLeod who lived 
and worked in Burma in the first half of the nineteenth century.
14 Following this route, MacLeod was able to reach Tseng Hung in Sipsongpanna from the Shan States. In the capital of 
Sipsongpanna he was denied permission to proceed any further by the Chinese authorities (Forbes 1987a:9).
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Muang Phung and Muang Mang in Sipsongpanna and the neighbouring polity of Xieng 
Khaeng (with its capital in Muang Sing) were located in between two important caravan 
trails: the trade route between Tseng Hung and Kengtung to the west, and the trade route 
to the east that linked Sipsongpanna to Chiang Mai via Luang Namtha and Viang Phukha 
(Grabowsky 1999:6). A secondary caravan track went past the three principalities. This 
road connected Tseng Hung to the Shan States via Muang Lun. Tkrough Muang Phung, 
Muang Mang and Muang Sing, it led south-westwards to Chiangkok via Muang Long and 
reached Chiang Lap across the Mekong. Being located in between important caravan 
routes, Muang Sing hosted a market of regional importance (Grabowsky 2008:215).
Yunnanese Hui Muslims and Han (called Haw or Ho), dominated long-distance caravan 
trade along the above-mentioned routes13. The Haw came from various centres in Yunnan, 
mostly from Dali-fu, Kunming, Mojiang, Pu’er, Simao, and a minority from Sichuan 
(Forbes 1987a:7). Caravans averaged fifty to seventy pack animals or could total one to 
three hundred mules and ponies, depending on the political shifts in the region and on the 
commercial importance of the route traversed (Forbes 1987a:17; Grabowsky and Turton 
2003:181; MacLeod 1837)16. This intensity and size of caravans remained almost unvaried 
until the first thirty years of the 20th century, being interrupted only shortly by warfare and 
by the repercussions of a major Muslim insurrection in Yunnan in the mid-19lh century.
Products brought by caravans from Yunnan to the main market hubs and villages along the 
trade routes included tea, silks (raw and made-up), wax, opium, ironware of various sorts, 
straw hats, salt, walnuts, copper utensils, lead, steel ingots, brass tools, skin jackets, and 
sandals. Goods carried back to Yunnan from mainland Southeast Asia were ‘general 
goods’, European goods such as textiles, woollens and broad cloth, local textiles, dye 
woods, stick lack, betel nut, muslins, cambric, ivory, and, above all, cotton. Tea17 and salt18 
from southern Yunnan was also taken northwards. Although the list of goods was very
15 For a detailed account of the Haw caravan trade and elaboration of the controversial explanation of the Haw ethnomyn 
see Forbes (1987a) and Maxwell Hill (1989).
16 Burney, for instance, reported that in 1830-31 Chinese Haw caravans that visited Ava totalled five hundred to one 
thousand men (Grabowsky and Turton 2003:76).
17 The major tea production areas were found in south-eastern Sipsongpanna, in the Six Great Tea Mountains near Yi Wu 
and Yi Bang (Chiranan 1989:69; Forbes 1987a:23; Maxwell Hill 1989:324). Dai living in the valleys, and hill-dwelling 
people such as the Akha, Jinuo, and Lahu cultivated tea. Processing and bulking was mainly managed by Flan Chinese. 
Pu’er and Simao were the main centres for processing, bulking, and taxing tea (Maxwell f i l l  1989:324).
18 Salt transported by caravan trains across the Upper Mekong frontiers was mainly produced in the wells of Bo Flae, Bo 
Flan and Bo Ten situated to the south of Muang La, one of the twelve parma of Sipsongpanna. Yunnan had approximately 
fifty salt wells that were under Qing administrative control (Chiranan 1989:67).
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extensive, the most significant exports (from Yunnan outwards) were opium19 and tea, 
while cotton was the most important import to China (Forbes 1987a:19-23). Trade 
transactions in these products occurred principally through barter or by exchanging 
products for cash in the form of rupees or other local ingots (Chiranan 1989:64).
Haw muleteers also brought minor quantities of these goods at the relatively small but busy 
pre-colonial market of Muang Sing. Further retail distribution occurred through local 
traders of various ethnicities. The latter created smaller trade circuits parallel to the long 
distance Haw-dominated commercial trails. Many Tai Lue from Muang Sing, Muang Phung 
and Muang Mang engaged in short-distance trade between small villages and towns. Tai 
Lue chiefs and aristocrats acted as opium and cotton brokers for Yunnanese merchants, 
playing an important role in controlling trade transactions in the region20. While the Akha, 
Lahu, and Lanten planted cotton and supplied forest products, such as bamboo shoots, 
nuts and tubers, the Hmong and the Yao, who resided in higher elevations, were the main 
opium growers. These products were bartered for lamp oil, utensils, metal tools and salt 
with lowland populations.
How are we to account for the circulation of resources across borders? What does their 
flow tell us about the nature of borders in this moment in history? According to Chiranan 
(1989:66), within this “completely independent” cross-boundary marketing structure 
existed a free-trade that was, by and large, beyond the control of the various powers in the 
region. But evidence from Chinese and Thai historical sources and British explorers’ 
accounts provides a slightly different picture. Most of the valuable commodities 
transported across borders were indeed subject to some form of taxation. As Walker 
(1999:29) notes with reference to northern Laos, “pre-colonial states.. .actively and 
enthusiastically supplemented their tributary income with direct and indirect revenue from 
trade and... in some cases, tributary and mercantile institutions were closely interlinked.” 
Therefore, taxation on trade was an important, although not the largest, source of profit 
for all political entities in the area. Yet it should be conceded that fiscal regulation was 
restricted to key commodities. A smaller portion of these and other less valuable goods
19 Opium was extensively grown in Yunnan and in the Shan States around Kengtung. As result of the Nanjing Treaty 
(1842) that ended the First Opium War (1839-1842), by the mid to late 19th century, Yunnan was transformed into a 
major exporter of home-grown opium to other Chinese provinces and Southeast Asia. Although in the 1860s, the 
Chinese authorities officially prohibited opium cultivation in most Chinese territories, mule caravans were still able to 
make profits of a commensurate nature from abundant local production in southern Yunnan (Chiranan 1989:61; Forbes 
1987a:23).
20 For an accurate account of the significant brokerage role played by Tai aristocracy and leadership in tea trade with the 
Haw in Sipsongpanna, see Maxwell Hill (1989).
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eschewed control of various administrations or was allowed to circulate freely through the 
intercession of local authorities. A case in point was opium that, after being prohibited in 
Qing China in the 1860s, became the prerogative of bandits and outlawed groups who were 
able to smuggle it across the region and into China with the connivance of Chinese officials 
(Chiranan 1989:62) as they do today.
Along the southern and western borders of Yunnan, cotton trade was regulated by Tai and 
Muslim local administrations, particularly the provisional government established in Dali-fu 
after the Muslim rebellion erupted between 1855 and 1873 (Chiranan 1989:51). Metal 
extraction, manufacturing, and circulation were also subject to regulation. Between 1700 
and 1800, the Qing administration had secured control over brass, iron, copper, lead, and 
tin mines in north-eastern Yunnan. It is reported that extraction and manufacturing of 
these metals was a “highly regulated, but also highly protected” state industry (De Came 
quoted in Chiranan 1989:56), representing the major source of the provincial 
administration’s revenue. Under particular state control were the copper mines, as copper 
was one of the two raw materials of Chinese “cash money” (Chiranan 1989:56). Mines of 
precious ores such as silver and gold were under less administrative restriction. Yet, a large 
portion of silver, the second material used to manufacture Chinese coins, was bought by 
the Qing government at a fixed price for making silver taels (Chiranan 1989:57). This 
suggests a certain degree of state interference also in the manufacturing and circulation of 
silver.
Tea and salt was also subject to regulation within and, intermittently, across borders. Salt 
was under the administrative control of Qing China. The Qing state regulated trade in 
eleven salt-administration regions of proper China (Chiranan 1989:66). It is not clear 
whether the wells of Muang La were under such an administrative system. Tai locals have 
reported to me that salt wells in this area were run by Tai residents and were under the 
administration of Tai rulers. It is likely that the latter paid some tax on salt in the form of 
tribute to the Qing administration in the nearby town of Yiwu. In 1860, the Qing 
introduced a transit duty (Ch.Mjfe lijiri), which was imposed in every part of the empire, 
including Yunnan (Chiranan 1989:67). The transit duty was applied to salt, opium, and tea. 
This regulation was often denounced by foreign merchants as a barrier to free-trade 
(Chiranan 1989:67). Nevertheless, after peace was restored in the 1880s, ending twenty 
years of social and political upheavals, salt went through the main frontier market entrepots
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of Tengyue, Simao, and Mengzi without much interference from the Yunnan provincial 
administration.
Being a central element in Chinese culture and widely consumed across the empire, tea was 
subject to a similar regulatory system. Highly valued Pu’er tea was central to the control of 
trade routes. It can be assumed that it was not haphazard that the Qing established the 
southernmost outpost of their administration in Yunnan at Pu’er, located within only a few 
days travel from the centres of tea production, and later at Yi Wu, one of the two main 
growing locales of Pu’er tea21. In Pu’er, tea was taxed before being redistributed for sale to 
the merchants. In times of peace, “tea commissioners” were appointed in Yi Bang and Yi 
Wu to collect the transit duty from caravan traders on their way to Dali-fu and Yunnan-fu 
(Chiranan 1989:69-70). Administrative officials ensured that the tea trade was regularly 
maintained without being diverted to the markets of Burma and Tonkin (Chiranan 
1989:69-70).
The regulation of goods across borders also concerned other polities in the Upper Mekong 
frontiers. In Nan, for instance, British and French explorers mentioned the strategic 
location of Chiang Khong in the regional trading system (Flallet 1988:163; Hong 1984:88- 
89; Lefevre-Pontalis 1902:115). At this port on the Mekong, Nan officials levied ferry tolls, 
collected taxes on traded goods, extorted protection money, and imposed frontier duties 
(Walker 1999:32-33). Local chiefs both on the lowlands and uplands along the trading 
routes were also involved in levying transit duties and taxes from traders. Trading 
monopolies on goods were often at the origin of disputes between neighbouring polities. 
MacLeod (1837:991) wrote that he had “experienced utmost difficulty in obtaining 
satisfactory information about the trade routes to China” due to rivalries between the 
Burmese and various Tai administrations in the region, each keen to defend their 
commercial interest against the other.
Despite state regulation in the form of taxation, in the 19th century the frontier between 
Yunnan and Southeast Asia was often troubled with robbery and violence. State 
administration of trade was constantly subject to negotiation by local chiefs and traders. 
Frequently, central regulation was inefficiently enforced. Carey (1899:393), on his visit to 
the “Chinese Shan States” in the late 1890s, noted that although the revenues collected by 
the tax offices at the most effective points on the Mekong were considerably high, the
21 For further details on tea production in Xishuangbanna see Maxwell Hill (1989).
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Chinese staff was “always quite inadequate to enforce the tax, and the collectors [were] 
obliged to accept what the tea and cotton traders [were] willing to pay.” In Yi Wu and 
Muang Lie, Chinese foreign customs were failing “from a revenue-collecting point of 
view.” In Simao, this failure was so extensive that transit duty levying was “not enough to 
pay the working expenses of the customs” (Carey 1899:393). Taxing inefficiency was also 
aggravated by the fact that Chinese officials working at the transit duty posts would pocket 
large sums while reporting to the higher level administration only minimal revenues (Carey 
1899:393).
In sum, although control of the mobility of precious commodities across borders was 
exercised irregularly and not always successful, it was a crucial factor determining the 
distribution of political and economic power among the polities in the region. Regulation 
of flows was not as pervasive as we witness in the contemporary world; yet it was 
nevertheless sufficiently intense to prove the exercise of authority of ruling states over then- 
borders. Therefore, the fluidity of pre-colonial borders did not translate into a total lack of 
control over territories and the resources that traversed boundaries. Taxation of resources 
moving across borders was as important for the survival of pre-colonial polities as it is to 
the perpetuation of modem nation-states. And political and economic endurance was 
guaranteed through the participation of local residents, officials, and traders, at times with 
the connivance of, others in collision with, central authorities.
The Gap between Dream and Reality: Colonial Border Mapping at the 
Turn of the 20th Century
The series of treaties signed between France, Britain, Siam and China in the late 19th and 
early 20th century have been perceived as a turning point in the traditional indigenous 
spatial knowledge of the Upper Mekong (Grabowsky and Turton 2003:196; Thongchai 
1994). It introduced, Thongchai (1994) argues, a new geography of mapping, a technology 
that replaced the partial territorial fluidity and ambiguity of the past with fixed borders and 
undivided sovereignties (Grabowsky 2003:40). Yet, as I will elucidate in the following 
section, the new cartographic representation of borders did not abruptly erase local notions 
of space organisation and humanisation. It did not translate into a complete fracture with 
the pre-existing socio-economic reality. Rather, the modem discourse of mapping was 
obstmcted, mediated and questioned by the political agency of local chiefs and the real life 
of residents and migrants of the borderlands. The Upper Mekong frontier persisted as a
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site of contact, dialogue, negotiation and friction even after the modernist cartographic 
operation (Walker 2008).
The signing of border treaties concerning the Upper Mekong was the climax of a long 
process of exploration that had tested the ground for economic and political expansion by 
Britain and France. Throughout the 19th century, the two colonial empires had separately 
sent explorers and delegates to map and explore the China-mainland Southeast Asian 
borderlands with the aim of incorporating economically profitable zones into their colonial 
possessions22. McLeod (McLeod 1867), Scott (1901) and Archer (1889, 1896) are three of 
the prominent figures of the many missions to the Upper Mekong funded by the British 
regime (Grabowsky and Turton 2003). After the first exploration undertaken by Henri 
Mouhout to Laos in the 1850s-60s, the most important French-sponsored expeditions were 
carried out by Francis Gamier (Gamier 1985, 1996[1885]) and Doudart de Lagree in 1866- 
68, and by Auguste Pavie (1901, 1903) and his numerous colleagues between 1887 and 
1891 (Stuart-Fox 1995:113-117). Gamier and de Lagree’s expedition to the Mekong “was 
designed to discover a means of communication with southern China” (Stuart-Fox 
1995:113). The French had hoped that the Mekong could be a navigable ‘road’ to link 
Cochinchina and Cambodia in the south with Annam and Tonkin in the north with the 
thriving trading posts of Yunnan23. China was a vast market into which French products 
could be injected and from where a wide array of goods could be exported. The annexation 
of the Kingdom of Lane Xang (today’s Laos) into Indochina, traversed by the mighty river, 
was to serve this purpose. Furthermore, it aimed to extend French influence into the west 
bank of the Mekong and beyond to Siam as well as to check Britain’s advance into the 
region (Stuart-Fox 1995:112).
The conquest of Upper Burma by the British forces in 1885 marked a turning point in the 
future geo-politics of the region. The exacerbation of the dispute between the British, 
French, and Siamese over the annexation of pre-existing polities with undefined borders 
made the clear-cut demarcation of boundaries in the Upper Mekong a necessary step in the 
1890s. A crucial issue at the centre of the rivalry between colonial powers was the 
construction of a railway linking Yunnan to British Burma or to French Tonkin (Clarke
22 O n the explorations of the Upper Mekong, Tonkin and Burma by the British and French see Archer (1889, 1896), Scott 
(1901), MacLeod (1837), Bock (1985), Osborne (1975), Gamier (1985, 1996[1885]), Pavie (1901, 1903, 1906), de Came 
(1995), and Grabowsky and Turton (2003:156-164).
23 To their disappointment, the explorers discovered that a series of rapids in the mid and lower reaches made the 
Mekong unnavigable along all its length. This made the dream of making the river a “road to China” a vane one (Stuart- 
Fox 1995:113).
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1986). A treaty signed in 1893 in Bangkok established the Mekong as the border between 
Siam and French Indochina. Siam was forced to surrender to France the whole of the 
territories that were previously under her sphere of influence lying on the east bank of the 
Mekong. Besides securing all territories to the east of the river (BTSI 1896:297-298), 
France was authorised to open trading stations and appoint consuls on the western bank of 
the Mekong24. France’s claims over the Upper Mekong concerned the British, who were 
keen to gain control of the trade routes between Burma and south-western China. Britain’s 
discontent led to the resolution of creating a ‘buffer state’ between British and French 
claimed-possessions (BTSI 1896:299). This neutral zone was identified in the territory of 
the polity of Chiang Khaeng (Grabowsky 1999:249; 2003), which lay strategically in 
between Tseng Hung in China and British-controlled Chiang Tung. Failure to settle the 
dispute in this way resulted in a “Declaration”, signed in 1896, that established that Chiang 
Khaeng was divided into two halves along the course of the Mekong (BTSI 1896:299). The 
eastern half, including Muang Sing, the capital of Chiang Khaeng since 1885, became a 
French protectorate (Grabowsky 1999:249; 2003) while the western part was included in 
the British Shan states (BTSI 1896:299).
While both France and Britain obtained territories within Siam as spheres of independent 
action, the Kingdom of Siam was guaranteed territorial integrity without being 
dismembered by colonial ambitions (BTSI 1896:297). After the humiliation of the Opium 
Wars and the subsequent opening up of ports to foreign powers, Qing China was forced to 
sit at the boundary demarcation table and renounced territories over which it had 
previously claimed suzerainty in the south-west of the empire. The Anglo-Chinese Treaty 
of 1894 defined clearly the boundaries between south-western Yunnan and the British 
Shan States. It established that the majority of the mrnig that had constituted the 
principality of Sipsongpanna were ceded to China23. The British were given control over 
the Shan States west of Muang Lem, which had previously fallen under Sipsongpanna’s 
sphere of influence. Sipsongpanna underwent further territorial losses through the mapping 
process. The convention of 1895 that delineated the boundary between China and Tonkin 
granted Muang Wu Neu and Muang Wu Tai, constituting one of the twelve panm under 
Tseng Hung’s sovereignty, to France. Furthermore, this convention secured for France Bo 
Ten, one of the main salt production sites in the Upper Mekong. Some important
24 For details of the 1890s Treaties see Walker (1999:41-45).
25 The treaty granted to China the Shan state of Muang Lem and the various muang that were previously under Tseng 
Hung’s sphere of influence (BTSI 1896).
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entrepots such as Simao, Hoi-han (near Muangzi), and Tengyue were opened to French 
commerce; the Mekong and its tributary the Loso were opened to navigation. French 
enterprises were also granted the right to access the mines of Guanxi, Guangdong and 
Yunnan (BTSI 1896:299). Trading and mining posts were, in the mind of French 
administrators, to be linked to Annam and Tonkin through a railway and a telegraph line. 
The Lao principalities along the Mekong, trapped within mountains but rich in gold and 
precious metals (Stuart-Fox 1995:114), were to be included in this ambitious infrastructure 
plan.
While the signing of the border treaties are events that find historical acknowledgment in 
official reports and histories, local understanding of them remain relegated to the memories 
of the descendants of that period or recorded in unofficial stories. In the memory of some 
elders in Mengman, influenced by their parents’ stories, the signing of the boundary treaties 
was still vivid in the mid-2000s. Elders referred to the installation of the boundary 
landmarks, carved in Chinese and French script, along the newly-demarcated border 
between French and Qing territory as an event that had changed the political order in the 
region. Those boundary stones meant to them and their parents that their neighbours in 
Muang Sing had been incorporated into a different political domain whose limits had been 
clearly defined. The fate of Sipsongpanna had, in their conceptualisation, been decided by 
the Chinese emperor. This demonstrates that, contrary to what some scholars on Lue 
ethnicity suggest (see FIsieh 1989), Tai indigenous people recognise that the Chinese had at 
that time ultimate suzerainty over the Tsao Phaendin’s polity. Mengman elders believed 
that it was because of the Chinese emperor’s will that Muang Wu Neu and Muang Wu Tai 
were sold to the French for a few hundred French silver piastres. “That sum had to satisfy 
the Tsao Fa Wong’s opium addiction!” one of them remembered, rationalising the border 
demarcation with the widespread opium addiction in China at that period.
Modemist cartographic discourse does not thoroughly clash, as Thongchai (1994) argues, 
with Muang Mang people’s spatial conceptualisations rooted in Buddhist cosmology and in 
“indigenous knowledge of local geography” (Thongchai 1994:78). In fact, the border 
demarcation by colonial powers, China, and Siam followed the same criteria that 
indigenous people used to adopt to determine boundaries in the pre-modem period 
(Wijeyewardene 2002). The boundary treaties of the 1890s took as boundary-defining 
markers the sources and direction of rivers, and the mountain ridges from which these 
rivers originated (YMXZBWB 1994:540-541). This coincided, rather than clashed, with
76
The Frontier in History
pre-existing indigenous conceptualisation of boundaries, as demonstrated by a Buddhist 
legend told to me by a Tai Lue elder in Mengman (previously Muang Mang):
During his wandering through Southeast Asia, Sakyamuni stopped on the 
mountain ridge between Muang Sing and Muang Mang to rest. After having 
eaten some sticky rice, the Lord went to wash his hands in the river that flowed 
between the two rrmng. He noticed a big rock that impeded the water from 
flowing into the territory of Muang Mang. The river streamed into Muang Sing.
By using his stick, the Lord drew a line on the ground modifying the water 
course. Ever since, the Mang River only flowed in the direction of Muang 
Mang, where the population could prosper and grow rice in the river basin.
Muang Mang territory was thus demarcated from that of Muang Sing.
Evidently, in this Buddhist legend, political boundary-drawing and mythology overlap 
suggesting continuity between pre-modem and modem visions of boundaries and use of 
space.
Dwellers of the borderlands between French Indochina and Qing China did not, however, 
entirely comply with the newly introduced spatial organisation. On the contrary, they 
played a central role in mediating, and even questioning, boundary demarcation between 
mightier entities. Inspectors of the Qing and Republic of China’s government reported that 
a few boundary landmarks along the China-Laos border were removed by local people; 
others were moved to new locations or replaced markers bearing Tai script (instead of 
French and Chinese script) by local people (YMXZBWB 1994:541). The moving of the 
boundary stone mark between Muang Sing and Muang Yun resulted, in 1948, in an 
invasion by Lao-French troops from Muang Sing into Meng Yun. Local ALha villagers, 
supported by the Tsao Muang Phung, supervisor of Muang Yun, had moved the stone 
tablet from the mountain ridge to the mountain slope to incorporate some territory that the 
treaty demarcation had attributed to France. The Chinese government took the claim of 
the Tsao Mung Phung to be true. Only after the mediation of a Tai delegate of the French 
administration in Namtha did the skirmish end with the return of the claimed territory to 
France (YMXZBWB 1994:542). This episode demonstrates how local chiefs of the 
previous political system participated, even after the colonial demarcation, in determining 
the subversion or restoration of borders.
In Muang Sing, on the Indochinese side of the border, the Tsao Fa Silino, ruler of the 
Chiang Khaeng principality, and his Tai Lue subjects did not easily submit to the British 
and French-imposed territorial division and administrative management. The Wat Ta Pao
77
The Frontier in History
version of the Chiang Khaeng Chronicle26, written by a scribe who witnessed the events of 
the turn of the century, describes clearly the disapproval and anguish of Muang Sing people 
about the decisions made by the colonial powers (Grabowsky 2003). The manuscript 
reports that the Tsao Fa Silino refused with courtesy but determination the imposition by 
Mr. G.G B. Stirling, vice-commissioner in the Brisith Shan States, to deliver tributary gifts 
of silver and golden flowers to Queen Victoria as a token of submission to her crown 
(Grabowsky 2003:55). The anecdote goes that the Tai Lue ruler responded to the threats of 
the British man by posing two metaphorical questions which caused the irritation of the 
latter. A further request of submission met the opposition of Chiang Khaeng subjects 
(Grabowsky 2003:55). Nevertheless, the British occupation of Muang Sing in 1895-1896 
forced the Tsao Fa Silino to flee to French-occupied territories in Luang Namtha 
(Grabowsky 1999, 2003; Hirshfield 1968). The Tsao Fa’s strategic appeal for French 
support against the British made the plan of transforming Chiang Khaeng into a buffer 
state fail in favour of a clear border division (Grabowsky 2003:56-57). From 1904, Muang 
Sing, capital of the principality of Chiang Khaeng, was fully incorporated into French 
Indochina following negotiations between the High Commissioner to the Shan States, Sir J. 
George Scott, for the British and the Haut Commissaire of Indochina, and Auguste Pavie, 
for the French (Gunn 1989:62). The Tsao Fa received official appointment by the French 
as ruler of the Muang Sing polity. The successor to the throne of Muang Sing, Tsao Ong 
Kham governed not without reluctance within the French regime. Muang Sing remained an 
autonomous polity under French protection until 1914, when an armed revolt led by Tsao 
Ong Kham erupted against the French (Grabowsky 1999:249; Gunn 1989). The Tai Lue 
rebellion was the apex of long-developed anti-colonial resentment by Tsao Ong Kham 
(Grabowsky 1999). To the Tcao Ong Kham, the revolt was a hope to restore the pre­
existing boundaries of the Chiang Khaeng principality that the French and British had 
destabilised (Gunn 1989:64). Unable to withstand the French crackdown on the revolt, the 
Tsao Ong Kham, recorded in history as the last Tsao Fa of Muang Sing, fled into exile to 
Sipsongpanna (Gunn 1989:62).
The Tai Lue rebellion in Muang Sing was just one of the many uprisings which erupted 
throughout Laos against the colonial regime27. Much discontent was generated by the high
26 The Chiang Khaeng Chronicle is a manuscript that records the history of the Chiang Khaeng principality from its 
origin to its division into British and French zones. The Wat Ta Pao version of the Chiang Khaeng Chronicle, written in 
1904-1905, was found in Ta Pao village near Muang Sing town in 1998. Grabowsky (1999, 2003) has translated the Wat 
Ta Pao manuscript, providing an important historical analysis of the events.
27 Widespread popular large uprisings took place also in southern Laos on the Bolovens plateau between 1901 and 1907 
(Stuart-Fox 1995:122).
78
The Frontier in history
tax burden imposed by the French on the Lao population to reduce colonial administrative 
expenses to a minimum (Stuart-Fox 1995). Even more resented was the cctruk labour 
demanded on the male population for the construction of infrastructure (Stuart-Fox 
1995:122). The small population of Laos was unable to provide sufficient labour for the 
extraction of resources (Stuart-Fox 1995:128-131). Exasperated by the perceived Lao 
apathy, the French resorted to meeting labour demands by recruiting large numbers of 
Vietnamese to migrate to Laos (Stuart-Fox 1995:129-30).
The ambition of creating an Indochina-Tonkin-Cochinchina integrated commercial area 
resulted in a failure similar to that of the execution of the taxation system. Governing a 
border required much more than map-making (Walker 2008). The longed for mseenudewr 
of Laos (Stuart-Fox 1995:121) through the exploitation of natural resources, and the 
construction of an efficient infrastructure network remained unfulfilled. The railway dream 
to unite French possessions with China became only partially materialised between Guanxi, 
Yunnan and Tonkin. However, the idea of generating a substantial trade flow down the 
Mekong from China to Saigon via Laos to enforce the Indochinese boundary was never 
implemented (Stuart-Fox 1995; Walker 1999). The French tried to redirect Lao trade away 
from Siamese ports on the west bank of the Mekong and towns further to the west towards 
Vietnam. Yet, they soon realised that commercial bonds between the two sides of the 
Mekong were too well established to be disrupted. Most trade was in the hands of Chinese 
traders on both banks of the river (Stuart-Fox 1995:122). Drawing on commercial routes 
and links created by caravan muleteers, Chinese merchants continued to trade in a wide 
array of goods from Yunnan to Bangkok via Laos and northern Siam even after the border 
demarcation. Traders relied on Chinese business houses and British export companies 
(Stuart-Fox 1995:122-135).
Superior transport infrastructure in Siam compared to northern Laos and Vietnam, along 
with better prices and product availability, maintained the pre-colonial trading status quo. 
Goods exported to Siam included cardamom, stick lack, benzoin, fur, ivory and tea. 
Imports included British and German-made manufactured goods (Stuart-Fox 1995:122). 
Although the French gained control of teak exploitation in northern Laos, they were 
unable to take command of commerce in more profitable goods (Walker 1999:48; 2008). 
French manufactured commodities, which were allowed to enter the colonies duty-free, 
were not sought after in Laos (Walker 1999:48). On the other hand, France applied high 
tax on British, German, and Japanese goods. Yet, these goods were subject to light tax in
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Burma and Siam from where they reached Laos through the loosely supervised Mekong 
border (Walker 1999:48-49). Paradoxically, therefore, the French colonial tariff regime 
benefited the merchants in Siam, Burma and China more than the traders of Indochina 
(Walker 1999:48-49). After a period as long as eighteen years of colonial regime in Laos, a 
French observer admitted, “the internal conditions of commerce and exchange [had] not 
varied” (Reinach 1911:353, quoted in Walker 1999:46). Their failure to regulate the Upper- 
Mekong area of commerce was so extensive that the French had to resort to encouraging, 
rather than prohibiting, economic connections across the border (Walker 1999-50).
As Grabowsky (2003) observes, relying on the Wat Ta Pao version of the Chiang Khaeng 
Chronicle, even after the territorial separation of Chiang Khaeng into two halves with the 
Mekong as the borderline, the social and economic links with the lost territories on the 
right bank were not broken off. Rather, close connections between the people on both 
sides of the Mekong were maintained. Similarly, cross-border socio-economic life between 
Muang Sing on the Lao side and Muang Mang and Muang Phung on the Chinese side were 
perpetuated even after the 1895 Convention. Elders in Muang Mang recalled that period, 
perhaps with a bit of romanticism, as being characterised by mutual connection between 
border residents. Although the French had introduced passports in other areas of their 
Indochinese possessions (Walker 2008), people from Muang Mang and Muang Sing said 
they could “come and go [across the border] easily without using any identification 
papers”28.
According Mae Thao Kham, a 75-year-old lady from Shang Jinglong in Mengman, the 
French were “good people.. .they did not care which nationality we had, they treated us all 
in the same way”. “If the French had stayed in Laos, now Muang Sing people would have 
been more [economically] developed”, she argued, perhaps projecting into the colonial past 
the current rhetoric of Chinese officials towards the neighbouring Lao town. The French, 
she recalled, even provided free vaccinations in Muang Sing, a service that was extended to 
people from Muang Mang and other locals from the Chinese side of the border. Whether 
these memories were created by nostalgia for a lost golden age of peace or by actual facts is 
hard to determine. Yet, they provide a twofold idea of what frontier life of that period was
28 The only interruption to smooth cross-border movement was caused by the Japanese occupation of northern Laos in 
1945. For two years communication and connections between the two sides of the border were restricted. However, this 
was to be resumed soon after the defeat of the Japanese in WWII.
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like: one of on-going interconnectedness between people from both sides of the border, 
and one of dialogue, not only friction, between the French and border residents.
Until the 1950s, Mae Thao Kham visited friends and relatives (T. phinong) in Muang Sing on 
a regular basis for weddings, funerals, festivals and other social occasions. She would cover 
the distance between the two rrmng through the mountain paths on bare feet. Once in Lao 
territory, the main attraction for her was the market located in Muang Sing town. Muang 
Sing hosted the busiest market in northern Laos, probably second to Luang Phabang and 
nearby territories in China (Walker 1999:44). It was also very close to the important salt 
wells in Bo Ten and Bo Flae. Drawing on the town’s commercial potential, in 1911 the 
French built a large building that hosted the market of Muang Sing even after the founding 
of the Lao PDR until 2005.
Mae Thao Kham and other frontier elders described the market of Muang Sing at the turn 
of the 20th century as a thriving commercial place. Even after the border demarcation, Flaw 
caravan traders continued to reach the Muang Sing market via Muang Mang from Simao, 
Mojiang, Pu’er and Dali-fu to sell salt, tea and tobacco and buy opium and cotton to take 
back to trading posts in Yunnan. Burmese and Siamese merchants populated the market 
with European-imported textiles and other types of merchandise such as cotton and ivory 
from the Upper Mekong region. Additionally, local frontier residents, both of low and up 
lands, played an active role in the trading activities of the Muang Sing market by selling 
opium, cotton, and forest products. Many Tai Lue engaged in short distance trade, buying 
products at the market which they would resell at retail in nearby towns and villages. In the 
trans-frontier commerce, the Akha acted as coolies by carrying goods across the 
mountains. Although it is hard to make an accurate estimate of the volume of products 
transacted, Tai elders in Muang Mang recalled that the quantity of products coming from 
Thailand and Burma and imported from Muang Sing into the Chinese side of the border 
surpassed that arriving from China.
By and large, therefore, during the French presence in Muang Sing, mobility patterns of 
Muang Mang’s Tai Lue residents did not change dramatically. Like in the pre-colonial 
period, the trajectory of their movements g across borders remained oriented towards the 
previous Tai polities located along the Mekong in Siam, Burma and Laos. Very few people 
ever made it to Kunming, the main seat of the Qing administration in Yunnan. While 
moving to other locales in the Upper Mekong was facilitated by geographical, linguistic and
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cultural proximity, travelling to places north of Sipsongpanna where people spoke alien 
languages and had different customs was almost unconceivable. Colonial border 
demarcation did not quite translate into the social and cultural incorporation of border 
dwellers into the Chinese centre.
The Frontier under the PRC and the Lao PDR: 1950s-1990s 
Border consolidation: 1950s-early 1960s
The events that transformed the border into a marker of clear-cut separation between 
sovereignties and people was the outcome of the nationalist movements against the French 
and the Royal Government in Laos, and against the Qing and the Nationalist party in 
China. These led respectively to the founding of the Lao PDR in 1975 and PRC in 1949.
In Laos, the first signs of rapid transformation appeared when, in the 1940s, a few different 
foreign armies occupied the north-western regions under French sovereignty. In 1945, the 
Japanese Army seized northern Laos, including Muang Sing, forcing the French to retreat 
into southern China (Hammer 1966:40; Sabattier 1952; Walker 1999:212-213; 232-233). A 
few months later, the Guomindang troops, on their mission to liberate China and its 
southern neighbouring regions from the Japanese, occupied northern Laos. For a period, 
the Nationalists intended to establish Muang Sing as the capital of a Chinese province in 
northern Laos (Walker 1999:51). One year later, the French regained control over northern 
Laos, following the withdrawal of the Chinese Nationalist army and the defeat of the Free 
Lao anti-French troops (Walker 1999:51). In 1953 and 1954, Vietnamese Communist 
forces entered the northern and north-western regions of Laos preparing for the decisive 
anti-colonial battle of Dien Bien Phu against the French. The memorable defeat of the 
French at Dien Bien Phu marked the incorporation of Laos into the northern Vietnamese 
sphere of influence (Walker 1999). After Laos gained full independence in 1953, the anti- 
Royal Government Pathet Lao forces made their presence felt in the north-west with the 
support of the North Vietnamese Army (Walker 1999). After the occupation of a few 
territories and villages to the south of Oudomxai, in 1962 the Pathet Lao and Vietnamese 
troops defeated the Royal Government forces gaining full control over Luang Namtha. 
Following the fall of Luang Namtha, north-western Laos was divided into two zones 
(Walker 1999:52). Muang Sing became part of the northern Communist zone along with 
Luang Namtha, Viang Pukha, Oudomxai and parts of the Beng and the Tha River valleys
82
The Frontier in FEstory
(Walker 1999:52). The Royal Lao Government (RLG) maintained control over the 
southern zone, which included areas adjacent to the Thai border marked by the Mekong 
River. The two regimes that contended for supremacy over the country in this period relied 
heavily on foreign support. The Communists received assistance from China, Vietnam and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), while Thailand became the main source of 
aid and the principal trading partner for the RLG (Walker 1999).
In China, the intense social and political upheaval of the first fifty years of the 20lh century 
involved the overthrowing of the Qing reign (1911); the founding of the Republic of China 
(1912); the anti-Japanese war of resistance (1937-45); and the civil war (1945-1949) between 
the Communist and the Nationalist party for the supremacy over the country. The 
Communist victory over the Nationalists in 1949 triggered a nation-building process based 
on consolidation of borders and assimilation of peripheral citizens into the Chinese centre. 
The priority of the newly established Communist regime was to create a ‘unified’ (Ch. ‘ 
tongyi) ‘New China’. In Sipsongpanna, the first sign of integration became manifest when, 
after the occupation of the People’s Liberation Army in the late 1940s to fight the 
Guomindang troops, in 1953 the former Tai Lue polity was transformed into the 
Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture29. Communist rule coupled administrative 
incorporation with a revolutionary plan of social, cultural, and economic integration aiming 
at eradicating what socialist evolutionist thinking perceived of as the old ‘feudal system’ 
(Ch. Tf it  tf§U fie fengian zkndü). One way of developing ‘backward’ border regions was 
through the mobilisation of more culturally and economically ‘advanced’ people from other 
parts of China (Hansen 1999:395). Ethnic Han Chinese were elected to fulfil this 
‘civilisatory’ task. In the national ethnic classification they were granted a high level of 
civilisation which they were supposed to extend to the newly-defined national minorities in 
border regions.
In the 1950s, the Communist government started to mobilise and transfer large numbers of 
Han Chinese to Xishuangbanna. The majority of migrants were sent from over-populated 
and poor areas of China, in Yunnan, Sichuan and, above all, Hunan. As sons and daughters 
of the home province of Mao Zedong, people from Hunan were particularly chosen to 
migrate to the borderlands so as to build the socialist country (Hansen 1999:401). Between
29 The Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture (Ch. 15 A  fifi. % 13; Ü Vo j'I'l Daizu Zizhizbou) was founded on the 24 
January 1953.
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the 1950s and the 1960s (Hansen 1999:397) thousands of ‘settlers of the frontiers’ (Ch.
Ü  zhibiari)30, arrived in Xishuangbanna31. The newcomers included teachers, farmers, 
cadres and soldiers. The zhibiaris mission involved the establishing of state farms to ‘open 
up and develop’ (Ch. TFS kaifa) the virgin forested wastelands of the borders and “unite 
all the nationalities and people” living there (Jiang 1996:7-8).
In total, ten state farms were set up in the Xishuangbanna Prefecture, whose units, teams 
and sub-teams were scattered across the territory inhabited by native people. The 
permanent nature and vast demographic scope of their settlement made the zhibian into 
real colonists of the borderlands. The state farms where they settled functioned as separate 
economic and social entities outside the local government’s administration. They had their 
own schools, hospitals, housing, and agricultural fields, which were seldom accessible to 
local residents.
The ‘opening’ of new lands for the introduction of agricultural crops was not a smooth 
process. Crops were first to be launched in the state farms and then extended to native 
villages. The newcomers were supposed to teach the local residents how to clear land, use 
fertilisers and plant crops to improve their livelihoods. Tea, sugarcane and rubber were the 
main products chosen to grow in Xishuangbanna. While tea and sugarcane had previously 
been grown in the region, rubber was an agricultural novelty (Xu 2006; Xu et al. 2005). The 
establishment of rubber plantations within the state farm system required the heaviest 
forest destruction. Often the plots that were cleared included forest that Tai Lue and 
mountain dwellers had previously utilised for hunting and collecting vegetation. This plan 
could therefore not be implemented without more or less open discontent, frequently 
degenerating into violence. The 1950s-1960s process of land incorporation in the 
borderlands remained a very hot topic of debate even in the mid-2000s, and was 
interpreted differently according to each person one talks to. The majority of zhibian 
claimed that the opening of land was a ‘must’ to create development for the indigenous 
people. Some Tai residents that had become cadres of the new Communist administration 
in Mengman supported the zhibiaris view and argued that locals gave land to the Han 
willingly without coercion. Commoners, on the other hand, claimed that the zhibiaris 
appropriation of what they regarded as their land occurred through deception and, at times,
30 Zhibian is the abbreviation for zhichi bianjiang literally meaning ‘the supporters of the border regions’.
31 Between 1950 and 1958 nearly 500,000 people were transferred to Yunnan Province. About 22,000 people from Hunan 
arrived in Xishuangbanna in that period.
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use of violence. In the initial stage, native residents were frequently persuaded to concede 
land to the Han in the convivial atmosphere of banquets organised by the newcomers to 
enlist the sympathy of local communities. In a later stage, land appropriation involved 
hostility. “If we resisted, it would be no use. They would just beat us up”, one Tai resident 
of Mengman recalled. Such authoritarian manners adopted for the establishment of rubber 
plantations resembled the treatment reserved for locals during the Land Reform in 1956, 
when opponents to land distribution were labelled as counter-revolutionaries and former 
landlords and then tortured, and in the worse cases, killed. The wife of the former Tsao 
Muang Phung, ruler of the Muang Phung panrn under the Tsao Phaen Din’s regime, was 
one of the victims of the Land Reform’s terror. She was beaten to death by zealous 
revolutionaries.
Rubber was the main crop grown in south-western Yunnan. With the deepening of the 
Cold War and the deterioration of diplomatic relations between China and the USSR, 
developing a robust national rubber industry became a priority. With its sub-tropical 
weather, Xishuangbanna was one of the most suitable regions in China for rubber 
cultivation. Plantations in this area had to supplement the small rubber production of 
Hainan Island and Guangdong Province. In the state design of the young and vulnerable 
Communist regime, large-scale rubber planting along the border regions had to meet 
various ends. Firstly, it had to support China’s autarchic response to the trade embargo 
imposed by the United States after the Korean War (1950-53); secondly, it had to 
contribute to build the national industry, thirdly, it had to support the national defence 
(Chapman 1991:40). Finally, rubber was a strategic crop that could support the control and 
consolidation of national borders (Jiang 1996:3-4;11), a tmchctio sine qua non for the existence 
of a modem nation-state32. The following passionate call to action by a leader of the zhibian 
teams of the Mengman state farm conveys a sense of the revolutionary mission ascribed to 
rubber planting in the borderlands:
Beautiful and richly endowed are the thick forests and fertile soils of the 
borderlands; [those] are the most suitable places to plant rubber for the 
motherland...[We] all ought to reach the borderlands to take root, germinate, 
blossom and bear fruit in order to develop our motherland’s rubber industry 
and contribute to its power ...[We ought to obey the call] of constructing and 
defending the borders.. .(Jiang 1996:48).
32 For more details on the introduction, development and impact of rubber in Xishuangbanna see Xu (2006) and Xu et aL 
(2005).
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Ordered rows of rubber trees were an ideal tool for reaching the modernist goal. In the 
vision of the new regime, plantations created a “legible” border landscape that could be 
more easily monitored than wild vegetation (Scott 1998; Xu 2006).
Nature’s simplification through the domestication of wild forests complemented another 
aspect of the modemist project: human standardisation. In the late 1950s, the central 
government of China started the National Ethnic Classification, whereby cultures and 
societies of the various ethnic people of China were studied and categorised by teams of 
ethnologists (Harrell 1995; Tapp 2002). At the end of the national survey, all Chinese 
citizens were classified into one of the officially identified fifty-six ethnic categories. 
Simplification was also expanded to other aspects of social and economic life. Farmers of 
Xishuangbanna were taught to produce and work together renouncing personal aspirations 
so as to exist as equal members of a collective and not as individuals. Mountain dwellers 
were ‘domesticated’ and encouraged to replace unsettled modes of livelihood, based on 
swidden agriculture and hunting with more sedentary agricultural practices. One of the 
main targets of this type of simplification to the west of the China-Laos border were the 
Akha (Hani under the new ethnic classification) living in Chinese territory.
Yet, the modemist design of the socialist state could not be entirely realised when it came 
into contact with the actions of border residents. Many Akha people managed to stay away 
from the domesticated space of the state farms, some migrating to Laos or Burma, others 
hiding in the mountain forests until the mid 1960s. In Mengman, Tai Lue (Dai under the 
new ethnic classification) residents refused to adopt rubber as the main crop on which to 
base their livelihoods. They considered rubber to be a product alien to their ‘traditional’ 
farming system and for which they lacked the agricultural technical skills. Refusing to plant 
rubber became for the Dai a matter of principle in response to the regime’s imposition. 
Even throughout the collectivisation period (1958 to 1978) Dai farmers continued to grow 
irrigated rice as they had done in the pre-1949 era. They also engaged in the cultivation of 
other crops encouraged by the new regime, such as tea and sugarcane, which were 
nevertheless previously part of their agricultural repertoire. Rubber planting remained until 
the 1980s the prerogative of state farms.
The adaptation of native residents to the revolutionary administrative, social and economic 
system was therefore not a smooth process. In eh mid 2000s, Dai elders recalled the 
suffering and hardship of the collective period, when all residents were asked to work on a
86
The Frontier in FFstory
rigid schedule on communal land “without having the right to rest when [they] needed to”. 
The only way they could coexist with the authoritarian practices of the collectivisation 
agenda was to openly abide by the rules and then, in silence, enact those “everyday forms 
of peasant resistance” (Scott 1985) or hidden dissent that allow subordinated groups to 
cope with hegemonic power dynamics. Some expressed this resistance by resting in the 
fields while not monitored by their superiors, others by keeping for themselves parts of the 
harvest which they were supposed to give to the state. These acts of dissent were 
frequently carried out with the connivance of locals who had become cadres of the 
revolutionary government.
Similarly, the enforcement of fixed borders and clearly defined identities was not a goal that 
could be achieved in toto. The new regime established check-points at the main passages 
along the border. It imposed identification papers on residents to regulate cross-border 
mobility. From the 1950s and throughout the 1960s Mengman residents could, in theory, 
traverse the border into Laos only provided that they obtained a permit from the local 
government. Identification papers were further controlled by the soldiers that monitored 
the frontier. Therefore, although mobility was not prevented it became channelled by a 
tight state regulatory scheme. With the political turmoil leading to the emergence of the 
new socialist regimes on each side of the border, the intensity of border crossings 
diminished. From being a normal practice, travelling back and forth between China and 
Laos became a regulated exception circumscribed to a few important social events a year. 
Yet, feeble contact did not translate into complete rupture. When it was not possible to 
cross through authorised passages, border dwellers continued to traverse the border from 
unofficial border crossings. Illegal crossing remained a normal practice for mountain 
dwellers. Its intensity varied according to the more or less intense monitoring by the 
different army troops that occupied the frontier. The radicalisation of political movements 
often resulted in the subversion of those same elements that were at the basis of modem 
nation-states: stable borders and defined citizenship. Thousands of Xishuangbanna 
residents migrated illegally to Laos to escape the terror of the Land Reform (1956) and the 
Great Leap Forward (1958). Many found asylum in villages in Muang Sing where they had 
relatives or friends. A few reached Thailand, and in some cases the United States.
The political and social transformations that swept over the frontier region in the 1940s- 
50s curtailed the volume of commerce between Muang Sing and Mengman. The caravan 
trade that had kept alive the Muang Sing market up until the early stage of French rule
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steadily diminished. By the mid-1950s, the Chinese government had imposed restrictions 
on private trade. After being limited by the French at the turn of the century, opium trade 
was subject to further restrictions by the new Chinese rulers. The Communists set as a 
priority the eradication of opium cultivation and consumption in China. Opium imports 
into China were strictly forbidden, although some quantities continued to be smuggled. 
The circulation of goods across the border was also affected by the introduction of 
identification papers limiting people’s mobility. Although some residents recall that a feeble 
trade of commodities such as salt and tea was maintained, overall, product exchange 
between China and Laos became increasingly part of the “hidden transcripts” (Scott 1990) 
of frontier life, mainly occurring at night time and through unauthorised border crossings.
Frontier socialist cooperation: 1960s-1977
Cross-border links in the 1960s and 1970s can be described as having developed along two 
lines: official cooperation between the Chinese and Lao socialist regimes; and underground 
commercial and social interactions between frontier dwellers. The nationalist revolutionary 
struggle led by the Pathet Lao had substantial social and economic repercussions on the 
northern Lao regions bordering with China. After the conquest of Muang Sing and Luang 
Namtha, the Communist government in the northern zone faced a period of crisis. 
Ongoing guerrilla fighting in the mountains and heavy bombing by enemy forces created a 
climate of terror. Throughout the 1960s, hundreds of people deserted the Muang Sing 
plain, some fleeing to Bokeo, others to southern Laos, some others to Thailand. The 
refugee exodus involved much of Luang Namtha and Oudomxai, two main targets of the 
American bombing along with the north-eastern regions of Laos bordering northern 
Vietnam. Depopulation and decrease in agricultural production forced the new Communist 
regime to turn to China for support (Walker 1999:54). With the rupture of trading links 
with Thailand, China became northern Laos’ major supplier of commodities, weapons and 
other forms of aid.
Substantial cooperation between China and northern Laos began after representatives of 
the two governments established the first official diplomatic relations in 1961 (Godley and 
St Goar 1991; Zhang 2002). The escalation of the Vietnam War in 1964 encouraged the 
Chinese leaders to increase their aid to Laos as a contribution to the construction of a 
strong socialist bloc in Asia (Zhang 2002). China’s support to the Pathet Lao concentrated 
on three main areas: supply of military and civilian materials; use of Chinese troops in the 
construction of roads in upper Laos; and use of Chinese aircraft artillery troops in defence
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of Chinese engineering soldiers and supply lines in northern Laos (Zhang 2002:1157). 
Chinese supplies to northern Laos included weapons, ammunition, food, medical supplies 
for the front, agricultural tools, clothes, and other basic goods. Chinese aid arrived in Laos 
mainly via Vietnam or was transported from Kunming to the Lao border near Muang Sing 
(Walker 1999:54). To facilitate the flow of Chinese aid and strengthen the Lao national 
liberation movement, it soon became clear that the building of efficient highways in 
northern Laos was a crucial step. Up until the early 1960s transportation lines in Laos had 
remained very poor, mainly based on the former caravan routes. The first project aimed to 
build a highway strengthening the old trading path between Mengla and Muang Sing via 
Mengman (Walker 1999:54). Between 1964 and 1966 the Mengman-Muang Sing region was 
populated by thousands of engineering troops from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army 
(CPLA) who were involved in this major infrastructure effort. Although Chinese soldiers 
made up a large portion of the Muang Sing population, their interaction with local residents 
was not necessarily intense. Zhang (2002:1161) points out that “Chinese soldiers were 
discouraged from contact with the local population, and LPLA [Lao People’s Liberation 
Army] units often set up security lines to keep hostile elements away from the Chinese 
engineering troops and construction sites.” Muang Sing residents confirmed this 
separation. None recalled a case of marriage or any important occasion of socialisation 
between locals and Chinese soldiers.
Walker (1999:54) argues that goods imported from China were sold in the northern 
region’s market by the Pathet Lao government to generate income for the local 
administration. This, he suggests, was crucial to boost trade in the area. Some scholars have 
also pointed out that during the Chinese troops’ presence Muang Sing prospered again as a 
main market centre in north-western Laos (Godley and St. Goar 1991:292). Yet, local 
residents of Muang Sing and Mengman described that period as being characterised by 
limited access to goods. This scenario, they recalled, contrasted strikingly with the thriving 
trading activities that took place in Muang Sing under the French. Access to supplies at 
local markets was monitored by Phatet Lao officials. Since little cash was available to 
individuals under socialist rule, the purchase of manufactured goods was difficult. Muang 
Sing residents recalled that Chinese troops’ supplies were distributed to civilians and 
soldiers through administrative channels. Relative prosperity, mainly based on black market 
activities, was limited to those who had access to goods distribution. Small scale commerce 
between ‘commoners’ from both sides of the border was kept alive through smuggling. In 
that period, Akha residents of the mountains to the west of Muang Sing played a crucial
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role in the underground cross-border trade. With their local knowledge of mountain ridges 
and intricate jungles, they carried goods on behalf of valley residents to be sold in villages 
on the Chinese side of the border. On return they would bring rice and other basic 
necessities to Muang Sing. Akha elders of a Lao village near the border recalled that 
relatives and friends from China were also quite active in smuggling goods for Akha living 
in Laos, especially in periods of food shortage.
By and large, therefore, cross-border social links between the 1960s and mid 1970s 
remained constrained by state regulatory power. The absorption of border citizens into the 
collectivisation system and the intensification of the nation-building process became 
increasingly effective in reinforcing the border as a marker of national separation. The 
launch of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 by Mao spread over the south-western borders 
of China a new wave of terror and anarchy which strengthened anew the regime of control 
on population mobility. During the Cultural Revolution, people crossing at official border 
check-points were asked to obtain written permission from local authorities. Mengman 
residents recalled that when friends or relatives came from Laos, both the host and the 
visitors had to go to the local police station and sign a statement about the nature of their 
relationship. Chinese soldiers would further check on the visitors during the period of their 
stay and make sure that they would return to Laos. The same system was applied on the 
Lao side of the border.
Certainly, in the generalised climate of terror of the Cultural Revolution there were 
numerous attempts by people to bypass regulatory constraints on mobility. Many were the 
cases of border dwellers who had been accused of having committed anti-revolutionary 
crimes finding asylum on the Lao side of the border. Yet the spread of revolutionary 
fervour could not be contained within the national border. A few descendents of former 
Tai Lue noble families in Mengman and Mengpeng were persecuted and beaten up with the 
help of Lao collaborationists. Some never returned to China, losing their lives beyond the 
border, others were dragged back to Mengman and forced to pay for their ‘crimes’ in re­
education camps.
China-Laos official collaboration continued even during the destabilising years of the 
Cultural Revolution. In 1968, Beijing’s leadership agreed to build six new highways in Laos. 
Most of the new road system was to reinscribe the pre-existing caravan routes. In the same 
year, thousands of Chinese engineering troops that had been deployed in northern Vietnam
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were moved to Laos (Zhang 2002:1160). By the early 1970s, a direct link between Mengla 
and Luang Namtha was completed, via the border village of Boten (Walker 1999:55). In a 
new road construction phase, twenty-thousand Chinese soldiers built the highway linking 
Boten to Oudomxai. With the establishment of a Chinese consulate, Oudomxai became the 
main centre of Chinese activities in northern Laos. In 1971 another highway was started, 
linking Oudomxai to Pakbeng in the south, in an attempt to obtain Communist access to 
Thailand via the Mekong (Zhang 2002:1160). A further highway built by the Chinese 
troops connected Oudomxai to Muang Khua to the north-east and met with the 
Vietnamese-built road at the Ou River, not far from the border between Laos and Vietnam 
(Walker 1999:55). This China-Vietnam joint effort realised the French colonial dream of 
creating an east-west trading and transport corridor cross-cutting northern Laos (Walker 
1999:55). The total number of Chinese soldiers involved in road building was over seventy 
thousand (Zhang 2002:1162). By 1978 all the troops had returned to China, leaving 
incomplete the highway linking Luang Phabang to Pakbeng. The abrupt withdrawal of aid 
was dictated by the deterioration of the relationship between China and Vietnam following 
Hanoi’s invasion of Cambodia in 1975. Beijing, a supporter of the Pol Pot regime in 
Cambodia, responded with a punitive invasion of Vietnam (Stuart-Fox 1980).
Border closed-off: 1976- 1980s
Laos’ support of Vietnam in the Sino-Vietnamese incident marked the termination of a 
decade of collaboration between Beijng and the Pathet Lao government. In 1979, the Lao 
administration summoned the closure of the Chinese consulate at Oudomxai. In the same 
year, the closure of the China-Laos border was enforced. From 1981, the Chinese 
concentrated troops along the border with Laos opposite Muang Sing and Boten, 
repeatedly violating Laos’ sovereignty (Gunn 1989:322). This resulted in the reinforcement 
of the Vietnamese army presence in northern Laos. From the mid-1970s up until the early 
1980s the mountain ranges separating Laos from China were occupied by thousands of 
Vietnamese soldiers. A ten-year phase of partial political, economic and social 
disconnection in frontier life began. With Mao’s death (1976) and the defeat of the Gang of 
Four, the Chinese side of the frontier was absorbed into a new nationally-oriented process 
of reforms guided by Deng Xiaoping. Meanwhile, Northern Laos became involved in the 
construction of the newly established Lao PDR state following the seizure of Vientiane by 
the Pathet Lao troops in 1975.
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The closure of the border and the end of collaboration with China signified for Laos an 
increased dependency on Vietnam and the USSR- However, despite the ideological and 
economic support of these two socialist brothers, the construction of the Lao socialist state 
was not an easy task to fulfil. The establishment of a Soviet-style “command economy” 
(Evans 1991:95; Walker 1999) based on anti-feudalist and anti-capitalist principles did not 
occur as smoothly as planned. The enforcement of collectivisation was obstructed from the 
early years of socialist enthusiasm by the incapacity of the new rulers to mobilise peasantry 
to abandon pre-existing land tenure and production practices (Evans 1990; Stuart-Fox 
1997). Although it had nominally become part of an independent state, the strikingly 
multiethnic Lao society lacked the political awareness of a unified nation. The new regime 
faced strong dissent from a large part of its population. Significant non-cooperation was 
apparent in the thousands of Lao people who fled the country after 1975, migrating to 
Thailand, and finding asylum in France, USA and Australia. Many of those that remained in 
Laos showed reluctance to acquiesce to cooperativisation, pay tax, or sell surplus rice to the 
state (Evans 1991:95; Gunn 1983:317; Walker 1999:60). A generalised lack of collaboration 
by the peasants, and the state’s incapacity to generate revenue forced the country into a 
deep economic crisis. Contributing to this malaise was the imposition of a state monopoly 
on foreign trade, restrictions on commercial transactions between rural areas and towns, 
and limits on inter-provincial trade and travel (Walker 1999:60).
As early as 1980, the Lao leadership in Vientiane started to realise that the prohibition of 
goods exchange and trading activities among the population was not a sustainable strategy 
for the development of a poor and sparsely populated country. Initial restrictions were 
relaxed and private trade was resumed (Walker 1999:61). Exchange of forest and 
agricultural products between mountain and valley dwellers was allowed again for it was 
recognised as crucial for the flow of resources in the country (Walker 1999:60). Unofficial 
cross-border trade was also permitted, often with the connivance of government officials.
In spite of the official border closure with China, unauthorised trading activities continued 
to occur. Tai Lue residents in Muang Sing still recall the stratagems that they adopted in 
their trading ventures. Mae Ai Long, today a successful entrepreneur from Muang Sing 
town, used to travel to the nearby town of Xiengkok on the Mekong, across from Burma, a 
couple of times a month. With the help of some friends she would clandestinely buy Thai 
merchandise, which included blankets, thongs, shoes, textiles and skin products to re-sell in 
China. Accompanied by her husband she would climb the mountains separating Muang
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Sing and Mengman via small paths, both carrying the merchandise on their shoulders. 
Often, Akha hill residents were hired to transport the goods for the couple. These journeys 
would always take place at night to avoid being seen by the dozens of Lao, Vietnamese and 
Chinese soldiers who patrolled the frontier. If caught, the traders risked being shot or 
arrested. Nevertheless, the significant revenues deriving from the sale made it worth taking 
the risk. Once in Chinese territory, the couple would find hospitality at the house of some 
Tai Lue friends and relatives in a village in the vicinity of the borderline. It was in this 
private domain that Mengman petty traders would sell Chinese goods to the Lao and buy 
Thai imported goods from the latter. Chinese products taken back to Muang Sing by Lao 
traders included batteries, soap, candles, biscuits, sugar, eggs and cigarettes. This 
merchandise would be sold privately to friends and relatives. Chinese Tai Lue would 
secretly sell Thai goods arriving from Laos in Mengman and Mengla.
In short, during the period of border closure, human mobility across the border continued 
to occur, albeit mostly illegally due to tight regulatory control. Both Chinese and Lao 
citizens were reduced to “bare life” (Agamben 2000) by the regulatory actions of the Lao, 
Vietnamese and Lao soldiers who patrolled the border. The use of violence and force was 
legitimised by a “state of exception”, a situation of political crisis that suspended the rule of 
law and allowed state representatives to decide on human life. The right to life or death was 
dictated by the raison d ’etat that stood above the human condition. A victim of this state of 
exception was the sister of Mae Thao Kham. The woman had moved to Laos during the 
terror of the Great Leap Forward. Having heard that a huge fire had burned Xia Jinglong 
village in 1979, the Lao woman begged border authorities to allow her to cross into China. 
Being denied permission, the lady made her way to Mengman via the mountain paths to 
find that her sister and relatives were still alive. On her way back to Laos the woman was 
stopped by Lao soldiers and, found guilty, was beaten up and sent to a re-education camp 
for two years. Her personal connections with local government officials were of no help.
The only officially recognised right to move across the border as human beings in this 
period of political crisis was inscribed within the refugee scheme supported by the United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Thousands of Lao citizens resettled in 
southern Xishuangbanna to escape the failures of Lao collectivisation. In the Chinese 
government’s geopolitical ambitions, the welcoming of refugees into Chinese territory was 
a way to ingratiate the loyalty and support of the many ethnic groups that straddled the 
Sino-Lao border. Along with shelter and fulfilment of basic needs, refugees received
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military training to organise an anti-Lao resistance guerrilla force. Large numbers of 
Hmong and Yao from Luang Namtha Province who moved to Mengla became part of this 
humanitarian-military scheme. Less involved in the guerrilla plan were the hundreds of 
Akha from Muang Sing that resettled in Mengpeng, Mengrun and Mengman. Some Lao 
refugees became incorporated into the state farms, while others lived in villages inhabited 
by people of the same ethnic background. Consequently, they became acquainted with the 
Chinese agricultural system. The spread of rubber planting in Laos by independent growers 
in the late 1990s, and its further development in the early 2000s finds its roots in this 
refugee experience. Although marked by a climate of surveillance, and nurtured with 
nationally-oriented Chinese agricultural and political principles, refugee resettlement 
contributed to keeping cross-border links alive.
Border reopened: m id 1980s-1990s
In 1983, negotiations for the resumption of diplomatic relations between Vientiane and 
Beijing were initiated. In the same year, the border between the two countries was officially 
re-opened. The tones of rivalry and animosity were replaced by soft words of amity, as 
demonstrated by a speech given by Kaysone Phomivihane, Prime Minister of Laos in 1986:
[tjowards China, we always have affection...[We] care for our friendship with 
Chinese people; we...affirm that we [will] uncompromisingly strive for 
maintaining this friendship.. ..We hope that relations between our two 
countries [will] be normalized on the basis of respect for each other’s 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, of non-interference into 
internal affairs of one another, of non-aggression.. ..and of peaceful co­
existence (Quoted in Phongsavath 2002:146-47).
In 1985, cross-border trade was re-authorised and ethnic groups straddling the frontier 
were encouraged to re-connect (YMXZBWB 1994:546). After some initial reluctance, 
frontier dwellers from both sides of the border started gradually to resume trading in the 
light of day. By the mid 1990s, cross-border trade was flourishing and the mobility of locals 
across the frontier had intensified.
In the early 1990s, the notion of a Greater Mekong Sub-region emerged. In 1992, the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) decided to put into practice the suggestion of Thailand’s Prime 
Minister, Chatichai Choonhavan, to transform “the battlefields of Indochina into a market 
place” (Vatthana and Banomyong 2006:26). The idea was to draw up a plan of cooperation 
between the six states traversed by the Mekong Riven Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar and China’s Yunnan Province. The plan was named after the mighty riven
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Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) (ADB 2002a, 2002b, 2004a, 2004b). It set as its main 
objectives to facilitate trade and sustainable development by enhancing sub-regional 
cooperation in seven areas: transport, energy, telecommunications, environment, human 
resources development, trade and investment, and tourism (ADB 2002b). The final aim of 
the GMS was to integrate its signatory countries into a unique ‘growth area’ and allow them 
to fully participate in the regional and global economy so as to realise what its ideologists 
later termed the three cCs’: connectivity among states, competitiveness as an economic 
bloc, and a sense of regional community (ADB 2004b:14). For its proponents, the GMS 
was a “vision of liberalised economic integration across national borders” (Walker 1999:3).
However, this renewed re-connectedness and cooperation between states translated into 
increased regulation (Walker 1999) and the re-assertion of each country’s sovereignty. In 
the 1990s a new delimitation and demarcation of the common boundary between China 
and Laos was enforced through the establishment of 505 border posts (Phongsavath 
2002:148). A new system of cross-border passes was introduced to channel mobility 
through official crossings. Despite the plans for cooperation, a tariff regime regulating the 
volume and types of goods to be imported and exported across the border was put into 
action. Walker (1999:65) points out that the rhetoric of the proponents of the regional 
integration plan clashed with the socio-economic reality of the borderlands which remained 
dominated by “continuity, competition, and regulation” (Walker 1999:65). Residents in 
Mengman refer to their ventures in cross-border trade in the 1990s as being constrained by 
the rigid control of customs and frontier police. Limitations on the volume of goods 
allowed and the arbitrary application of tariffs maintained a cross-border underground 
trade circuit parallel to the officially authorised flows. The quantity of goods transacted 
illegally across the mountains was as much as the volume of merchandise that passed 
through the Panthong-Chahe border check-point. Promises of cooperation between the 
countries often vanished in the midst of rivalry between officials from each side of the 
border. Global economic plans could not be implemented without being enmeshed in local 
power plays (Walker 1999:65).
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On the social level, the re-opening of the border revitalised those ties that had been 
weakened by almost thirty years of nation-building and warfare. Although, as the previous 
sections have demonstrated, links between the two sides of the border were never 
completely disrupted, centripetal national movements had reduced the intensity of contact. 
They had turned the normality of pre-modem interaction into exceptional socialising 
subject to the gaze of authority. The Chinese nation-state had somehow instilled among 
many of its border citizens an increasingly strong sense of belonging to the Chinese 
fatherland. Many scholars (Cohen 2000; Davis 2003; Wasan 2005) have celebrated the re­
opening of the border as a return to the pre-modem past when the social life of frontier 
dwellers occurred free of constraining national thrusts. On the contrary, the chapters that 
follow will highlight how the revitalisation of cross-border ties has occurred parallel with 
the flourishing of nationally-oriented socio-economic and cultural practices.
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Figure 19. Rhetoric of China-Laos cooperation on the hillside in Boten: “a beautiful 
landscape and good roads strengthen the friendship between China and Laos”
Figure 20. Trans-border rubber cooperation: 
Chinese-initiated plantations in Myanmar along the Mekong River
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Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to show how the frontier has maintained its indeterminate, 
fluid and unstable character over time. Despite the political breaks produced by the ruling 
entities that succeeded each other in the region, the Sino-Lao frontier was never completely 
incorporated into any of the cores of power. Lack of absolute integration should not be 
interpreted as absence of change. During the pre-modem period, as I have stressed, fluidity 
was generated by the overlapping of small polities with mighty empires. Interactions 
between margins and the centres of power, and between multiple centres were regulated by 
a diversified and ever-changing range of borders, some fluid, some more fixed, and others 
defining ambiguous zones of competition and exchange. Local residents, migrants, traders 
and bureaucrats in the various political entities all participated in maintaining, disrupting or 
negotiating borders through their socio-economic and cultural practices. The notion of 
fixed borders brought about by the discursive power of colonial maps did create a new 
modem geography. Yet, this new mapping remained more a discursive innovation than a 
reality (Walker 1999). The implementation of colonial map-making was constantly subject 
to local re-workings and interpretations. It remained unrealised up until the formation of 
the Chinese and Lao modem nation-states. Through revolutionary movements and nation­
building projects, borders became fixed lines separating discrete sovereignties and people in 
the 1950s. The introduction of identification papers and cross-border permits aiming to 
circumscribe belonging within national compartments did succeed in forging a national 
awareness among border residents. Nevertheless, even during the period when border 
closure was strictly enforced, frontier dynamism persisted through hidden meanderings 
across the territory, the resettlement of refugees, and smuggling. The re-opening of the 
border in the 1980s revived old trans-border ties and created new transnational 
connections, but did not erase national thrusts. Nowadays, the frontier continues to 
fluctuate in between these national and transnational impetuses.
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Chapter Three
Sovereignty at Risk? Chinese-Driven 
Rubber Planting in Luang N amtha
Figure 21. Rubber boom: latex being collected in Mengman near the border with Laos
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O n  t h e  d a y  o f  t h e  Ch i n e s e  n e w  y e a r  i n  Fe b r u a r y  2008, four long
tables were set outside the Thai-style mansion of the Chinese rubber company in Nalae. As 
many as a hundred people were expected to join the celebration of this important social 
event in the Chinese calendar. Two corpulent pigs and a water buffalo had been 
slaughtered at dawn. A cohort of Lao workers, their wives and female friends, the manager 
and the brothers of Lao Zhang, the Han company’s boss, had been mobilised to organise 
the feast. On the previous day, Lao Zhang’s extended family had also made it for the first 
time to the rough countryside of Laos from one of the Mengman state farms. Even his 
mother, now in her late seventies, had arrived. She came, she said, seemingly continuing 
along the same path that she had covered on foot in the 1960s to open the wild 
borderlands of the country with rubber planting. This time, however, the woman and her 
son had made her way through the rugged mountains of the Laos-China frontier in a red 
four-wheel drive.
At five o’clock in the afternoon, the Lao guests started to arrive. The local personalities 
were honoured at the table in the centre. In a hierarchical order, the district vice-governor, 
the head of the District Planning and Investment Office (DPIO), and the chief of the 
district police gathered right next to Lao Zhang and his brothers. A few seats further away 
sat two agents of the District Agriculture and Forestry Office (DAFO) who had been 
recently employed by the company. The chiefs of the villages where the company had 
established its rubber plantations were arranged at surrounding tables, next to lower-level 
local government officials and other acquaintances. ‘Happy New Year’ toasts were 
exchanged between hosts and guests from one table to the other, alternating between 
Chinese and Lao.
Going against the Chinese New Year custom, Lao Zhang chose to please his guests with an 
assortment of Lao dishes. The lavish menu included stir-fried hot chilli buffalo with 
bamboo shoots, fried peanuts, grilled pork, and boiled vegetables with spicy chilli and 
tomato sauce. Only a Chinese style stewed pork dish belied the Lao imprint of the banquet. 
Yet, among such a myriad of delicacies, to the great surprise of the guests, no rice could be 
seen on the tables. “This is what happens when you plant rubber with the Chinese. There 
won’t be any rice to eat!”, giggled someone sitting next to me. In the blink of an eye, the 
comment had spread across the table, generating the hilarity of most of the invitees. There 
was a unanimous sigh of relief when, following the rules of Chinese conviviality, towards
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the end of the dinner, Lao helpers served copious quantities of white rice. Only then, 
inebriate with com wine and reassured of food security, Lao guests lowered their 
inhibitions entering in a festive symbiosis with the Chinese hosts. In this joyous 
atmosphere, the New Year celebration continued late into the night.
On a superficial level of analysis, the above vignette could be read as an expression of jovial 
conviviality between Chinese and Lao. The banqueting between Lao Zhang, his family, the 
Lao officials and the Lao village leaders is also a socio-cultural constituent of a broader and 
new economic mechanism of investments that since the mid-2000s has been initiated by 
Chinese migrants, small entrepreneurs and large companies in north-western Laos. These 
new economic arrangements unfold through an intermingling of centrally-devised political 
directives from Beijing and Vientiane and locally-embedded border practices.
The increasingly large size and atypical combination of profit-aid and cooperation- 
exploitation of Chinese investments in mainland Southeast Asia has prompted cries of 
alarm among an array of Western aid agents, socio-economic analysts and academics 
working and researching in the Mekong region, about a subtle, Chinese politico-economic 
and cultural penetration. Kurlantzick (2007:5-6), for instance, has considered Chinese 
investment, trade, formal diplomacy, aid, and the establishment of Confucius institutes1 
overseas as the new tools used by Beijing to exercise “soft poweC, an expression that 
Joseph Nye (1990, 2004) had coined to define American global expansionism after World 
War II. Soft power is the ability to obtain what one wants through co-option and attraction 
of others rather than the through hard power of the stick Recently, Kurlantzick (2007:5) 
assumes, China has adopted this strategy of diplomacy to transform itself from a global 
threat into a global benefactor.
Unveiling the recent connections between the central leadership and Chinese investors in 
Cambodia, Menguin (2007:2) has more pessimistically argued that Chinese aid and 
investments help “to consolidate a political economy based on arbitrariness, increased 
inequalities and violence, as well as the overlapping of positions of power and 
accumulation”. In the context of rubber investments in north-western Laos, Walsh (2009) 
has claimed that:
1 Confucius Institutes are public institutes which aim to promote Chinese language and culture and support 
Chinese teaching internationally.
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[t]he ability of the Chinese involved to organize cross-border activities and 
exchange of resources exceeds in most cases the ability of state-based 
organizations to do the same.
He theorises that:
[i]n a geographic region in which the rule of law is limited, transparency of 
official activities is low and the technical capacity of state agencies restricted, 
the rapid growth of economic activities conducted by private sector firms and 
individuals can lead to the creation of a kind of shadow or para-state.
While conducting my research between 2005 and 2008, the positions of these academics 
were echoed by the voices of Western aid operators and some Lao frontier residents who 
claimed that “[Luang] Namtha Province is becoming part of China”. “Where is Laos going? 
The Lao government is selling the country to China!...Muang Sing has already been sold to 
the Chinese”, commented my Akha interpreter on the rubber deals in which Chinese 
businesses and Lao government officers in Muang Sing were together involved. Perhaps 
influenced by the rhetoric of Western aid agents he worked for, he hinted that the 
incorporation of northern Laos into China was a fait accompli. A Hmong man who, while 
working as a driver for an aid organisation in the area, had established a large rubber 
plantation on his own from acquiring rubber expertise in China, expressed his 
understanding of the situation thus:
Lao commoners do not have rights over their lands as the government decides 
for them...The big fish eats the small fish and the small fish eats the smaller 
fish. The Chinese companies eat the Lao government and the Lao government 
eats Lao common people. But the companies and the Lao government eat 
together!
A lowland Lao and DAFO officer from Muang Sing who himself planted rubber and was 
involved in lucrative deals with Chinese entrepreneurs operating in the district joined this 
chorus of complaints: “The Chinese have not come to develop Laos. They have come to 
colonise Laos, just like the French did”.
The multivocal opinions by the above actors finds a common ground in two main points: 
first, China’s economic expansionism will turn or, according to some, has already turned, 
into political and economic dominance over its neighbours. Laos, land-locked and one of 
the least-developed countries in Asia whose rulers are prone to corruption, is deemed to be 
a particularly easy target of this expansionism. Laos’ vulnerability is leading to a Chinese 
territorial encroachment. Sovereignty of the Lao state is being partially shifted to Chinese
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companies and investors to the extent that the Lao Northern Provinces are said to have 
become a “shadow state” or a colony of China. Second, Chinese-driven investments, 
particularly in the rubber sector, are univocally seen in a framework of exploitation. While 
their rulers collaborate and share profits with the colonisers, Lao farmers are victims of the 
Chinese rubber companies’ predatory practices. The companies are depriving Lao people 
of their land and resources. Locked up for centuries in a subsistence economy, Lao farmers, 
it is assumed, are still inexperienced in managing new market mechanisms and therefore, 
easily fall into the trap of contract farming or land concessions with foreign investors. 
From independent shifting cultivators, Lao upland farmers are becoming waged labourers 
of the investors from China.
But who or what is ‘China’? Who are the Chinese in Laos? Who are the Lao that are being 
exploited and those that are becoming wealthier under Chinese influence? Why such 
discrepancy in wealth distribution? What does the act of eating and banqueting mean? 
What are the socio-political constituents at the basis of Chinese-driven rubber investments? 
Is Lao sovereignty really being undermined by the influx of Chinese capital? These seem to 
be crucial questions that deserve answering if we want to gain an understanding of the 
investment dynamics and the Sinophobic sentiments that many Westerners and a few Lao 
locals have developed since the mid-2000s.
To this end, first, I argue that the claims of Chinese neo-colonialism in Laos oversimplify. 
In a fashion that resonates with the ‘Yellow Peril’ phobia of the Cold War period, the such 
claims reify China as a monolithic politico-economic entity that marches beyond its south­
western borders to sweep all it finds on its way, ruthlessly absorbing natural resources, raw 
materials, land and labour in the name of its national economic growth (Wiens 1967). The 
Chinese are seen as an undistinguished and uniform mass of evil exploiters. Similarly, Lao 
people are divided into two simplified categories: one of poor, disenfranchised farmers and 
one of conniving, profit-making rulers. This homogenising picture ignores the array of Lao 
and Chinese individuals of various ethnicities, areas, classes and political strata that 
participate in the investment process with Chinese investors. It also overlooks the 
diversified and complex ways in which these actors interact with each other, producing not 
only scenarios of exploitation, but also of resistance, dialogue and compromise.
Second, I suggest that at the basis of the contemporary Sinophobia is not just the actual 
predatory behaviour of the Chinese investors. For the Lao farmers and small entrepreneurs,
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constructing the Chinese as ‘evil colonisers’ is a way to defend themselves from the 
Chinese investors’ more competitive capacity to use resources and land and to master 
agricultural knowledge. For the above-mentioned Western thinkers, aid agents, and large 
numbers of commoners, mystifying China and the Chinese is part of an orientalising 
ideology (Said 1978). It is a defensive discursive mechanism against the unknown that 
frightens. Constructing China as ‘bad’ and the West as ‘good’ is instrumental to 
circumscribe ‘China”s growing political and economic influence on a global scale. Many 
Western aid agents I met in Laos demonised what they considered the unfamiliar and 
indecipherable modus operandi of the Chinese to assert the superiority of Western pro-poor 
development orientations. Apart from ‘cultural others’, in their speech, Chinese came 
across as ‘economic others’ whose predatory and profit-oriented actions were opposed to 
the benevolent and non-profit dispositions of Westerners. Orientalising China was a way to 
constrain Chinese aid interventions, which although of dubious transparency, were in many 
cases more efficient or captured the farmers’ hope for poverty alleviation more 
efficaciously than Western-designed projects had done over ten years of operating in 
northern Laos. Othering China was seemingly a result of fear that Western aid would lose 
ground to the advantage of a Chinese mode of development. In sum, I see alarmism about 
Chinese expansionism as more a Western counter-territorialising tactic than an empirically 
proven fact. What follows in this chapter is an attempt to demystify this orientalising 
rhetoric by unravelling the complexities of Chinese-driven rubber planting in north-western 
Laos.
Jane and Peter Schneider’s (2005) notion of “plural cultures” illuminates. Following their 
master Eric Wolf’s appreciation of Anthony Wallace’s (1970) call to think about culture as 
“an organisation of diversity” rather than “the replication of uniformity”, the Schneiders 
(2005) have debunked the myth of a homogenised Sicilian and Mafia culture in Southern 
Italy. The Schneiders (2005:501) respond to the stereotypical representation of Sicilian 
culture as condemned to backwardness because of its traditional embeddedness in 
clientelism, corruption, familism, patriarchy and lack of trust, with differentiated histories 
of the mafia and the antimafia movement, highlighting the “contrasting values and 
practices that are specific to each”. Sicily and the mafia emerge as “culturally plural” rather 
than as culturally homogeneous. From their analysis we leam that “culture is best 
understood in [its] historical context and in relation to the ‘alternative voices and traditions’ 
that would challenge the dominant ideological forms” (Schneider and Schneider 2005:509).
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This chapter explores the plural cultures of Chinese-driven rubber planting in Luang 
Namtha Province to show how the influx of global capital has affected the sovereignty of 
the Lao state and its citizens. I read the rubber investments by large Chinese businesses as a 
‘process of diversity, rather than as an organisation of uniformity. In so doing, I reject 
officialism or abstract politico-economic theories in favour of empirical, analytical 
complexity that goes beyond the face value of foreign investments and neo-colonialism. I 
elucidate such complexity by dissecting the process of rubber development into two levels 
of analysis: rhetoric and practice. I start with exploring the rhetoric of rubber planting. I 
describe Chinese-driven rubber investments as a (trans)national machination, a strategy that 
served the particular national interests of the Chinese and Lao central states. I then move 
on to investigate the rhetoric of the Chinese investors. The company agents saw then- 
rubber ventures in northern Laos as the perpetuation of the “civilising mission” (Nyiri 
2006) initiated by the zhibian in the 1960s on the Chinese side of the border. Mixing 
lucrative goals with philanthropic impetuses, the investors portrayed themselves as carriers 
of ‘civilisator/ developmental solutions for the Lao people. The colonising nature of the 
written word of the contracts signed between the companies and the Lao officials 
complemented the civilising rhetoric. Nevertheless, this (trans)national, civilisatory and 
colonialising project was countermanded precisely by the incongruence between rhetoric 
and practice. The companies’ operations were muddied when they became embedded in 
local social relations and cultural peculiarities. To obtain the complicity of various level Lao 
government officials the investors practiced established social connections (Ch. gmnxi) and 
dispensed bribes, gifts and banquets. Additionally, operations occurred by building a cross- 
border, multi-ethnic China-Laos axis. Yet, the Chinese rubber business was hampered by 
national, institutional and cultural boundaries. Open or more subtle manifestations of 
resistance by the Lao villagers contributed to obstruct the Chinese companies’ mseenwlmr 
of north-western Laos (Stuart-Fox 1995) through rubber. By describing the risks and 
opportunities that all parties involved faced, I highlight the dynamics of Chinese-driven 
rubber investments as inscribed within a complex framework of experimentation. I 
conclude that the influx of global capital in north-western Laos has resulted in maintaining 
power and sovereignty for the Lao state.
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Rubber Rhetoric 
(Trans)national machinations
The expansion of rubber planting in Luang Namtha Province between 2004 and 2008 was 
closely linked to new trends in the Chinese market. After almost a 40-year period during 
which China’s domestic latex price had remained quite low within a subsidised state 
economic regime, in 2003, prices underwent a sudden increase. Mainly utilised in the 
domestic automobile industry, rubber came to be one of the four crucial industrial 
materials needed to boost China’s rapidly growing economy2. As a result, China started to 
emerge as the world’s main rubber consumer. The scarcity of land suitable for rubber 
planting within China’s boundaries3 and the insufficient domestic supply caused China to 
become the world’s largest importer of rubber. The Chinese central government saw a way 
to meet the domestic demand by both importing raw rubber from other rubber producing 
regions elsewhere in the world and initiating cultivation in other Asian countries and later 
in Africa. For its proximity to China’s largest rubber planting areas in Xishuangbanna, 
Luang Namtha was one of the regions to be included in this state design. Luang Namtha 
offered large land and at a much lower price than China. Pre-existing socio-economic 
cross-border links between southern Xishuangbanna and the Lao province contributed to 
create the conditions for transnational rubber development between China and Laos.
The central governments of Bejing and Vientiane marked this cooperation through a series 
of official agreements and memoranda of understanding. The “China-Laos joint statement” 
signed in 2000 on Chairman Jiang Zemin’s official visit to Laos— the first by a Chinese 
leader since the Sino-Lao political crisis in the late 1970s—established long-term all-round 
collaboration between the two countries in various sectors of the economy, defense, 
security, education, health, culture, and tourism. Rubber development was listed as one of 
the key projects of the statement (Shi 2008:25). In March 2004, the Vice-Prime Minister 
Wuyi’s visit to Vientiane further sanctioned the involvement of the Chinese government in 
rubber cultivation in Laos. This time, the focus of the agreements was the Yunnan State 
Farms, the core rubber planting institutions in China’s border regions since the 1960s. The 
resolution allocated 2,500,000 "if mu (=16,675 hectares) for rubber development in four 
northern provinces of Laos, including Luang Namtha (Shi 2008:25). Finally, a third visit by
2 The other three are coal, petroleum, and iron.
3 In China, natural rubber is grown in Southern Yunnan, particularly in Xishuangbanna, in Hainan Island and 
in some areas of Guangdong Province. These are the only areas with a suitable climate for planting the crop.
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President Hu Jintao to Vientiane in November 2006 further boosted bilateral economic 
bonds in various economic sectors including rubber.
Playing the card of ideological affinity, President Hu’s speech to the Lao authorities 
stressed China and Laos’ common goal of constructing socialism through collaboration 
between two parties, two countries, and two nations (ZRGZRZ 2006). Yet this target was 
to be attained following national motivations, or, “according to each country’s specific 
conditions” (ZRGZRZ 2006). Therefore, fraternal, socialist cooperation between 
neighbours did not exclude the protection of each state’s particular interests. In line with 
this broader political framework, Chinese-driven rubber planting came to be what I term a 
‘(trans)national project’, where the brackets that separate the prefix ‘trans’ from the 
morpheme ‘nation’ indicate the ambiguity underlying this state design. The brackets convey 
the veiling of national benefits through the rhetoric of transnational collaboration.
The plan involved the swap of Chinese privately and state-owned capital and technical 
expertise for land use and manpower in the neighbouring country. In turn, latex produced 
in Laos was to be transferred back across the border to feed China’s national market needs. 
This marked a shift in the way the Chinese central government had conceived of rubber 
planting in the past. In the 1960s-70s period, rubber cultivation was an exclusively national 
endeavour. Rubber was among the resources chosen to sustain the building of New China 
as a modem and independent nation. In the 1960s-70s, a rationale of autarchy due to 
political closure to the West and the USSR had circumscribed the cultivation and 
production of rubber within the national borders. In Chapter Two, I pointed out that 
rubber plantations, with their “legibile” and ordered rows (Scott 1998), were used by the 
newly-established communist regime as a way to define and defend the south-western 
borders of the Chinese state. Rubber trees had to separate China’s national sovereignty 
from the Lao one. Furthermore, rubber cultivation and manufacturing were inscribed 
within a state farm system where land, means of production and outputs all belonged to the 
Chinese central state. In contrast, the (trans)national rubber project of the 2000s blurred 
the distinction between the national and transnational field and between the private and 
state sphere.
The (trans)national spirit of rubber investments in the 2000s had its roots in the Chinese 
national policy framework ‘to go out’ (Ch. yk lb d? zoudouqu). The Chinese central 
government had launched this three-word motto for the first time in 1998 to encourage
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Chinese citizens to move beyond the national boundaries and sow capital and harvest 
industrial raw materials and natural resources, to nourish the nation’s economy. It aimed to 
transform China from being primarily a recipient of foreign investment to also a key 
initiator of investment (Shi 2008:24). Further developed in the early 2000s, the cto go out’ 
political formula was in line with the Chinese government’s changed attitude towards 
Chinese overseas migrants. The latter, formerly stigmatised as traitors for abandoning the 
motherland, had since the 1980s been rehabilitated as crucial contributors to China’s 
modernisation. In the new framework of economic cooperation, Chinese migration was 
presented as a social phenomenon instrumental to the motherland and to the recipient 
country. Chinese migrants and investors had to become producers of development and 
modernisation both for their own and the hosting nation (Nyiri 2006:95).
In Yunnan, the ‘to go out’ national agenda was linked to the ‘Poppy Cultivation 
Replacement Program’, an economic directive prompted in the early 1990s by the Yunnan 
provincial government in cooperation with Laos and Myanmar. This program was designed 
to substitute poppy with other legally marketable cash crops in the provinces of the two 
neighbouring countries bordering with China. While the declared aim of this project was to 
reduce poppy cultivation in Laos and Myanmar, it also served China’s national purpose of 
circumscribing the flow of narcotics across its borders. Furthermore, the scheme was 
devised so as to ensure that China be the main recipient of the crops promoted to replace 
opium. This fulfilled the domestic demand for natural industrial resources and agricultural 
products, whilst also altruistically promising to release the Lao and Burmese farmers from 
the yoke of poverty and opium addiction. After being implemented on a more unstructured 
basis, in 2004, the “Poppy Cultivation Replacement Program” was intensified and subject 
to new regulations. In conjunction with the zoudoiqu directives, a series of new policies 
were formulated by the Chinese authorities to simplify the investment approval process, 
relax capital requirements, ease labour restrictions, and provide financial incentives to 
investors (Shi 2008:23).
It would be misleading to describe the rubber boom in Luang Namtha in the 2000s as a 
plan exclusively prompted by the Chinese government and passively accepted by the Lao 
authorities. Indeed, rubber planting was also a plan of the Lao state that had to serve the 
Lao national interests. Both the Lao central and provincial administrations played an active 
role in the promotion of rubber in northern Laos. As early as 1991, the Luang Namtha 
provincial authorities had identified rubber as a strategy that could serve a threefold
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purpose: poverty alleviation, stabilisation of swidden cultivation, and poppy eradication 
(Shi 2008:17). For this reason, in 1994, the provincial authorities had encouraged six 
villages to plant the crop on an experimental basis by providing subsidised loans and 
technical support through links with the Chinese State Farms (Shi 2008:12). Part of this 
first state-driven rubber experiment was Ban Flat Nyao4, a FImong village not far from the 
provincial capital whose former chief secured government subsidies to the village while 
acting as vice governor of the province. For its success in rubber planting, mainly based on 
a cooperative system, Hat Nyao set a national model that various communities in north­
western Laos tried to imitate in the following years. In 2003, the provincial administration 
delineated more precise guidelines to regulate the promotion of large-scale rubber planting 
in the province. The regulation established that in addition to smallholders, rubber 
cultivation could be realised through investments by foreign and domestic companies 
through either concession or contract farming (Shi 2008:17). The Lao central government 
sustained provincial initiatives on rubber with policies on foreign investment. The 2004 
national law on foreign investment accorded preferential treatments for foreign companies 
through exemptions or reductions on profit tax, import duties on equipment and vehicles, 
and export duties on import products according to the investor’s zones of operation (Shi 
2008:17). Within this climate of (trans)national state promotion Luang Namtha Province’s 
total rubber area grew from a few hundred ha in 2003 to 12,585 ha in 2006, with the largest 
rubber forest coverage in Namtha and Muang Sing districts (Shi 2008:13-14).
The civilising project: between aid and profit
Responding to the zouchuqu call, in 2004, hordes of Chinese small and large investors 
started to engage in rubber planting in north-western Laos. Rubber ventures paralleled a 
myriad of other economic activities in which Chinese entrepreneurs and migrants were 
involved in the province. These spanned the commercial, agricultural, mining, industrial, 
energy, infrastructure, and service sectors. Since the early 2000s, Chinese entrepreneurs 
from Xishuangbanna, Kunming, Hunan, Anhui, and as far away as Guangdong, had played 
a crucial role in the commercialisation of agriculture in Luang Namtha. With the support of 
the Lao authorities, they had transformed the local semi-subsistence economy into a 
market-based economy. The crops promoted included com, sugarcane, banana, cassava, 
watermelon, pumpkin, capsicum and tea. Rubber was part of this agriculture revolution.
4 For details of the economic development of rubber planting in Ban Hat Nynao see Vongpaphane and 
Cramb (2008).
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The nine3 large Chinese companies that established rubber businesses in Luang Namtha 
province between 2004 and 2006 operated through the Poppy Replacement Program. Most 
of them had headquarters in Kunming or Xishuangbanna, although capital flowed into 
Laos from as far away as the northern and coastal provinces of China (Shi 2008:50). 
Almost all companies were privately-owned. An exception was Yunnan Rubber, a Lao 
branch of the Yunnan State Farms Group which was a joint private-state-owned company. 
Yet, all firms maintained political, financial or personal bonds with sections of the Chinese 
government, be these at the national, Yunnan provincial or the Xishuangbanna prefectural 
level. As such, their operations were consistent with the intertwinement of public (Ch. TV 
gong) and private (Ch. si) that has characterised Chinese business since the Reform and 
Open Door era. As Plsing (1997:155) notes, in China,
[the] public and private are seen as being a continuous spectrum.. .or as being 
concentric circles. Gong [public] is a congregation of private, individual entities, 
and there are different levels of publicness. Therefore, the expansion of si 
[private] is not always considered as an evasion of gong, but rather as an 
adjustment of the level of publicness (or privateness) in different situations.
The overlapping of public and private was for instance manifest in the management of 
Zhenhua, a company operating in Viang Phuka district which was attached to the Yunnan 
Provincial Land Reclamation Team. The Tungli-Jinggu company, a Lao-Chinese joint- 
venture between the ex vice-governor of Luang Namtha Province and an ex official of the 
Chinese Xishuangbanna administration also reproduced this pattem. Both managers of the 
firm, so rumours suggested in Luang Namtha town, were still well-connected with fringes 
of the Chinese and Lao government bodies that guaranteed protection in business.
The rubber planting initiated by Han Chinese in Laos in the mid-2000s bore not only the 
economic roots but also social and ideological continuity with, the rubber endeavours of 
the zbibian in the 1960s. A large number of investors and rubber technicians operating in 
Luang Namtha Province were the descendants of the zbibian or residents of the state farms 
from Mengman, Menpeng and Mengrun. Large companies were no exception to this 
pattem. Nevertheless, many firms did not have any real previous involvement in rubber 
planting. As I will elucidate later, they strongly relied on rubber technical experts to 
implement their ventures, many of whom were from the state farms.
5 The rubber companies operating in Luang Namtha Province in 2007 were: Yunnan Rubber, Ruifeng, 
Diyuan, Shengli, Tongly-Jinggu, Zhenhua, Jiachuang, and Taijiang. The name of a ninth company operating 
in the province is unknown (Shi 2008:50).
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Jiachuang was one of the companies whose bonds with the state farms permeated its social 
basis from the managers to the employees. As mentioned in the introduction to this 
chapter, Lao Zhang, the Jiachuang’s boss, was the offspring of a zhibian couple. In a 
nostalgic recollection of the zhibian revolutionary period, Lao Zhang’s mother described 
her and her husband’s migration to Xishuangbanna from Hunan in 1962 as a heroic act of 
obedience to Chairman Mao’s call to develop the border regions of China. After residing in 
Xiao Mengyang in western Xishuangbanna for ten years, the couple had been sent to the 
deep south of the prefecture. Relocated in one of the settlements of the Mengman state 
farm, the Zhangs had worked to establish large rubber plantations along the border with 
Laos. In the rubber cradle, the Zhang couple had nurtured five children. All family 
members had spent a large portion of their lives fulfilling revolutionary duties, some as 
rubber tappers and some as managers of the rubber production and manufacturing at the 
state farm. Forty years after the parents’ undertaking, the eldest of the Zhang’s children 
decided to perpetuate the family’s rubber planting tradition in Laos. In this effort, Lao 
Zhang was supported by his two younger brothers and one of his two sisters. Even his and 
his siblings’ children joined the undertaking, some working as supervisors in the plantations, 
others studying tropical agriculture in Jinghong, some others simply aspiring to be educated 
in commerce in the best universities of China to become managers of the latex exports for 
the family’s firm in the near future.
Lao Zhang described his rubber venture in Laos as the perpetuation of the mission 
initiated by his parents on the frontier of China as follows:
When we came here two years ago there was nothing.. .the road from Namtha 
was very bad, in some parts totally impassable. We did not have any other 
choice but to talk to the [Lao] government officials and bring a bulldozer from 
China to upgrade the road. Now it has improved a lot. We have also 
ameliorated the roads to the villages where we planted mbber. Lao people here 
are really poor, as were the people of Xishuangbanna when my parents arrived 
in the 1960s sent by Chairman Mao. The [Lao] have very little to make a living 
on. But as Chinese border residents have experienced development with my 
parents, in ten years time Lao people will become wealthy with us....My 
parents were the zhibian for the people of Xishuangbanna. We can say that my 
brothers, sister and I are the wealth-bringers (Ch. ' r f /  f p  daiß) for the Lao 
people.
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Figure 22. Between aid and profit: billboard of a rubber investment by a 
Chinese company within the “Poppy Replacement Program” in an Akha village in Muang Sing
Figure 23. Rubber seedlings’ nursery in a village in Muang Sing
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Therefore, I suggest, the daifu expanded beyond China’s borders the “civilizing project” 
(Harrell 1995) that the Chinese centre of power has undertaken since the imperial times to 
domesticate and modernise the ‘uncivilised’ and ‘backward’ ethnic minority people of the 
frontiers. The civilising project has been reiterated in the Open Door and Reform era by 
the Chinese leadership through the new rhetoric of development. Development is 
conceived as a linear, progressive process from backwardness to modernity, having as its 
main focus economic growth, cultural amelioration and the improvement of the 
population’s quality. Ethnic minority people along the Chinese frontiers are encouraged to 
follow this idea of development to reach modernisation along the patterns set by the centre. 
Since the early 2000s, China has exported this development “civilisatory” model abroad 
through state-led aid, investment, and migration (Nyfri 2006). Laos, a major recipient of 
Chinese aid and investment, can be seen as included in this civilising mission abroad. Lao 
Zhang and the other rubber investors’ undertakings were in line with the Chinese 
government’s development ideology.
The civilisatory overtone and developmental end of rubber planting was confirmed by the 
Chinese investors’ use of the term kaifa to describe their undertakings. Kaifa, meaning to 
develop, to open up, to exploit land hitherto untouched by the human hand, refers to the 
domestication of what is wild and the transformation of uncultivated land into an 
exploitable resource to create a more ‘advanced’ economic setting. This word, in use since 
the Qing era (Peng 1990), was adopted by the zhibian in the 1960s-70s when they arrived in 
Xishunagbanna. Just as the zhnbiaris opening of waste land along China’s national borders 
resulted in the improvement of the local people’s living standards, the Chinese investors 
argued, so would the opening of forest land in Laos improve the lives of the Lao people.
The zhibian had been driven by the revolutionary spirit of serving the people (Ch. A A R  
wb renmnfumif. The daifu merged profit-making with altruistic ends. Nyiri (2006:84-5) 
observes that while international organisations conceive Western-originated development- 
aid as a non-profit affair, Chinese officials and managers include within the aid rubric even 
the most lucrative business undertakings overseas. In the discourse of Chinese companies 
or investors in Laos, aid and investment emerged as two interlinked processes necessary to 
rescue Lao farmers from the condition of underdevelopment and lead them towards 
modernisation. Rubber planting was presented as a form of aid, despite the lucrative goals
6 To serve the people (Ch. wd reminfwm) was a slogan coined by the Chinese Communist Party in the 1940s 
to exhort the Chinese masses to act in the service of the people in the name of the Revolution.
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pursued by the companies. To give further credibility to their aid purpose, many companies 
committed in the written agreements to combine the establishment of plantations with 
infrastructure amelioration, such as road building, and power or water supply.
Nevertheless, in public speeches, investors veiled the lucrative propositions with a patina of 
philanthropy. At a workshop on rubber development organised by the GTZ in November 
2005, the manager of the Zhenhua Company thus responded to the claims by Western aid 
agents about the firm’s assumed exploitation of Lao farmers: “Investing in rubber planting 
and development is a foreign business for the universal fraternity and support of the Lao 
people”. At the same meeting, a private investor in the Chengli Rubber Company acting in 
Muang Sing defended his cause thus: “while acting to develop my own company, as 
entrepreneur I hope that our people and all households that have planted rubber in 
Namtha will attain development and wealth together.” A visual representation of this 
narrative of benevolence was the two shaking hands-logo of the “Poppy Replacement 
Program” on promotion boards which were erected near the plantations established by the 
companies. Positioned in between the two national flags of Laos and China, the logo 
situated the Chinese companies’ investments within a framework of amity, concealing any 
reference to lucrative goals.
The written word: the contracts
The companies’ rubber operations were established on the basis of two modes of land 
acquisition: contract farming and concessions (Shi 2008:30). These arrangements were 
sanctioned through signing written contracts. In 2006, the provincial government 
promoted the so-called “2+3” formula to regulate contract farming. According to this 
model, the investors had to supply capital, technical expertise, and marketing, while the 
farmers had to supply land and labour (Shi 2008:34). The provincial regulations prescribed 
that the proceeds (latex, trees, land or profits) be split according to the ratio 30% for the 
company and 70% for the farmers. However, in the written contracts between the 
provincial government and the investors, the proportions varied, ranging between 55%- 
70% to the villagers and 45%-30% to the investors (Shi 2008:16). In general, the share was 
determined by the investors’ ability to negotiate with the authorities and the response of 
the village communities. Depending on the specific case, contracts prescribed that once the 
rubber trees reached mature age for tapping (7-8 years after planting) farmers might not 
have to sell their share of latex to the investors. If sold to an investor, latex would be 
bought at the market price.
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In the concession contracts, the companies acquired the right to use land through the 
payment of a fee and gained full control over establishing and managing the plantations. 
The duration of the contracts was as long as the productive life of a rubber tree, 30-35 
years. Concessions given in Luang Namtha included large undeveloped blocks of land 
classed as ‘state land’ (normally land for national defence or security such as that located in 
border areas), or land belonging to village territories7. The Lao Army played an important 
role in granting concessions to the investors (Shi 2008) and was particularly involved with 
three companies in Luang Namtha. Using rubber as a way to defend the sovereignty of the 
country, plantations were established along the Mekong in Long District, where the river 
constitutes the border between Myanmar and Laos, and along the border with China in 
Muang Sing. However, the large number of rubber smallholdings established by Lao or 
other foreign small investors reduced the availability of large plots of land suitable for 
concessions in the province. Moreover, in theory, in 2005, the Luang Namtha provincial 
government forbade concessions for rubber since the long term of the contracts implied a 
partial loss of land to the Lao state (Shi 2008:30)8. Therefore, obtaining a concession was a 
difficult endeavour, whose success strongly depended on the connections that the investors 
established with fringes of the national or provincial government or the Army.
Of a total area of 12,585 hectares of rubber in the whole Luang Namtha Province in 2006, 
the Chinese and Lao companies planted 1,466 hectares (Shi 2008). The remaining 11,119 
hectares was planted by Lao farmers with or without the collaboration of their relatives or 
friends from China (Shi 2008). These figures can be taken as a starting point to question 
the colonising argument. Due to under-recording or to the investors and Lao authorities’ 
unwillingness to disclose information, it is impossible to quantify the actual rubber area 
planted by each company. The area allocated in the contracts varied from 300,000 hectares 
to 1,004 hectares (Shi 2008:16). Nevertheless, there is a big gap between contracts and their 
actual implementation. The myth of a Chinese politico-economic takeover in northern 
Laos is therefore debunked by the incongruence between rhetoric and practice.
7 The distinction between “state land” and “village land” in Laos does not really exist as technically all land 
belongs to the state. By “village land” I mean land that had been officially allocated to a village by the Lao 
authorities.
8 A decree on the Allocation of Land and Forest Land for Tree Plantation and Forest Protection issued by 
the Prime Minister in 2007 suspended large concessions for industrial plantations and perennial plants at the 
national level.
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Figure 25. Recording cooperation: the signatures of Lao government 
officials and Chinese investors on a rubber planting contract
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Rubber Practices
Guanxi, bribes, gifts and banquets
The Chinese investors’ civilising discourse and the colonising rhetoric of the contracts 
seems to confirm the claims by some Lao locals and Western aid operators about China’s 
colonising aspirations over northern Laos. In the broadest sense of the term, colonialism 
refers to a form of political and territorial seizure by one power over another, often 
undertaken through the use of force, or the signing of voluntary contracts or treaties. 
Nevertheless, although involving the acquisition of land through long term contracts or 
concessions, the establishment of rubber plantations by Chinese investors in northern Laos 
has neither resulted in the Lao government’s loss of control over its territory nor in the loss 
of its political power to China. Rather, the investments have occurred with the full, 
although not always stable, involvement of the Lao political class. Rubber investments were 
embedded in the convergence of economic interests between the Lao officials and the 
companies. Furthermore, rather using violence, social connections (Ch. guanxi), bribes, gifts 
and banquets were the subtle tactics that investors adopted to obtain the Lao government 
officials’ complicity. In this section I will explore how these tactics were put into practice.
In the Lao environment where the rule of law is almost absent and the use of power is 
arbitrary and discretional, cultivating interpersonal networks or connections with officials at 
all levels of the government was crucial for the Chinese investors to conclude agreements 
in the most favourable way. In so doing, the investors transplanted into the Lao social and 
political setting a practice adopted by all Chinese in Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong 
Kong and in other Chinese societies overseas to successfully accomplish any task in 
virtually all spheres of social life (Gold et al. 2002:3). Guanxi, some authors have argued, is 
an essential element of Chinese culture rooted in Confucian philosophy which persists 
from ancient times up to the present (Hwang 1987; King 1985; Yang 1994). Others have 
maintained that there is nothing Chinese about guanxi, but rather that this system is the 
result of the institutional structure of Chinese society (Guthrie 1998; Oi 1988; Wälder 
1986)9. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to define whether gmnxi is rooted in Chinese 
cultural or social peculiarities. Rather my focus here is on the waning or waxing of guanxi 
and on how the Chinese produce guanxi (Kipnis 1997) in the current era in alien cultural
9 For an exhaustive discussion on these two positions on the nature of guanxi, see Gold at al. (2002:10-17).
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settings. Guthrie (1998) has postulated that with the emergence of rational law and a 
market economy the use of guanxi has been losing ground in Chinese society. On the 
contrary, I espouse Hsing’s (1997) view that gmnxi has become even more pervasive since 
the Chinese state partly decentralised the economic system in the late 1970s and local 
officials have gained more economic autonomy. The persistence or proliferation of guami 
is the outcome of a poorly-managed coexistence of two economic systems (socialist and 
market) and the necessity to cope with a volatile application of regulations. Wanks work 
(1995, 1999) confirms this position by calling the types of relations formed between 
businessmen and officials in Xiamen “symbiotic clientelism”. My ethnographic findings on 
the south-western frontier of China endorsed this point.
The Lao side of the frontier, where the rule of law was even weaker than on the Chinese 
side, offered an even more fertile ground for creating and nurturing social connections. 
Using guanxi to accomplish a task was not alien to the Lao people themselves, who would 
translate guanxi as sensed in their own language or adjust its practice to the local system of 
‘patron-client’ relations (Brummelhuis and Kemp 1984; Hanks 1964, 1975). In the case of 
rubber, establishing social connections was seemingly encouraged by the Lao Land Law 
that granted some autonomy to the provincial and district authorities to approve 
investments. The investors drew on this local autonomy to establish their rubber 
businesses. According to the Lao Land Law, the district authorities could authorise leases 
for land up to 100 hectares. Plantations between 101 and 1000 hectares could be approved 
by the provincial authorities in consultation with the district and then be recognised by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. More than 1001 hectares of forest land for 
plantations needed the endorsement of the National Assembly. Therefore, negotiations 
were undertaken simultaneously with officials at various ranks of the government as 
contracts had to be signed at each level of the administration. However, given the less 
penetrable nature of bureaucratic webs in Vientiane, obtaining the flexibility of provincial 
and district officials in the interpretation of the law was essential to conclude a deal. 
Bureaucrats of the DPIO and the DAFO approved the feasibility of the operations more 
easily than in Vientiane, identifying potential sites on the map and allocating this land to the 
investors. Often they even undertook to sign contracts before full agreements were reached 
with the village communities. The provincial authorities provided other flexible 
arrangements to the investors, which included granting them a high share of the outputs, 
favourable tax policies, and easing procedures to issue work permits for Chinese rubber 
technicians. To achieve the last two types of facilitation investors also sought the support
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of police and the customs’. The backing of district officials was fundamental to identifying 
plots of land on the ground and to contact the village communities. At the lowest level of 
the bureaucratic hierarchy were the village leaders whose cooperation was necessary to 
involve the communities in the investment.
How did the companies obtain the connivance of provincial and district officials and 
village leaders to establish their businesses? How was gmnxi practiced and nurtured? The 
first, easiest way to gain the bureaucrats’ trust and support was through bestowing gifts. In 
a study of Hong Kong investors in Guangdong, Josephine and Alan Smart (1991:220) 
noticed gifts were a means to bridge the socialist and capitalist economic systems. Engaging 
in a system of gift exchange with local Chinese officials helped Hong Kong entrepreneurs 
to “facilitate the speedy establishment of small-scale, socially mediated investment.” 
Similarly, for Chinese rubber investors in Laos, gifts were the tools to bridge the Chinese 
and the Lao socialist systems and their clumsy adjustment to market economic mechanisms. 
Gifts were also means to bridge the cultural separation between the investors and the 
officials.
Gifts offered by the Chinese entrepreneurs to the Lao bureaucrats could be of various 
forms. Some were of pecuniary kind, or, more blatantly put, took the form of bribes. The 
low salaries that Lao officials received from their own government to act in their positions 
made them particularly prone to accept money from the investors. Although they were 
taboo in official discourse, these forms of compensation were an open topic of gossip in 
the towns and villages of the province. In Luang Namtha, rumours suggested that the 
amount of the regular pecuniary donations paid by the companies varied in line with the 
administrative hierarchy, increasing as one moved from the level of the district to the 
capital. Given the ambiguous way in which they were granted, I class the compensation 
from the investors under the rubric of gift. Although they became ‘employees’ of the 
companies, the officials also maintained their government posts or their previous political 
authority. They acted as intermediaries between the administration, the village communities 
and the investors. Many villagers I spoke to claimed that this financial mechanism often 
resulted in the officials’ siding with the investors rather than with the farmers when 
problems arouse during the contract’s implementation.
The gift system expanded all the way down to the villages. It was common for the firms to 
gain the village chiefs’ support to involve their communities in the rubber venture by giving
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the former gifts of money or consumer goods such as mobile phones, landline phones, and 
motorbikes. In remote villages with a high poverty rate, luxury items were unaffordable for 
the large majority of villagers and therefore appealing tools for social and economic 
advancement. The village leader of a remote ethnic Akha village in Muang Sing told me 
how his life had changed since the Chinese company that had started a rubber business in 
his village had given him a mobile phone and a motorbike. He felt connected to the outside 
world, he claimed, and, more significantly, he was now able to reach business partners to 
establish new commercial relations.
A further form of gift was the form of “study trips” to China. The village chiefs and other 
politically influential figures in a few villages in Nalae told me that the Jiachuang Company 
had taken them to China on a study trip. The tour included a short stay in villages in 
Mengman and visits to the state farms where the Lao had been introduced to rubber 
planting and processing, and to the outcomes of the rubber economic miracle embodied in 
large villas, lavish cars and TV sets. The second part of the trip included a stroll in the mall 
in Mengla, where, a village leader said, you could find concentrated in one place all the 
goods and merchandise that you cannot spot in shops or stalls across the whole of Laos. 
The Chinese experience concluded with a visit to the beauty parlours and massage salons in 
Mengla, where beautiful women with wasp-like waists and white skin provided all kinds of 
pleasures.
In mechanisms of temptation, sexual and gastronomic allure is intertwined. Banquets were 
also an important way to establish interpersonal relationships with officials, village leaders 
and farmers and drag them into business. In a few villages I surveyed in Nalae, farmers 
reported that on the day they organized a meeting to involve the community in the rubber 
investment the company managers and their helpers would slaughter a pig. The entire 
village community would be invited to consume the food. Since in China the purpose of 
giving a gift or inviting someone to a banquet is to manufacture a mechanism of reciprocity 
(Yang 1994), I see the village chiefs and their communities’ signing of the rubber contracts 
as the companies’ success in triggering the reciprocity ring in an alien cultural context.
A further example of the use of banquets as a way to maintain business bonds in a non- 
Chinese cultural setting was the New Year party that opened this chapter. I have shown 
how Lao Zhang and his entourage adjusted their food offerings to Lao taste to better 
capture the indigenous sympathy. Lao style dishes were presented to the Lao guests and
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not the Chinese menu that one would expect for a Chinese New Year celebration. Thus, 
even for the festivity that most embodies Chineseness, the company sacrificed, in the name 
of business, their cultural identity. Lao locals were incorporated into a festival normally 
devoted to family intimacy, hinting that they were now seen as part of an extended business 
family.
The members of Jiachuang also tried to bridge the cultural gap with Lao locals to reinforce 
their business in the linguistic sphere. Lao Zhang’s right-hand man, a second generation 
zhibian from Hunan, pointed out to me the importance of learning the local language of the 
country where one conducts business. In so doing he debunked the myth of Chinese 
migrants and investors as being closed in their cultural nationalism. On arrival in Laos, he 
was strongly affected by linguistic estrangement, he confessed. Only by persevering, even 
when he uttered words with the wrong pronunciation, often exciting the hilarity of his 
listeners, was he able to communicate with the Lao. After one year, he could speak almost 
fluently in the foreign language. Although he still relied on interpreters to discuss important 
topics with government officials, he was able to conduct most of his business in the local 
language in unofficial settings.
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Figure 26. Rubber trees growing on a mountain slope in Nalae district
Figure 27. Acquiring knowledge from across the border: a Lao 
farmer grafts rubber saplings under the supervision of a Chinese technician
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A China-Laos multi-ethnic axis
In an attempt to theorise the rise of China’s economic and political hegemony in Asia, Ong 
(2004) has put forward the idea of a “Chinese axis”. This concept refers to a strategy 
unilaterally devised by the Chinese state to economically integrate various ethnically 
Chinese-dominated states, such as Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, and Chinese 
communities in Southeast Asia into a Chinese regional entity called “Greater China” (Ong 
2004:70). The ultimate end of the plan is the political integration of these political entities 
into this Chinese regional configuration (Ong 2004:72). “Greater China” is an axis of 
“variegated sovereignty” (Ong 2004), whereby China recasts its sovereignty and political 
modus operandi to accommodate global capitalism into the socialist system. This re- 
territorialisation particularly concerns border regions where the Chinese state has, since the 
launch of the Opening Up Reforms, applied a model of flexible governance (Ong 2004:75). 
Finally, Ong (2004:88-89) suggests that an emerging regional narrative emphasising a 
shared sense of Chineseness pushes the inclusion of other Sinic parts of Southeast Asia 
(Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines) into the “Greater China” project. In 
the process of Sinic integration, ethnic Chinese play a crucial role as transnational 
economic and cultural catalysts.
At first glance, Laos could be seen as part of the “Greater China” design. In 2007, China 
became Laos’ largest foreign investor after Thailand with a total investment input of 462 
million US$ approved by the Lao Committee of Planning and Investment (The Nation 
2007). Mohan, the international border check-point that separates Yunnan from Laos, 
which in 2000 was turned into a special economic zone, can be seen as an example of the 
variegated sovereignty model applied to the south-western borders of China. Chinese 
investors and migrants spanning Yunnan and Northern Laos could be seen as contributing 
to form a “Greater China” region. According to some Han Chinese I spoke to during my 
fieldwork in 2005, the Chinese population in Luang Namtha provincial capital totalled 
about two thousand people, while in Muang Sing district Han Chinese residents were 
estimated to be three hundred. In 2008, the Chinese population in Luang Namtha was 
estimated to have almost doubled10. Chinese migrants in northern Laos wove a socio­
economic axis across the Lao and the Chinese national spaces through frequent trips 
between the two countries and the transferring of capital and resources across the border.
10 In 2005-2007, the residence of Chinese citizens in northern Laos was regulated through a six to twelve- 
month permit and a ten-day work permit system. Since the issuing of permits was in many cases subject to 
bribing of police officers and non-transparent business deals between Chinese migrants and local authorities, 
police officers were not keen to disclose the official numbers of Chinese migrants in Luang Namtha.
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Yet on a closer analysis, Ong’s theory cannot fully explain the dynamics of Chinese-driven 
rubber investments in north-western Laos. First, as elucidated earlier, these are embedded 
in an on-going tension between national particularism and transnational impetuses. 
Investments are reliant on an unstable alternation of flexibility and fixity. Authoritarian rule 
is often resumed to defend national interests making the transnational axis an 
undependable option. Contributing to hamper the formation of a Chinese cross-border 
axis is the attitude of the Lao authorities who, similarly to their Chinese counterparts, 
alternate flexible experimentation with authoritarianism.
Secondly, the sino-centric character of the “Greater China” theory does not stand if 
applied to the China-Laos frontier. In fact, the way capital, resources and expertise flowed 
between China and Laos did not exclusively rely on an ethnically Chinese axis. Rather 
Chinese-prompted investments in rubber in Luang Namtha occurred along a China-Laos 
multi-ethnic axis. The ventures of Chinese investors involved a multi-ethnic pool of border 
residents from both sides of the border. The Han Chinese were only one among the 
various cross-border ethnic actors transferring capital from China into Laos.
Certainly, for the Chinese companies, Sink bonding was still a desired and sought after 
element for establishing business in the Lao local setting. Many Han Chinese migrants 
from Hunan, Yunnan and Sichuan that engaged in various businesses ranging from retail 
sale of hardware, clothes, and household supplies, to vegetable planting, car repairing, 
restaurant and hotel management in Luang Namtha Province worked for the companies. 
Many, already involved in rubber smallholdings in the region, acted as agents, brokers, and 
sub-contractors of rubber plantations, or suppliers of rubber saplings for the investors. 
Han labourers or technicians from the state farms on the Chinese side of the border 
assisted the investors to spread rubber grafting expertise among Lao farmers.
The Haw or H o 11 were also active participants in the companies’ operations. These 
included third to sixth generation Chinese that had migrated to north-eastern Laos from 
Yunnan between the end of the 19lh and the beginning of the 20th century to escape war 
and persecution in China. Some individuals I spoke to said that their ancestors had
11 In the past, the term ‘HaV  was used to refer to Chinese caravan traders and migrants from Yunnan that 
traveled between China and South-East Asia in the 19th and early 20th century. Nowadays, in Thailand and 
Laos ‘H aV  denotes the descendants of these Chinese migrants. However, in northern Laos, ‘Haw’ also refers 
to Elan Chinese people from China in general. In Tai Lue language, widely spoken in northern Laos, China is 
called ‘Muang Haw5, ‘the country of the Haw.
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migrated southwards after the Taiping rebellion or following the Civil War between 
Communists and Nationalists in the 1940s. Yet, as I mentioned in Chapter Two, large 
numbers of Haw from Yunnan, many of whom were Muslim, had populated the frontier 
regions of Laos and mainland Southeast Asia since the early 19lh century as part of the mule 
caravan trade (Forbes 1986, 1987; Maxwell Hill 1982, 1998). Up until the 1990s, the 
majority of the Lao Haw resided mainly in the mountain ranges of Phongsali Province 
where they engaged in poppy cultivation. Since the enforcement of opium eradication by 
the Lao government in the early 2000s, many had relocated to Luang Namtha Province 
where they had gained important roles in local trade. In 2007, the Haw ran about twenty 
stalls at the Muang Sing market. The new modem structure where the Muang Sing market 
was moved in 2005 from the old market building constructed by the French in the early 
1900s was the investment outcome of a powerful and wealthy Haw entrepreneur with close 
connections with the Luang Namtha government. Their fluency in Lao and Yunnan dialect 
made the Flaw ideal cross-cultural mediators between Chinese investors and Lao locals. A 
conspicuous number of Haw men worked for the Chinese companies as interpreters or 
local business agents.
’The multi-ethnic make-up of the China-Laos frontier, and the demographic minority of 
ethnically Sinic people, forced Chinese rubber investors to widely rely on large numbers of 
people from other ethnic backgrounds as well. Indeed, in many cases, firms and 
entrepreneurs strategically deployed cross-border ethnic affinity to implement their projects. 
Ethnically Khmu village leaders and farmers told me that Lao Zhang’s firm had taken them 
to Mengman in China where they had received training in rubber planting in the state farms 
and in villages inhabited by people from their same ethnicity. The company had rekindled 
or even produced cross-border ethnic affinity. Some Lao Khmu men living in more remote 
villages in Nalae who had had little contact with China in the past were pleasantly surprised 
to meet Khmu people across the border. They admitted that it had been very enjoyable to 
leam about rubber planting from ethnic fellow Khmu because they understood each other 
well.
To facilitate their working relations with Lao Akha farmers and leaders the companies drew 
on Akha individuals from China. In ethnic Akha villages of Muang Long and Muang Sing 
where the largest areas of rubber plantations established by the companies in Luang 
Namtha were located, Akha from China with expertise in rubber planting were employed 
as technical advisers, supervisors or instructors of growing and grafting techniques. Fluent
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in Chinese and their mother tongue, Chinese Akha also acted as cultural and linguistic 
mediators between the locals and the Han investors. By capitalising on their linguistic skills, 
ethnic background, and technical expertise, these Akha men improved their economic 
status working for the companies.
Integral to the multi-ethnic cross-border axis were also the Tai Lue. Through then- 
linguistic affinity and long-term social connections with Tai Lue people in Muang Sing, Tai 
Lue from China played the important role of intermediaries between high ranking Lao local 
officials and the Han entrepreneurs. For facilitating the deals, the Lue gained conspicuous 
sums of money, turning their pre-1949 dominant ethnic status on the frontier into a 
financial asset.
In these cross-border economic coalitions, Lao of various ethnic and social backgrounds 
were often the initiators of business ventures with Chinese investors, not solely passive 
recipients. These included locals of Hmong, Tai Lue and Lao ethnicity who could speak 
Chinese. Many operated as compradores for both small and large Chinese entrepreneurs, 
making their intermediation crucial to procuring land plots or facilitating liaisons between 
other locals and the investors. Among the most entrepreneurial conpradores were the shop 
and restaurant keepers and hotel owners operating along the main road in Muang Sing 
town. Two of them were a couple that ran a photocopy shop in the town centre, the 
daughter and son-in-law of a deceased district government official. The photocopy 
business was in fact a cover for the “consulting” activities that the owners engaged in for 
foreign investors intending to undertake agricultural extension in the district. The son-in- 
law of the former politician spoke fluent Chinese, Lao and Tai Lue and drew on the high 
social status of his wife’s family to mediate between high-ranking district officials and the 
Chinese rubber investors. It was common to spot him going around in villages with foreign 
entrepreneurs during the day and, in the evenings, sitting at one of the Chinese restaurants 
on the main street of Muang Sing sharing a meal with village leaders, district officials and 
his Chinese clients to celebrate the successful conclusion of a business operation.
127
Sovereignty at Risk?
Figure 28. Signs of Lao involvement in Chinese business: a shop 
sign advertising brokerage service to Chinese investors in Muang Sing town
Figure 29. Building a China-Laos multi-ethnic axis: two Chinese 
Akha acdng as brokers for a rubber company in Muang Long (Laos)
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Figure 30. A restaurant in Muang Sing town run by a 
Sichuanese family involved in rubber planting
Figure 31. A Sichuanese owner of a 
restaurant in Muang Sing with her daughter
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Love affairs, inter-marriages or concubinage relationships between investors and Lao of 
various ethnic backgrounds were also important constituents of the China-Laos economic 
axis. Entering Lao society through marriage with locals to gain economic benefits is a 
practice that Chinese migrants have adopted in Laos since the late 1950s (Halpem 1960). 
At that time, the most common marriage arrangement was that between Chinese men and 
Lao women with high social status or who belonged to the local nobility (Halpem 1960:10). 
In these marital-economic alliances, the Lao counterpart supplied capital and the name to 
open the business while the Chinese men ran the business and sometimes the capital as 
well (Halpem 1960). This pattem has been reproduced in the mid-2000s. Despite the strict 
regulations imposed by the Lao government on marriages and unions between Lao citizens 
and foreigners, in 2005-2007, an increasing number of Lao women, especially of Akha 
ethnicity, established relationships, either as wives or lovers, with Chinese men. In these 
more recent alliances, Chinese men provided capital and business expertise, while Lao 
women provided land and local connections. A few company agents would take Lao 
women as concubines while keeping their family and wives back in China.
Cultural divergence, internal factions, uncertain business
The intercultural mediation of the various frontier ethnic actors and the interpersonal 
networks established with local government officials did not always guarantee the success 
of the rubber investment projects or the smooth formation or operation of the ventures. 
Cultural divergences between the Han Chinese investors and the Lao bureaucrats often 
hindered business. Hsing (1997:144) argues that “there is a correlation among culture, 
institutions, history and the direction of transnational capital flows”. By stressing that one 
of the most distinctive characteristics of Taiwanese business in south China is the cultural 
affinity between the investors and local politicians, Hsing (1997:149) raises the question as 
to how cultural connections can affect the establishment of inteipersonal networks in 
specific institutional conditions and, consequently, of business collaboration. On the 
China-Laos frontier, cultural disconnection often played a destabilising role in interpersonal 
relations and therefore in business. Despite the claims that in the global age capital 
circulates unconstrained by national boundaries (Ohmae 1995), in this part of Asia, in the 
mid-2000s, capital flow was often channelled and sometimes blocked by national, 
institutional and cultural boundaries (Hsing 1997:144).
The investors’ efforts to offer Lao food to the Lao officials and to learn Lao language to 
better communicate with the locals were not always efficacious enough to bridge the
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cultural gap between Chinese entrepreneurship and Lao institutions. A few Chinese 
investors in Luang Namtha complained about the feeble nature of their personal relations 
with the Lao, which they attributed to cultural differences. “The Lao are unreliable, 
untrustworthy and time-servers”, remarked the son of a company manager who had been 
occasionally betrayed in business.
“The Lao do not listen to reason” was a milder remark of an employee of a company 
operating in Sing, hinting at an allegedly irrational, incomprehensible mode of acting of the 
Lao which the Chinese could not handle. “You cannot discuss with them. They cannot give 
you explanations for anything. And when something goes wrong, you never understand 
why”, he added. Then he elaborated on his cryptic message with a story. One night, in the 
pitch dark, he had been driving his car around Muang Sing. Suddenly, a drunk Lao 
youngster crashed against into the car on a motorbike. The guy was the son of an 
influential district government official with close connections with the head of the local 
police. Although the Chinese man was in no way to blame for the accident, the Lao family 
had forced him to pay for the motorbike repairs, the tying the string ceremony (T. sukuari!) 
held to call back the lost spirit of the young Lao guy, and a dinner in a restaurant to give 
the Lao family face. That much had to be conceded for the sake of peace and quiet, since 
the Chinese employee’s company had signed a contract to operate in Luang Namtha for 
the next thirty years. All these remarks and stories convey a sense of reciprocal mistrust 
between Chinese investors and Lao locals. They unmask the difficulty that the former faced 
in overcoming cultural divergences with the latter to implement their ventures. The Lao 
locals’ subtle forms of dissent, retaliation, and disloyalty constrained the colonising and 
civilising ambitions of the Chinese.
The unsteadiness of Lao political institutions was a further obstacle for the Chinese 
investors’ business activities. Lao bureaucrats often twisted the laws by which they signed a 
rubber contract to obstruct its implementation. Sometimes, the same government officials 
who accepted gifts and banquet invitations and signed the contracts would withdraw their 
approval causing serious financial and legal problems for the companies. Other times, local 
officials manipulated the law and went against the bilateral agreements between the Lao 
and Chinese central governments. For example, at the rubber workshop in Luang Namtha 
mentioned earlier, the manager of Zhenhua pleaded the Lao authorities for a reduction in 
the fees for residency permits and immigration for the Chinese rubber technicians working 
in Laos. He also asked that tax on inputs, the import of vehicles and fees for land lease be
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reduced as had been agreed upon in the Poppy Replacement Program. In sum, the Chinese 
companies’ business operations were always undertaken in a limbo of uncertainty and 
improvisation.
Finally, internal factionalism, divided loyalties and friction within the Lao political 
apparatus contributed to hamper the operations of the companies. In some cases, district 
government agents or police officers approved contracts or arbitrarily applied regulations 
without the endorsement of higher level officials. When these autonomous actions were 
discovered, provincial or national authorities would abrogate decisions taken from below. 
They would invalidate contracts or concessions or modify their terms. In other cases, 
authorities at the national level would approve concessions or contracts which did not 
comply with provincial regulations. The Yunnan Rubber company, for instance, was 
authorised in a contract signed by the Prime Minister to establish a demonstration 
plantation under land concession in Namtha district despite a provincial regulation forbade 
this form of land acquisition. This action was disapproved by local authorities, who, 
however could do nothing but to obey orders from above (Shi 2008:30).
Additionally, particular frictions arose between some sections of the provincial government 
and the provincial Army. In the province’s rubber boom, the Army operated independently 
from the officially recognized foreign approval process (Shi 2008:31). Although the 
Investment Law did not authorise the Army to grant investments, in Luang Namtha, the 
Army approved rubber concessions to three companies without the full endorsement of 
the provincial authorities. In the case of the concession granted to the Ruifeng Company, 
the situation became quite complicated. The original contract signed between the firm and 
the Army bore also the stamp and the signature of the provincial Planning and Investment 
Office (PPIO) (Shi 2008:31). Yet later on, one faction of the provincial government 
contested the validity of the contract and the operations of the company, igniting a legal 
turmoil. In late 2007, the Chinese company and the Army hired Bunsone, a young Lao man 
who had previously worked for the provincial PPIO to try and remedy the situation. The 
son of an influential provincial government officer, the youngster had learned Chinese 
while completing his masters’ degree in commerce in Beijing. Drawing on his cultural 
capital and political connections, the Army and the company tried to formally legalise then- 
operations in Muang Long district through the PPIO. When I left Luang Namtha in 
February 2008, the bureaucratic wrangling had not yet been resolved.
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Does the big fish eat the small fish?
How did the operations of the investors unfold in the villages when they met the farmers? 
Did the big fish really eat the small fish?
In the complex socio-institutional scenario of rubber planting, the farmers were involved in 
the investments with the Chinese companies in diverse but more or less transparent ways. 
The investors organised promotional meetings in the villages concurrently with or after 
signing the contracts at the provincial and district levels. At the meetings, the company’s 
agents, assisted by the officials, explained more or less clearly the objectives of the 
investment and the terms set in the contracts. Manners ranged from soft persuasion to 
coercion. In some cases, the farmers were forced to accept the offer, in others, they were 
given the opportunity to negotiate the terms. Yet, the picture of the farmers’ participation 
did not have clear-cut colours of subjugation, but nuances of compliance and resistance. 
The prevailing tone varied. It depended on a few factors such as the negotiating capacity of 
the village leadership, the villagers’ experience in rubber planting, poverty rate, geographic 
vicinity and intensity of social relations with rubber growers in China, political connections 
between the village community and the Lao district or provincial authorities, and the 
determination of a company to achieve its goals.
Since rubber planting had become a venture that every farmer wanted to undertake to raise 
his/her living standard, those that lacked the substantial financial means necessary to 
establish plantations on their own and did not have connections with people in China were 
more inclined to enter into the contracts with the companies. These were mostly people of 
Mossur (Lahu), Akha, and Khmu ethnicity who resided in villages located in upland and 
remote areas or in less remote regions but with poor road access. Although Tai Lue, Tai 
Neua, Yao and Hmong farmers in Muang Sing and Namtha districts tended to plant rubber 
independently or through private collaboration with small investors from China, villagers 
of these ethnicities in other less prosperous areas also became involved with the companies.
The feelings of the farmers about doing business with the companies were mixed. In most 
cases, villagers claimed that they would have preferred to plant rubber on their own if they 
had the capital. Some saw collaboration with large investors as a trap because it signified 
loss of land and becoming wage labourers. Nevertheless, others were optimistic about the 
contracts. “The Chinese have technical expertise and capital, so we need them to develop 
our village” many said, thinking in more opportunistic terms. Perhaps not completely
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aware of the actual outcomes of the ventures, they regarded it worth the risk A few argued 
that their lives had been quite miserable anyway since the Lao government had outlawed 
poppy cultivation in the early 2000s, a fact that had limited their chances to generate 
income. Undertaking the path of rubber with the companies could improve their situation, 
they maintained, leading to self-reliance in the future. For any of these reasons, farmers 
signed the contracts, some without understanding exactly what that entailed, some, 
especially those with the option to exchange knowledge with other growers, being more 
aware of the consequences. For all, entering into a contract with the companies was more 
an experiment than a certainty. As such, the farmers’ approach to the venture was no 
different from that adopted by the companies and the officials. They all walked on the 
bumpy ground of experimentation.
In this climate of uncertainties, the interaction between the investors and the farmers was 
seldom unproblematic. In some cases, it led to harsh disputes and loss of land for the 
farmers. An extreme episode of dispossession occurred in Ban Chagni, an ethnically 
Mossur village located along the Mekong River in Muang Long district. In 2006, the 
residents of the village were bombarded with persuasive visits by the Ruifeng Company, 
the Lao Army and a few government officials. Entering into a rubber joint-venture with the 
foreign firm through a concession, the Lao Army had initially given the company the right 
to use o military land adjacent to the village territory along the Mekong. Subsequently, the 
villagers were forced to allow the company to convert the area that they used as paddy 
fields into a rubber seedling nursery, and a part of their swidden land into plantations (Shi 
2008:32). When I visited the village in February 2008, farmers were seriously concerned 
about their loss of paddy land and their inability to grow rice. They reported that those 
who had tried to resist the land grabbing had been literally threatened with guns by the 
Army soldiers. Their pigs, oblivious to the new plans for the area, had been shot dead for 
eating rubber saplings in the nursery. Some villagers had resorted to work for the company 
as wage labourers for 30,000-40,000 kip (=3.33-4.44 US$) per day to be able to buy rice. 
However, the company had delayed paying many farmers at the time of my visit, as some 
problems arouse from receiving subsidies from the Chinese government. The promises 
that their paddies would be returned after three years and that some land would be 
reallocated to them were not sufficient to reassure the villagers. A sense of 
disempowerment and resignation hovered above them.
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Figure 32. Khmu villagers hold a meeting with a DAFO official in Nalae district
Figure 33. Akha villagers discuss Chinese-driven rubber plandng in Muang Long district 1 (left) 
Figure 34. Akha villagers discuss Chinese-driven rubber planting in Muang Long district 2 (right)
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In Luang Namtha Province, the “2+3” contract farming model prescribed by the 
authorities and reworded in almost all contracts worked well only in a few villages in Long 
that contracted with companies which were Lao-Chinese joint-ventures (Shi 2008:35). This 
farmers-investors’ symbiosis seems to have emerged in cases where Lao people were part 
of the company’s management and stronger trust between the villagers and the investors 
was established (Shi 2008:35). Cultural affinity between partners played a crucial role in 
ensuring written contracts were followed in practice.
However, in a large number of cases in Sing and Long, the implementation of contracts 
was obstructed by the farmers’ lack of collaboration. Contrary to the concession option, 
contract farming provided the farmers with more room to resist, negotiate, question or 
abide by the terms of the contracts according to what was more convenient for them. Ban 
Sivilai, a Tai Lue ethnic village in Long district12 provides an example. Sivilai’s residents 
began planting rubber on their own or with relatives and friends in 2004. They relied on 
relatives and friends from China to acquire technical knowledge on grafting and planting or 
hired skilled rubber workers from Mengman and Mengla. In 2007, the agents of the 
Yunnan Rubber arrived, encouraged by the district authorities. Initially, the company asked 
for 200 ha, but this excessive request encountered the resistance of the farmers who 
wanted to keep land for their own rubber planting plans. Eventually, the farmers agreed to 
concede a 50 ha plot far from the village. Yet the inputs and production share did not 
correspond to the standard “2+3” formula that the company had specified on the contract 
signed with the provincial authorities. Without signing a contract, the two sides decided 
that the company would take care of seedlings, equipment and labour supply. After three 
years, the villagers would get 30% of the trees while the company would get 70%. Both the 
investors and the company expressed their dissatisfaction about this arrangement. To 
accommodate Yunnan Rubber’s request, the district had to concede a plot from what was 
designated as reserve forest—which was in theory excluded from rubber planting. Yet, one 
of the business managers expressed his frustration at the impracticability of his company’s 
plans: “The leaders of the two countries have agreed on doing this, but we still have to 
fight at each and every level.. .Not being able to get land is our biggest bottleneck” (quoted 
in Shi 2008:36). The transnational, highly celebrated agreement signed by the central 
governments of Vientiane and Beijing on the basis of fraternal cooperation between the 
people of the two countries was countermanded on the ground by the farmers’
121 drew this ethnographic example from Shi’s report ‘Rubber Boom in Luang Namtha’ (2008:36).
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obstructionism, the companies’ demanding requests and the officials’ inability to 
accommodate them.
Not all forms of villagers’ resistance were as manifest and harsh as that of Ban Sivilai’s 
residents. In many villages whose residents did not have as strong a political awareness or 
opportunity to choose whether to accept the contractual terms of the companies, dissent 
was expressed in a more subtle way. In Ban Moteu Kao13, an ethnic Akha village in a 
remote area of Muang Sing district near the Mekong, a Chinese company arrived in 2006 
proposing to plant rubber on a “2+3” model that offered 55% of trees to the villagers. 
Isolated in a rugged mountain area with no road connections, the villagers initially saw the 
proposal to plant rubber as pointless. Subsequently, the investors were able to persuade 
some villagers to plant 8,000 trees, but further disputes emerged. The company did not 
supply saplings at the time the farmers dug the holes. The farmers complained that they did 
not get paid for the labour they provided, although according to the agreement they were 
not supposed to be paid, but to provide labour for free. In 2007, the 8,000 rubber trees 
could be barely distinguished on a hill slope overgrown with weeds and bushes. The 
villagers refused to maintain the plantation. The company gave up on the farmers and 
resolved to plant rubber elsewhere with local labour. Some of the villagers ended up 
working for the company on a 20 j t  yuan (=0.26 US$)/day wage.
By and large, the rhetoric of the contracts became muddied in reciprocal mistrust between 
the Lao villagers and the Chinese investors. By 2008, even the residents of remote villagers 
had learned how to manipulate or resist the Chinese business modus operandi. A large 
number of farmers had directly experienced or learned from others of the ambiguous 
behaviour that many Chinese investors had adopted. Chinese companies operating in the 
province in other types of business had either underpaid or refused to pay for the crops 
they contracted. Vexed at these abuses, many Lao growers began to mistrust the Chinese. 
In their speech, some Lao had turned the Chinese term “boss” (Ch. laoban) into “old 
cheat” (Ch.16 laopian). When the requests of the Chinese did not meet their needs, farmers 
would refuse to cooperate. Mistrust came also from the Chinese side. An investor lamented 
some farmers’ reticence to cooperate by defining all Lao people as “beasts under a human 
mask” . Another young Chinese, agent of a company rationalised the Lao lack of 
cooperation by saying that
131 drew this ethnographic example from Shi’s report ‘Rubber Boom in Luang Namtha’ (2008:38)
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the Lao, including Akha, Tai and Hmong are like China’s ethnic minority 
groups. They have a backward thinking. Their brain does not function very 
well because they drink too much alcohol. [And] they are too lazy, they do not 
like working.. ..They do not understand that what we are doing is for their 
good.
The statement of this young entrepreneur is evocative of the French colonial rhetoric. The 
French lamented that the Lao “were naturally lazy, morally as well as physically slothful, 
working only when constrained and forced to do so” (Stuart-Fox 1995:130). This attitude 
had thwarted all efforts to involve Lao locals in the economic development of the country 
according to the colonisers’ agenda. After two decades of colonial rule, the French 
administrators still desperately lamented that the Lao were “indolent and set in their ways” 
(Stuart-Fox 1995:130). It was this alleged indolence together with culturally embedded 
apathy, that turned the vise en udeur of Laos into a failure. Lao farmers’ unwillingness to 
collaborate based not on indolence but on open or hidden dissent has hampered the 
civilising and colonial endeavours of the Chinese in the mid 2000s as well.
Conclusion: Sovereignty Secured
By focusing on the rubber investments of Chinese companies in Luang Namtha Province, 
this chapter has questioned whether the flow of capital across the border from China into 
Laos has resulted in a loss of sovereignty over Luang Namtha Province to China for the 
Lao state. It has also called into question claims that massive Chinese investments in north­
western Laos have been creating a neo-colonial scenario of exploitation, land grabbing and 
violence. I have attempted to debunk this simplistic analysis by showing the plural cultures 
of rubber. I have argued that the rhetoric of Chinese rubber investments had colonising 
and civilising overtones which were aptly masked by a facade of fraternity and transnational 
collaboration. Yet, when translated into practice, the civilising and colonising mission 
became muddied in the local social, political and cultural context of Laos. Lao government 
officials connived with the investors, but without renouncing their political authority, to 
decide over the operations. A wide pool of Lao brokers and business agents created 
alliances with the Chinese for profits. Attracted by a better future, Lao farmers 
spontaneously joined the investments or were forced to do so. Their responses ranged 
from open resistance to hidden dissent or opportunistic collaboration. All Lao actors 
involved in the investments accommodated Chinese capital by experimenting with the 
model of ‘graduated sovereignty5 adopted by the Lao central state. However this did not 
equate to a total unbundling of territories to the advantage of China. Rather, when
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sovereignty and political flexibility threatened the hold of power for the Lao bureaucrats 
and the hold of land for the Lao farmers this flexibility reverted to fixity. Therefore, the 
influx of global capital in the guise of rubber investments in the mid 2000s resulted in a 
sovereignty and power status quo.
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Chapter Four
State Power and Akha Potency: 
Reconnecting Centres and Margins
Figure 35. Akha style roof representing buffalo horns
140
State Power And Akha Potency
\ ^ H E N  I D EC ID ED  T O  INVESTIGATE rubber development from a village vantage
point at the periphery of Laos my choice fell on Ban Samu, an ethnic Akha settlement 
located near the border with China on the mountain range to the north-west of Muang 
Sing. In the 1990s, Samu villagers, I had been told by Lao employers of GTZ, had been 
among the pioneers of rubber in Luang Namtha Province before the Lao government 
institutionalised the crop’s cultivation. Subsequently, in 2004 the villagers had planted 
rubber through unofficially endorsed contracts with small investors from China. The 
officially appointed chief of Samu was renowned in the area for managing illegal activities 
with China. The ambiguity and illegality' surrounding this rubber establishment led to Samu 
becoming known as a paradigmatic outlaw village at the margins of the Lao state. It was 
this alleged unruliness that drove me to the village in May 2005. Yet, as soon as I arrived in 
Samu I started to suspect that a clear-cut image of anomie at the margin of a weak state had 
to be replaced with a murky picture of law and outlaw.
This chapter uses rubber planting in an Akha village of the Lao north-western borderlands 
to debunk the myth of peripheral upland ethnic groups’ resistance and political isolation 
from state central power in the Upper Mekong. I see the establishment of rubber 
cultivation in Ban Samu not as an act of rebellion against the Lao state but as part of a 
process of creating an alternative Akha centre of “potency” (Tooker 1996) astride the 
peripheries of an incomplete state and of an emerging economic giant.
Highland people of mainland Southeast Asia have been a central topos in literature 
concerned with disconnection between centres and peripheries and marginal resistance to 
centripetal thrusts of modem-nation states (McKinnon and Wanat 1983; Michaud 2000; 
Tapp 1989). Discussing the contemporary socio-cultural conditions of the “montagnards” 
of the Southeast Asian massif, Mckinnon and Michaud (2000:8), for instance, stress upland 
groups’ “remoteness,...marginality, [and] distance from the seat of power”. By putting 
forward the notion of “zomia” 1 to refer to what he considers an academically and 
politically neglected mountain area of the Himalayas and lower ranges that run from 
Vietnam, Laos, southwest China, northern Thailand, northern Burma, and into 
Northeastern India, van Schendel describes the relationship between the myriad of 
highland ethnic groups inhabiting this region and the ten nation-states where they have
1 van Schendel derived the term “zomia” from zcsrri a term for highlander in various Chin-Mizo-Kuki 
languages spoken in Burma, India, and Bangladesh (2002:653).
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been incorporated as “antagonistic” (2002:653-654). In a fashion reminiscent of Leach ’s 
(1954, 1960) frontier analysis, van Schendel emphasises the shared ideas and cultural traits, 
same ecological conditions, language affinities and trade links of the “zomi” (highlanders) 
as opposed to the nation-building severing agendas of the states to which they belong (van 
Schendel 2002). Recently, James Scott (2008:12; 2009) has espoused van Schendel’s idea to 
reconceptualise state power in Southeast Asia, arguing that “zomia” is a “region of refuge” 
for populations who have chosen to place themselves away from expanding valley states. 
Or, as he otherwise puts it, “zomia” is a state-repelling space, a region inhabited by outlaw 
rebel highlanders that reject being part of the nation-state framework (Scott 2009).
The Akha, one of the “zomi” living in and across the borderlands of Thailand, China, Laos, 
and Burma, have been considered by some other scholars as an example of marginality and 
isolation from the centres of power of the nation-states they belong to. Alting von Geusau, 
for instance, has described the Akha as a “perennial minority” in relation to the lowland 
valley polities in the past, and to “predatory modem states” in the present (1988:215-216)2. 
Sturgeon (2005:26) notes that Akha are peripheral and marginal in several senses: 
geographically—they live at the edges of nation-states; socially—they are considered 
different from the ethnic majorities of the nation-states where they are included; and 
ecologically—they practice swidden agriculture, a practice regarded inferior to lowland 
agriculture.
Along the same lines, Cohen notes that Akha that have lately, forcedly or spontaneously, 
resettled to the lower slopes of Muang Sing continue to occupy a subordinated and 
marginalised position in relation to the politically and economically dominant Tai 
lowlanders (2000:190). The difficulty of adjusting to life on lower elevations has 
transformed the Akha into wage labourers of the Tai and has increased opium addiction 
and mortality rates3. Economic subordination is coupled with political disempowerment. 
The political power of the Akha, Cohen argues, “is limited to that of village headmen at the 
lowest rung of the local administrative hierarchy, dominated by Tai Lue and Tai Neua 
officials” (2000:190).
2 On the topic of Akha marginalisation, see also Alting von Geusau (2000).
3 On the topic of opium addiction, development and resettlement of the Akha population in Muang Sing see 
also Cohen and Lyttleton (2002), Lyttleton (2004), Lyttleton and Cohen (2003).
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The picture of Akha subordination and marginality drawn by scholars is complemented 
with claims of unruliness from government officers on both the Chinese and the Lao side 
of the border. In Muang Sing, at the time of my fieldwork, Tai Lue officials often referred 
to the Akha as ‘people who do not listen’. Similarly, in Mengman, many Han and Tai 
residents stereotyped the Akha as ‘naught/ and as a people impervious to reason, 
expressions commonly used to refer to mischievous children. In the lowland discourse, 
therefore, Akha were constructed as recalcitrant children that refused to obey governing 
practices emanating from the valley.
Although the perspectives of Western scholars and lowland residents differ in moral 
purposes, both views share an idea of the Akha as peripheral and disconnected from 
central power webs. Above all, both perspectives are based on an assumption that power is 
localised in the lowland centres and feeble at the margins, reproducing the mandala, a 
centre-out approach that has been variously formulated in literature on Southeast Asia as 
“galactic polity” (Tambiah 1977), “theatre state” (Geertz 1980), “emboitement” 
(emboxment) (Condominas 1980) or “ideology” (Tanabe 1988). The mandala framework 
stands in opposition to the zonia argument which postulates the existence of independent 
centres of power outside of those of the nation-states in the valleys. In the following 
sections I will demonstrate that both the mandala and the zonia level of analysis are 
inadequate to explain the embracement of rubber planting in upland Akha villages in 
Muang Sing, in north-western Laos.
My intention is not to downplay the high rates of poverty, opium addiction and human 
misery found in many villages of north-western Laos. These conditions are a reality for 
large numbers of individuals of Akha ethnicity in the region (Cohen and Lyttleton 2002; 
Lyttleton and Cohen 2003). What I would like to point out is that theories of 
marginalisation and isolation often conflate geography with socio-political positioning. 
They are often the distorted conclusions of analyses that take the lowland as a starting 
point to theorise power. To have a more multifaceted view we need to shift the angle of 
analysis from the lowland centres to the highland periphery and focus our attention not so 
much on the opposition but on the intersection of centrifugal and centripetal forces that 
make states in the Upper Mekong. We also need to re-think established tenets of power 
from a practice-based perspective (Sturgeon 2004; Tooker 1996). By proposing a move to 
the margins inhabited by the Akha through practice I draw on TookeLs notion of 
“potency” (1996:327-329).
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Potency (A. gylan), Tooker notes, is an Akha concept that refers to fertility, prosperity, and 
well-being, and differs from political power as “rule by force” (1996:327-328). In the Akha 
diarchic system of village rulership constituted by the political headman (L. naiburi) and the 
spiritual leader (A. ckönn)\ the latter draws his status as highest individual in the village 
from his capacity to channel “potency” from the supramundane world (or cosmos) to this 
world (Tooker 1996:328). The spiritual leader is in charge of the internal affairs of the 
village3. He himself does not own potency, but he is responsible for the dispersal of 
potency or fertility in three main domains that are important for the reproduction of Akha 
society: crops, people and livestock (Tooker 1996:328;333). The ability to channel the flow 
of cosmic potency is also related to the alignment of the mundane lived space with the 
cosmic model organised according to three axes: centre/periphery (or interior/exterior), 
upper/lower and front/back (Tooker 1996:328). Similarly to the Hindu-Buddhic derived 
mandala system of the Tai lowlanders that takes Mount Mem as centre from which 
potency emanates outwards4 56, potency (or cosmic energy) for the Akha flows from a raised 
centre outwards (Tooker 1996:343). In the village context, the spiritual leader and his house 
are the centres from which potency flows. All that lies outside this centre is peripheral and 
therefore lower in a hierarchy of power. However, this position is reversed in the houses of 
other village residents where the household ancestral shrine becomes the centre emanating 
potency (or innermost point), in relation to which the village centre (and the dzönu) are 
indexed as peripheral, outer, and therefore polluting (Tooker 1996:340). These alternative 
centres of potency are in competition with or, at least question, the Tai “cosmic polity” 
model which locates the king or ruler in the lowland at the centre from where power 
radiates out to the periphery occupied by the Akha (Tooker 1996:346)7. Through Akha 
ritual practices the lowland centre undergoes a transformation into a periphery (Tooker 
1996:336;352). The Akha village polity represents an alternative centre of potency to, and 
reverses the dominant position of, the polity in the valley (Tooker 1996). Yet, this 
alternative centre of potency is not disconnected from but exists in relation to the valleys.
4 For the role of the spiritual village leader in Akha society see Airing Von Geusau (1983:; 1988).
5 The dzörm has politico-religious responsibilities such as supervising Akha customs (A. akhazan) carried out 
by the villagers, and overseeing intravillage disputes as well as ritual prescriptions (Tooker 1996:332-333).
6 On the lowland mandala system see (Tambiah 1976, 1977).
7 The main advocates of the “cosmic polity’ model are Ccedes (1968), Condominas (1980), Errington (1989), 
Tambiah (1976, 1977), and Tanabe (1988).
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Figure 36. Creating centres of Akha potency: 
a village gate in an Akha village in Muang Sing
Figure 37. Creating centres of Akha potency: 
talisman to ward off evil spirits
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It is in the Akha capacity to create alternative centres of potency connected to other 
centres of power that I would like to consider the spread of rubber in Samu. While Tooker 
sees the Akha ability to channel potency as confined to the inner-village sphere and related 
to ritual practices, I extend it outside the village domain and attribute it to socio-economic 
and political practices. The protagonist in the production of an alternative centre of 
potency in the rubber establishment is the miban, the officially appointed village headman. 
While the spiritual leader channels a type of spiritual or cosmic potency within the village 
domain, I argue that Ase, the former political leader of Samu, channels a type of economic 
and political potency between the village, the Lao state and China. The polyglot, multi- 
connected Ase manoeuvred between maintaining allegiances with some factions of the Lao 
local government while declaring disobedience to others, and establishing connections with 
investors, kin and friends in China to set up rubber cultivation in the village. Excluded 
from the political-economic ambitions of their chief, Samu villagers design parallel potency 
channels of capital and rubber knowledge which flow across the border relying on kin 
networks. Part of this production of alternative centres of potency is the farmen’ creative 
negotiation of the socio-economic changes inherent in the process of modernity. 
Manoeuvring between legal and illegal practices, Ase and his villagers draw on both the 
weaknesses and strengths of the Lao state, an incomplete political entity in continuous flux 
striving to adjust to global economic changes. Within these undefined boundaries between 
legality and illegality, multiple trans-border loyalties and alliances at the fringes of an 
incomplete state, Samu villagers and their chief form alternative centres of rubber potency.
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Figure 38. A view of Ban Samu
Ban Samu: A Village in an in-between State Zone
Ban Samu lies on the rugged mountain range at the north-eastern tip of Muang Sing 
District four kilometres from the border with China8. In 2005, the hamlet comprised about 
80 households with a population of approximately 300 people9 10. The ethnic make-up of 
Samu was mainly Akha"' although some Han and Hani had recendy migrated into the 
community from China". Following a common pattern found among upland shifting 
cultivators, Samu had a long history of re-setilement. The ancestors of its inhabitants had 
migrated from Burma in the early 1900s to the high mountain region along the Mekong in
8 The majority of Akha in the borderlands of the Upper Mekong live in mid-slope or low-slope areas. Being 
located on a high elevation, Ban Samu and a few nearby villages to the west of Muang Sing represent an 
exception to this Akha general dwelling pattern (Cohen and Lyttleton 2002).
9 To protect confidentiality' I have approximated the number of village households and residents of Samu.
10 The Akha speak a Tibeto-Burman language. Akha oral histories suggest that Akha people originated in 
northern Yunnan Province in China and over the last centuries have migrated into southern Yunnan, Laos, 
Burma, Thailand and Vietnam (Sturgeon 2000:3).
"The social fabric of Ban Samu was quite heterogeneous. Some of the inhabitants had moved from the old 
village site, some from two neighbouring villages while some others had come from China. The population 
belonged to three of the many sub-groups in the big Akha ethnic family. The Je Jo sub-group, originating 
from the old village, totaled 90% of the population. An additional 3% belonged to the O La A Be clan. The 
Bo Che had arrived from a nearby Allage and made up 6% of the population. The remaining 1% of villagers 
fell under the Puli sub-group. In accordance with a common Akha custom, social organisation in Samu was 
based on a patrilineal lineage system and on virilocal residence. Sub-groups and lineage exogamy was quite a 
common practice (Alting von Geusau 1983; Tooker 1996:326).
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Lao territory. From there, they had gradually moved to lower elevations due to epidemics, 
war and in search of land suitable for swidden cultivation12.
Ban Samu had been at its current site since the early 1990s. The main reason for this last 
relocation was the need to find paddy land to reduce swidden agriculture. Such a shift was 
in line with a broader trend across mainland Southeast Asia whereby central governments 
have been resettling upland populations to lower slopes and urging them to adopt 
sedentary agricultural practices such as wet-rice cultivation as a way to control def orestation 
(Cohen and Lyttleton 2002; Lyttleton et al. 2004; Rigg 2005). Despite the Lao central 
government’s pressure to reduce swidden agriculture, in 2005 and 2006, a large number of 
Samu villagers still relied on swidden to cultivate rice, while only a minority had access to 
paddy land for irrigated rice farming. After the enforcement of opium eradication by the 
Lao government, encouraged by the United Nations International Drug Control Program 
(UNDCP) in 2002, Samu villagers abandoned poppy cultivation as a cash generating 
strategy13. Over the 2005-2008 period, Samu residents filled the gap in their livelihood 
system created by the absence of poppy with sugarcane, com, and vegetable cultivation and, 
above all, with rubber planting. Yet, while waiting for their rubber trees to reach a mature 
age for tapping, villagers generated small revenues from selling non-timber forest products 
and other crops to China. Agriculture and petty trade was integrated with hunting, cattle 
and water buffalo husbandry14. High poverty rates led villagers to work as wage labourers 
and engage in illegal commercial activities with China.
A 60 kilometre-long unpaved, winding and bumpy road separates Ban Samu from Muang 
Sing town. In the mid-2000s, the road was accessible during the dry season by vehicle, but 
almost impassable during the rainy season. The village was therefore poorly connected for 
half of the year to the Lao administrative centre. Apart from a very few individuals who 
owned motorbikes and could cover long distances in Lao territory, for the majority of 
Samu residents the six hour trip on foot to Muang Sing town was an endeavour to be
12 Like other shifting cultivators living on the borderlands between China, Laos, Burma and Thailand, Akha 
people set up new villages every three to ten years (Tooker 1996:326).
13 In the Upper Mekong region, opium cultivation is mainly practiced by highlander ethnic groups such as the 
Hmong, Yao, Lisu, Lahu, Shan, Wa and Akha. Even before the enforcement of opium eradication by the Lao 
government and UNDCP, Muang Sing District was a “low-scale opium production region” (Epprecht 
1998:131). Since opium grows only at elevations higher than 1000m above sea level, mid-slope and lower 
slope Akha villages in Muang Sing District did not engage in the crop’s cultivation. Samu and other villages 
located on high elevations in the district represented an exception to this general trend. Many of its residents 
planted opium until the early 2000s.
14 Mika Toyota has illustrated the active and long-standing involvement of the Akha in trade and commerce 
with neighbouring groups to debunk the myth of the Akha as subsistence farmers (Toyota 2000).
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undertaken only once or twice a year. In contrast, proximity to the international border 
makes Samu better connected with China. Chinese towns and villages along the border 
were Samu’s main points of reference for market transactions, healthcare, various types of 
services, and outlets of wage labour.
Samu’s location in an in-between border zone engendered that dynamic interpenetration of 
cultures typical of interstitial regions between nation-states (Alvarez 1995; Leach 1960:50; 
Vila 2000, 2003). The blending of Chinese, Akha, Lao and Tai Lue cultural elements in the 
village challenges the idea of a unitary and discrete national culture epitomized by the 
national border (Donnan and Wilson 1999; Gupta and Ferguson 1992). A manifestation of 
such merging could, for instance, be seen in the architectural style of the village houses. 
Apart from the huts of poor families made out of bamboo and covered with thatched 
roofs, representing the dominant dwelling model in other Akha villages in Laos, the bigger 
abodes of the village leaders and a few well-off families reproduced the architectural style 
of Akha houses found in China in material (wood, clay tiles and bricks), layout and 
structure based, in turn on Tai Lue architecture.
Frontier cultural juxtaposition could also be observed in the way middle-aged women in 
the village dressed, drawing on Lao, Akha and Chinese fashion repertoires. On my first 
visit to the village the wife of the political leader, Ase, for instance wore a blue synthetic 
tracksuit from China and a t-shirt with writing in Chinese in place of, respectively the 
traditional pleated dark blue skirt and embroidered blouse worn by Akha women in other 
villages in Laos. The modem outfit was integrated with the headgear of her ethnic sub­
group decorated with silver piastres dated 1904, which was during the period of the 
Republic of French Indochina15.
15 Elderly and middle-aged Akha women in Laos wear embroidered headgear decorated with old French silver 
piastres. The shape and decoration of the headgear varies according to each sub-ethnic group within the 
larger Akha ethnic family (Looker 1996:326).
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Figure 39. Road to China from Ban Samu
State Power And Akha Potency
Frontier cultural hybridity was further exemplified through multilingualism. In addition to 
Akha, young generations of male and female villagers were fluent in the Mengla variant of 
the Yunnanese dialect and, the few with school education, in Lao. Whereas male elders 
spoke mainly Akha and Tai Lue, the majority of middle-aged men were fluent in Akha and 
the Mengla dialect and spoke very little Lao with the exception of a few who had learned it 
while serving in the Army16.
Nevertheless, in this multicultural melting-pot, Chinese elements were more noticeable 
than others. It was sufficient to take a glimpse at the rubbish heaps in the courtyards to 
find evidence of the Chinese consumerist sway. The discarded packaging of instant noodles, 
mango juice, cookies and strawberry cream pies, cigarettes, batteries, beer and canned food 
bearing Chinese characters were the only waste to be seen. Cooking utensils and 
kitchenware found in the houses were made in China. The two or three people who owned 
a mobile phone used China Mobile SIM cards drawing illegally on the Chinese 
telecommunication network. The houses of the four or five well-off people in the village 
were furnished with Chinese TV and DVD sets, sofas and chairs. The walls were decorated 
with posters of Ming style gardens from China’s metropolitan areas. The currency through 
which all these consumer goods were acquired was the Chinese yuan. The Lao kip was 
barely seen, let alone used in the village.
Cultural proximity with China was reinforced by well-knit socio-economic links with Akha 
residents in a few villages in Chinese territory in Mengrun Township and with a Han 
settlement of the Mengman State Farm located near the border. While perhaps recently 
reinforced by the Greater Mekong economic corridor (ADB 2002, 2004a, 2004b), or by 
globalising thrusts, cross-border connections between Samu villagers and peoples in China 
had deep roots in history and were embedded in numerous migration waves from one side 
of the border to the other. According to the accounts of some village elders, the clear 
border demarcation produced by colonialism and later reinforced by the founding of the 
Chinese and Lao nation-states did not represent an impediment for cross-border flows of 
people and goods on this part of the frontier. As one of them put it, “Akha people are like 
elephants, borders do not matter much to them”. Even when, in the 1990s, the Lao and 
Chinese governments introduced a border pass and imposed tax on goods traded across 
the border, residents of Samu and other nearby Akha villages in Lao territory were able to
16 When conducting my research in Samu I drew on the villagers’ polyglot skills in Chinese and Lao and only 
occasionally communicated in the Akha language with the assistance of Akha interpreters.
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negotiate an exemption from these regulatory measures appealing to their distance from 
Muang Sing and their commercial dependency on China. In 2005-2006, residents of this 
stretch of the frontier traversed the border daily without the use of identification papers 
through either an officially opened, unpaved road or various unofficial, narrow 
passageways that frontier dwellers had carved through the frontier’s lush vegetation.
This intense cross-border mobility included trading and agricultural collaboration between 
Samu farmers and their ethnic fellows in villages in Mengrun. Samu and Akha fellows from 
China, for instance, exchanged agricultural expertise and land. On one of my visits to Samu 
I was taken to a rice swidden field on a slope not far from the village. In a bamboo hut in 
the middle of the mountain range, in solitude, an old Akha man from a Mengrun village 
was guarding the rice fields of a few relatives in Samu. The man and his family from China 
had contributed seeds and advanced technical expertise in rice cultivation to the owners of 
the land in Samu. In exchange, the Chinese Akha received a share of rice harvested in Laos 
that he would take back to his village in China.
Cross-border marriages between Ban Samu villagers and people from locales in China 
contributed to create a contiguous frontier social spatiality. In theory, the Chinese law 
allows intermarriage between Chinese citizens and foreigners, but without granting Chinese 
citizenship to the latter. A foreign spouse can obtain Chinese residence, yet only after the 
payment of very high fees, an avenue impassable for most of the poor farmers in the 
borderlands of Laos. Nevertheless, a few Akha women from Samu had found strategies to 
marry Chinese citizens and reside in China. Once an Akha girl moved to China in secret, 
the Chinese husband would register her as a Chinese citizen with the local authorities by 
applying for household registration (Ch. f '1 P  hukou) in the area of his own residence. The 
ruse, Samu residents explained to me, was normally successful since Chinese authorities 
rarely checked on the actual identity of the woman and were usually unable to distinguish a 
Lao-Akha from a Chinese-Akha. Children of the couple would be easily registered as 
Chinese citizens.
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Figure 41. Akha women from Laos sell their goods at a 
border market in China
Figure 42. Trading interaction between an Akha woman from Laos and a 
Han Chinese vendor at a border market in China
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In the 2000s, five women from Samu had married Akha (or Plan) men from China. 
Following the Akha patrivirilocal pattem of residence after marriage, the women had 
settled in villages in the proximity of the border or as far away as Mengpeng and Mengla. 
This had occurred without notifying the Lao and Chinese authorities. For both Akha girls 
and their parents, marrying a Chinese man was an avenue for social and financial upward 
mobility. As I will explain in the last part of this chapter, China was for all Akha in Samu 
the locus where modernity had to be sought. Marrying out in China was for Samu women a 
way to reach that modernity. Practical hypergamy to China was facilitated by the fact that 
some Chinese Akha men regard Lao-Akha women as ‘purer and fresher5 than Chinese 
Akha, and therefore more appealing. The reverse situation (a Lao-Akha man marrying a 
Chinese Akha woman) rarely occurred, since a Chinese woman would seldom devalue 
herself for a poorer Lao or Aka man17.
The embracing of China’s cultural elements, the socio-economic interconnections with 
Akha and Pian across the border, and the exemption from state-defined regulatory 
channels of tax, citizenship and personal identification all conveyed an idea that Samu 
villagers engaged with the Lao and Chinese states more as border mediators than as border 
rebels. They contested border rules but they did not locate themselves outside the state. 
Rather, they positioned themselves in between states transnationally. Their transnational 
location allowed Samu residents to strategically manoeuvre between law and outlaw to gain 
economic benefits. It is within this framework of inter-state manoeuvring, negotiation and 
mediation that rubber planting took place in Samu.
17 For a comparative discussion on cross-border marital tactics on the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore frontier 
see Amster and Lindquist (2005).
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Figure 43. An Akha man from China (first to the left) visits relatives in Ban Samu
Figure 44. Akha elder in Ban Samu (left)
Figure 45. An Akha woman with her child in Ban Samu (right)
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Initiation to Rubber Planting: the Refugee Experience
Samu villagers were among the pioneers of rubber cultivation in northern Laos in the late 
1990s, well before the Lao government institutionalised rubber as a main substitute for 
opium in the upland regions of Namtha Province in 2004. The initial thrust towards rubber 
came from a refugee experience in China. As a result of the Vietnam War and the political 
upheavals leading to the Lao Issara takeover in the 1970s, many Lao citizens were offered 
political asylum in China as part of a refugee program patronized by the UNHCR. A few 
thousand people moved across the border to escape violence, persecution and the Lao 
government’s compulsory recruitment of soldiers. The fugitives were given asylum in 
refugee camps or incorporated into villages in Xishuangbanna. Between the end of the 
1970s and the early 1980s, some people from Samu were able to settle in three Akha 
villages in Mengrun territory located near the border with Laos. In China, refugees were 
integrated into the local agriculture system, which in the uplands was dominated by 
swidden rice, sugarcane, and rubber18. In this context, Samu refugees became familiar with 
planting and managing rubber trees as well as with tapping techniques. In 1986, as part of 
the process of land allocation to individual farmers promoted by Deng Xiaoping’s de­
collectivization, Samu refugees were allotted land by the Chinese government and allowed 
to set up their own rubber plantations. Each family was entitled to up to 20 rru (=0.1334 
hectares) of slope land. By 1993, the refugees had started tapping and selling latex to the 
Mengman State Farm factories.
As the Lao political situation started to stabilize in the early 1990s, and diplomatic relations 
between China and Laos became normalised, the Chinese Government ordered the 
repatriation of the Lao refugees, organized in sixteen returning waves. The UNHCR, 
together with the Chinese and the Lao governments, supplied 2000 yuan (=263 US$) 
compensation to each returning family. Although willing to stay in China, where they could 
enjoy a more comfortable life, those that had been formally registered as ‘refugees’ could 
not escape this forced return to Laos. However, those who had fled to China outside the 
official refugee scheme were able to avoid repatriation, taking advantage of the Chinese 
authorities’ loose monitoring of their border population.
18 Due to the mountainous topography of the region, rubber cultivation started in the 1980s in the Akha 
villages of Mengrun township, quite early compared to the lowland areas of Mengman and Mengpeng where 
Dai farmers refused to plant the crop until the mid 1990s.
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Eight families living in Ban Samu in 2005 had been repatriated between 1992 and 1997 
after a ten-thirteen year stay in China. However, some of them had left in China their 
daughters who had married Chinese men of Akha or Han ethnicity and had bypassed 
formal registration in the refugee records. An old Akha man from Samu who returned to 
Laos after a 16-year stay in a village near Mengrun had left three daughters on the other 
side of the border. Through their marriages with Akha men in Mengrun and Mengpeng the 
women had acquired Chinese citizenship.
Some other returnees who had been unable to stay in China despite having married a 
Chinese, had brought their husbands or wives to Laos. Among them was a young lady who 
had married Li Hong, a 37-year-old Han Chinese man from a settlement of the Mengman 
State Farm. Li Hong was the son of a Hunanese couple who had arrived in Mengrun in the 
1960s as zhibiaru He and his wife had met in the Akha village near Mengrun to where she 
had migrated from Laos in 1982 with her parents. Despite their reluctance, in 1997, the 
couple was forced to move to Samu. Li Hong had renounced his Chinese citizenship to 
gain a Lao one. However, the couple maintained close social bonds with China. Their little 
daughter, who had also become a Lao citizen, had remained in a State Larm settlement 
with Li Hong’s parents to receive education in Chinese.
On repatriation, the returnees were asked to return the land where their rubber trees had 
been planted to the host villages in China. Lrom the profit made from the sale of the 
rubber trees between 1996 and 1997, the eight returning families to Samu were able to set 
up new plantations in Laos. Li Hong and his wife, for instance, had sold 300 trees of 
tapping age for 70 yuan (=9 US$) each to a Han man from Mengrun. On arrival in Samu, 
they had used part of the total 21,000 yuan (=2,763 US$) profit to establish a new rubber 
plantation and build a new house. In 1997, the couple had planted 50 mu (0.333 hectares) 
of rubber, taking advantage of copious land availability in the village.
From across the border the returnees brought back not only rubber saplings, but also 
technical expertise in planting, managing and tapping mbber trees. Above all, the 
newcomers became the pivotal actors in spreading mbber in Samu and inspiring other 
villagers to plant the crop. In the late 1990s, the livelihood of Samu farmers depended 
mainly on swidden rice agriculture and poppy cultivation. Opium was the major cash crop 
and was sold in the lowlands in Muang Sing and in China. In an agreement with the 
authorities in Mengla, the Lao government had encouraged sugarcane cultivation as an
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alternative to opium. The private company managing the ex-state-run sugar factory in 
Mengpeng had signed a contract with some households in Samu to buy sugarcane. 
However, the ambiguous business behaviour adopted by the company, which involved 
non-transparent weighing procedures and underpayment, discouraged the farmers from 
pursuing sugarcane cultivation.
The drastic eradication of poppy growing enforced by the Lao administration in 2002-2003 
contributed to the creation of a vacuum in the livelihood system of the villagers. In 2004, 
latex prices in China had increased, improving dramatically the living standards of many 
Akha in Mengrun. To Samu residents, rubber appeared to be the only crop that could fill 
the vacuum caused by opium eradication. Yet, most of the villagers lacked the financial 
resources necessary to set up the rubber plantations. In the following two sections I will 
outline various border practices devised by different social segments of the village 
population to cultivate rubber. These practices, I argue, created alternative centres of 
“potency” to the Lao centre of power (Tooker 1996).
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Creating Alternative Centres of Akha Potency 
Ase, the village chief
Ase, the village headman of Samu was the protagonist in a new wave of rubber planting in 
the village starting in 2003-2004. This illustrated his ability to create his own centre of 
politico-economic potency of which the majority of his villagers constituted the periphery. 
Drawing on his multiple connections with China, some sections of the Lao government in 
Muang Sing and other Akha village leaders in the uplands of Mom District, Ase’s centre of 
potency was related to the Lao centre of power in the lowland and to other minor centres 
of potency in the Chinese borderland.
His charisma and outstanding leadership capabilities had earned Ase the appointment of 
village chief in 1998, after a decision by the district government in Muang Sing in 
agreement with the village elders. Echoing the model set by Leach (1954:286), Ase was a 
man with “a status position in several different social systems at the same time”. He acted 
as middleman between his village community and the external world. Outside the village, 
he maintained links with members of the Muang Sing District to whom he had to regularly 
report on the socio-political situation of his village19. Ase also had close links with the 
chiefs of the various Akha villages in Mom Sub-district where his village was located. 
Within the village, his and his clan’s power was reinforced by the appointment of one of 
his younger brothers as vice-village headman and another as village veterinary officer. Ase’s 
elder son had married the youngest daughter of the dzorm, an alliance that seemingly 
merged the centre of political potency with the centre of spiritual potency in the village.
Above all, Ase enjoyed very strong bonds with relatives and peers in villages in Mengrun in 
China. In cross-border networking he was favoured by his polyglot capabilities that allowed 
him to easily switch from Akha into Lao, Tai Lue or Chinese dialect according to his 
interlocutor. It was not unusual to see Ase talking on his mobile phone on the western 
comer of the terrace in his house, by chance one of the few spots in the village where the 
China Mobile network was available, to some peers from China. Ties with China were 
created and reinforced through a reciprocal exchange of gifts, favours, and invitations to 
weddings or banquets.
19 For a discussion on the connections between border ethnic upland leaders and the state in Thailand see 
Hjorleifur (2005).
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Ase manoeuvred among his multiple connections in both China and Laos to channel and 
control the legal and illegal passage of goods and resources across the border, at times 
including, at other times excluding some of his villagers. An officer from the DAFO in 
Muang Sing who supervised the forest management in Samu on a regular basis confessed 
to me that once he had ‘helped’ Ase and some of his villagers to smuggle timber to China 
by signing the papers that allowed the cross-border transaction. The revenues from the sale 
of the logs had been split between Ase, his brothers, the members of the village elders’ 
committee, Akha brokers from China and the DAFO official. Wildlife, another protected 
resource in both Laos and China was regularly sold by Samu residents to Tai Lue, Akha 
and Han people from China. When hoping to make a wildlife deal, Ase was the first person 
in the village that Chinese buyers approached. I myself once happened to witness the 
arrival of a Tai man from Mengrun at Ase’s house in search of gourmet wildlife. A 
government official in Muang Sing told me that Ase had deposited part of the money he 
had gained from cross-border illegal activities in a bank in Mengrun and had invested the 
remainder in a hundred head of cattle.
In 2003, a wealthy Akha peer from Mengrun proposed that he and Ase’s villagers 
cooperate to plant rubber. The Chinese Akha’s intention was to take advantage of the 
abundance of land in Samu and the cheap labour provided by the villagers, while Ase’s aim 
was to gain capital to set up rubber planting. A verbal agreement with Ase and some elders 
of the village committee enabled the Mengrun investor to realise the rubber investment in 
Samu. In 2004, three more investors from Mengrun, one of Hani, one of Akha and the 
other of Han ethnicity became involved in the rubber deal.
However, the terms of the agreement and the number of villagers involved were shrouded 
in mystery. On my first visit to Samu, Ase revealed only one part of the story to me. 
Accompanied by an official from the Muang Sing DAFO with the logistic support of GTZ, 
Ase and his villagers saw me as an extension of the lowland government’s monitoring 
tentacles on land rights and tax payments and therefore someone for whom the reality of 
facts had to be twisted. Ase told me that the agreement with the investors from China had 
been recently officialised in a written contract that had been endorsed by the district 
authorities. However, when I asked him if I could see the document, his response was that 
it had been taken away by the district officials.
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Figure 46. An Akha village leader (centre) with members of his extended family
Figure 47. A DAFO official, Lao Akha villagers, and 
Chinese Han and Akha entrepreneurs discuss investments at a banquet
Figure 48. The author shares a drink with a DAFO 
official and an Akha leader
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In the contract, he explained, he and the village elders had agreed to lease 3500 mu (=524 
hectares) of their land to the investors for forty years. The investors committed to 
supplying capital to establish the plantation, including remuneration of the villagers’ labour 
for clearing the land, and setting up a rubber nursery, and paying for labour to graft the 
saplings. Once trees had reached the mature age for tapping (after 7-8 years from planting), 
the plantation would be split into two parts: 60% to the investors and 40% to the farmers. 
After the land bipartition, each of the two parties would look after their own plantation.
Ase said to me that twelve families in the village had joined the contract, which included 
the ex refugees from China. However, when I spoke to the villagers, their involvement was 
unclear. They could not tell me who, apart from Ase and his family, was part of the 
agreement nor, if they were part of it, what their share of the rubber land would be. From 
the blurred picture that the villagers could provide, it seemed that Ase and a small group of 
powerful individuals had made the decision on the behalf of other village members and 
that the former were the only individuals whose economic benefit from the deal was 
certain. The villagers excluded from the deal were resentful towards Ase.
Between 2003 and 2005 the investors established the rubber plantation in Samu. They 
hired labour from the villagers to clear the land. They brought skilled workers from China 
to breed saplings in the nursery and train villagers in transplanting and grafting techniques. 
By the end of 2005, at least twenty people in the village had developed good grafting skills 
and had set up their own rubber nurseries.
On my subsequent visits to Samu I discovered another aspect of the truth about the 
agreement with the Akha investors from China. When I asked Ase, he still declared the 
contract unavailable. The reason for the on-going concealment of the written document 
was the involvement of the head of the Muang Sing DPIO, one of the most influential 
political figures of the lowland government and in charge of regulating foreign investment 
in Muang Sing District. The DAFO official who accompanied me to Samu revealed that, at 
a certain stage of the negotiations between Ase and the Chinese investors, the head of the 
DPIO had been included in the deal in exchange for political protection. The Tai Lue 
politician had obtained a 20% share of the rubber investment in Samu. Muang Sing DAFO, 
whose head in the early 2000s had started a land use planning program that later included 
regulation of rubber forest coverage in cooperation with GTZ, intervened to try to bring 
the illicit deals under the feeble rule of law of the Lao state. Ase was threatened to be jailed
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if he continued his illegal activities with China. The head of DAFO had apparently 
confiscated the written contract. The situation became complicated when the head of 
DPIO suddenly died. His family demanded that his share of the rubber investment in 
Samu be handed down to them. To ensure that the family received their full entitlement, 
the son-in-law of the deceased politician met with Ase. By 2008, the family of the deceased 
had gained the support of the newly appointed head of DAFO. When I went to ask the 
new chief of DAFO if I could have a look at the contract signed between Samu, the 
Chinese Akha investors and the former head of DPIO, he told me that no contract had 
ever been signed.
In late 2005, Ase was courted by another investor. This deal was larger in scale than the 
previous one. It involved a 6,000 mi (=900 hectares) plantation to be sponsored by a ‘big 
boss’ from Guangdong. The middleman of the boss was a Han man from Mengrun whom 
Ase had met in an Akha village visiting his peers. Probably not coincidentally, the Flan 
middleman had a rubber plantation right adjacent to the border, which he would have liked 
to expand on the Lao side if the boss’ deal succeeded. When I met him at Ase’s house, the 
Han broker confessed that he had been coming to Samu for the last few months “to have 
some fun”, an expression often adopted in Chinese when the speaker wants to be vague 
about why she/he is in a certain place. While refusing to tell me the name of the company 
or of the boss, he revealed that the latter had gone to Vientiane to negotiate with the 
central government about the land concession in Samu and some nearby villages. Although 
Ase assertively claimed that the whole village would be involved in the project, he could 
not spell out the criteria to be used for allocating land to the households. Even in this case, 
therefore, the villagers seemed not to be part of the decision-making process. On my 
return to Samu in 2007, I learned that the investment with the ‘big boss’ had never been 
put into practice. My usual DAFO escort informed me that the non-transparent deal 
previously concluded with the investors from Mengrun had affected the outcomes of the 
negotiations for establishing the larger rubber plantation with the Guangdong boss.
Ase was no longer the village chief in 2007 but had become part of the village elders’ 
council. He had been replaced in his office by the dzöom20. Nevertheless, this had not 
dissuaded Ase from his illicit cross-border ventures. In December 2006, a Chinese 
company from Kunming had obtained from Ase, the new village chief, and other political
20 In some cases the miban and the dzörm can be the same person.
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figures in the village the support to smuggle timber into China through the territory of 
Samu and a neighbouring village. According to the DAFO official, some Akha and Chinese 
police officers in Mengrun were also part of the deal. All participants in this mega-logging 
operation were to receive a share of the money depending on the role they played. The 
company broadened the road linking Samu to the Chinese border to allow the trucks to go 
through with the logs. The timber was felled in a protected forest in Siang Khaeng Sub­
district near the Mekong, a remote area that escaped the full control of the Muang Sing 
authorities. For about a month the company succeeded in smuggling large quantities of 
timber. My companion from DAFO said that although he had noticed the operations he 
had not reported them to the office in Muang Sing as he was afraid of putting his life at 
risk. When the office eventually found out about the illegal smuggling, the head of DAFO 
and his assistants immediately went to Samu and threatened the village headman, Ase and 
their collaborators with imprisonment.
The issue then became a political matter between the Chinese and Lao governments. The 
illegal practices of the Chinese company and their collaborators on both sides of the border 
had challenged the political and territorial integrity of the Lao state. The Muang Sing 
authorities asked the Chinese Frontier Army to intervene. A few days after the deal was 
denounced, some members of the company were arrested. The Army disrupted links 
between Samu and China by digging a big hole in the main road and erecting concrete 
poles tied with barbed wire. When I asked Ase about the reasons for the Chinese Army’s 
punitive action, he avoided any reference to the logging issue but simply said that “the 
Chinese and the Lao government at the moment do not understand each otheri’. A few 
days before my visit in 2007, the DAFO chief had again gone to Samu to settle some other 
breaches of the law that Ase and his entourage of people had been involved in. The visit 
had ended in a fight. As an act of retaliation, someone in the village had hidden the car keys 
of the DAFO delegation delaying their return to Muang Sing by a day. The relationship 
between Samu villagers and the DAFO had therefore become very strained.
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Figure 49. The road to China from Ban Samu interrupted
by the Chinese Army
Figure 50. Rubber trees belonging to a Chinese man 
in Lao territory near Ban Samu
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Villagers ’parallel centres o f potency
Many residents of Samu were excluded from the predatory plans of Ase and his entourage 
to set up rubber plantations and exploit local resources. Such exclusion derived from the 
unequal power relations between the leading political and ritual figures and the 
‘commoners’ found in most Akha villages I visited in Muang Sing. Or, it can better be 
viewed as the outcome of the position of ‘commoners’ at the periphery of centres of 
potency created by the leaders. Alting von Geusau (1988:218) and Tooker (1996:326) 
maintain that the Akha village-level polity is relatively egalitarian and that lineages within 
the village are unranked. However, the village headman and his clan members, together 
with the family of the dzorm in Samu, had privileged access to resources by virtue of their 
superior status in relation to other members of the village group. Ase, the dzörm and their 
families owned the largest area of paddy land in the village. Therefore, the political and 
ritual potency of the chiefs translated into economic empowerment.
Villagers who lacked the political power to gain economic benefits traced alternative 
channels of potency to those marked by Ase and to the power webs woven by the lowland 
government in Muang Sing. Rubber planting was part of this alternative process of 
potency-creation enacted by commoners through cross-border socio-economic practices 
with China. A large number of families in Samu initiated rubber cultivation through the 
cross-border ethnic network of friends and relatives in Mengrun, skilfully twisting social 
relations into strategic financial, trading, and expertise channels (Toyota 2000). After losing 
most of their rubber trees in the big frost that hit the region between 1999 and 2000, the 
eight ex-refugee families borrowed money from their relatives in China to re-establish the 
plantations. Similarly, other households borrowed part of the capital to start planting the 
crop ex now from friends and relatives in Mengrun. The remainder of funds derived from 
the sale of vegetables, cattle and buffalos on the Chinese market.
Many Samu villagers grew rubber by making agreements with Akha Chinese. In such cases, 
the Lao side provided land and labour, while the Chinese side contributed capital, input 
and technology. The agreements were never written down. The kin or friendship tie was 
sufficient to guarantee trust between the two parties. These agreements were normally 
concealed from the DAFO authorities of Muang Sing and often even from Ase. When I 
conducted the household survey in Samu, most villagers were reluctant to reveal their
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Figure 51. Swidden set for rubber planting on a mountain slope in Ban Samu
Figure 52. Rows of newly planted rubber trees in Ban Samu
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Figure 53. An attempt of state territorialisation 
in 2005: board indicating the land use plan in Ban Samu
Figure 54. Failed state territorialisation: the land use 
plan board on the ground in Ban Samu in 2007
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unofficial rubber arrangements with Akha in China for fear that I would report them to the 
lowland authorities.
Those who planted rubber on their own still relied on relatives and friends in Mengrun to 
buy good quality saplings. Relatives and peers were an invaluable source of technical 
knowledge, providing advice and assistance on how to breed, graft and plant the saplings. 
Samu villagers travelled to China to leam, or invited kin and friends to the village to teach, 
for as they often remarked, “the Chinese know the way”. Relatives and friends from China 
also acted as providers of market outlets. The three families that started tapping rubber in 
2005 relied on their relatives to sell latex to Chinese middlemen in Mengpeng or Mengrun. 
The son-in-law of one of the ex-refugee families would come to Samu every second day to 
tap latex at his parents-in-law's plantation, which he would then sell on the market in 
Mengrun where he lived.
The rubber growing practices adopted by villagers within Samu territory both escaped and 
challenged the regulatory scheme on land use of the Muang Sing government which 
followed a broader national plan started in 1997. At the beginning of 2003, a GTZ program 
on Rural De velopment in Mountainous Areas of Northern Laos (RDMA) in collaboration 
with the DAFO had started to involve Samu villagers in a district land use plan that 
encouraged farmers to manage resources within their village territory according to officially 
designated categories of forest and agricultural land21. This standardisation of land use 
aimed mainly at protecting certain areas from indiscriminate deforestation. The DAFO and 
RDMA team had drawn a map of Samu’s land zones with the participation of Ase, the 
village committee and other village members. At that time, only the ex-refugees from China 
had started rubber cultivation in the village. Following the rubber boom in 2004-2005, the 
DAFO program had restricted rubber cultivation to ‘agricultural land’ and ‘use/production 
forest’ zones. Since most of the designated zones for rubber had been occupied with 
saplings planted by the investors from Mengrun in 2003-2004, villagers planted their rubber 
trees in areas that the DAFO plan had excluded from rubber cultivation. In November 
2005, DAFO officials estimated that rubber covered most of the village land in Samu 
except for 70% of the Conservation/Reserve forest. DAFO officers repeatedly urged Ase 
to take action to stop his villagers’ breaches of the law, but without much success. When
21 According to the classification of the land use plan promoted by DAFO and GTZ in 2005, village forest 
land is divided into five categories: conservation/reserve forest, protection forest, production forest (used for 
the collection of non-timber forest products, regeneration forest (used for firewood collection and wood), 
and cemetery forest. Agricultural land is divided into three categories: paddy, swidden, and garden.
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asked by officers about their rubber assets, household members would understate the 
number of trees they had planted and were deceitful about the location of their plantation. 
In the official rhetoric of DAFO officers and many other district government agents in the 
lowland, the dynamics underlying the rubber planting in Samu were described as having 
escaped state control; they revealed the lowland’s failure to bring the marginal Akha under 
central rule. Yet, the involvement of some of the district government officials themselves 
in the rubber and logging affairs with Ase was never officially disclosed. Indeed, the 
lowlanders’ alliances with Akha to set up rubber plantations in 2005 became a widespread 
phenomenon in a large number of Akha villages in Muang Sing. This aspect of reality was 
only addressed in unofficial gossip by commoners. The outlaw behaviour of lowland Tai 
Lue state agents was an issue of shame, and hence had to be officially denied. In contrast, 
Akha unruliness was something to be publicised, for it conformed with the highlanders’ 
low position in the ethnic and social ranking of Laos and with the construction of Akha as 
forest destroyers (Sturgeon 2005).
Rubber as a tool of modem potency
Cross-border practices leading to economic advancement were not the only form of 
alternative potency that Samu farmers and Ase produced in relation to the power model of 
the lowland state. They also created an alternative centre of modem potency. By embracing 
rubber from China, Akha peripheral subjects were empowering themselves as modem 
subjects as opposed to being made modem by the Lao central state (Gaonkar 2001:18). 
The model of modernity they drew upon was that offered by their friends and relatives in 
Mengrun. It was the Chinese dream of prosperity and well-being from China’s eastern 
regions that was becoming a reality for many rubber farmers in the south-western 
borderlands of the country. Therefore, by reaching for Chinese modernity, Samu villagers 
were somehow allying themselves with the Chinese centre of power. This was made 
possible by their strategic position in the upland margins of the Lao state and in the 
proximity of the mighty economic neighbour.
Ethnographic accounts of the US-Mexican border describe border practices as trapped 
within an inescapable mechanism of unequal power relations between the first and the 
third world economies. A common picture presented is that of the first world projecting 
itself into the third to exploit cheap labour and take advantage of lax environmental 
regulations (Vila 2003). An alternative image is that of the third world extending itself into 
the first to pursue economic and social advancement (Alvarez 1995). In the second case,
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the American dream is the pole of attraction of a south-north unidirectional migratory 
vector of labourers from ‘underdeveloped’ Mexico to the United States. Yet the rigidity of 
geopolitical borders succeeds in marginalising local residents, in regulating and constraining 
their movement. Despite the fact that fronterizos (frontier people), endowed with trans­
national hybrid identities and enacting an “ever-shifting behaviour^ (Alvarez 1995:451), 
strive to resist and, at times, manage to transcend the impenetrable boundary, they 
nevertheless remain caught up in the economic asymmetry with the wealthy first world. 
The border, with its innumerable check-points and monitoring technologies acts as a 
marker of exclusion and separation. It functions as a barrier limiting the longing for wealth 
and improvement (Flynn 1997:313).
In contrast, on the stretch of the Sino-Lao frontier examined in this thesis, ‘a poorer5 third 
world (Laos) and a ‘wealthier5 third world (China) interpenetrate each other. The two 
worlds meet at the border, one taking advantage of the other in an idiosyncrasy of 
contestation, negotiation, friction and manipulation. However, the border and its crossings 
do not neutralise the unequal power relations between the two sides they separate. 
Separation and mutual interdependence are, in fact, two contradictory features that 
characterize life at the juncture of the Lao and Chinese states. The border remains a 
dividing line of two different degrees of modernisation. At the same time, it acts as a gluing 
element between ethnic fellows belonging to two nation-states, and as a bridge for 
reciprocal social and economic inter-reliance (Flynn 1997:311). Border dwellers manipulate 
the border and transform it into a corridor of modem opportunities.
The frontier is not only the site where an alternative form of modernity to that promoted 
by the Lao state is imagined but also the locus where various strategies to pursue such 
modernity are put into practice. To Samu farmers, China offers prospects of a tangible 
modernity that the Lao state is currently unable to provide. Longing for, and not yet fully 
attaining a Western 19th century version of modernity embedded in rationalisation and 
standardisation, the Lao central state is focusing on territorial sovereignty, clearly defined 
borders, regulated land use patterns, and transparent investment contracts. Modernity is 
perceived by the lowland authorities as a goal to be reached through progressive stages of 
economic development in which the state acts as main regulator (Oakes 1998:7). Big 
development projects implemented across the country, in the guise of dams, highways and 
casinos, is the manifestation of a modernity of “spectacle55 and “ostentatiousness55 (Oakes
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1998:8), through which the Lao central government is striving to disentangle itself from a 
condition of underdevelopment in the eyes of the international community.
Nevertheless, to the Lao farmers along the border with China, state-brand rationalisations 
seem to be unsuitable for their aspirations. While allured by the monumentality of the 
state’s spectacular version of modernity, they perceive it as out of their reach. Rather than 
being a goal to be achieved with the assistance of the state and whose achievement is 
associated with a remote future, modernity is a contingent process through which border 
dwellers confront and negotiate the socio-economic changes occurring in the present 
(Oakes 1998:7). The adoption of rubber from China as a new livelihood strategy is 
expression of such negotiation. It is the outcome of the farmers’ creative adaptation to the 
insecurity, flux and precariousness of the world in motion.
Relegated to the periphery of a state where the low domestic production of consumption 
goods generates significant reliance on commodities imported from neighbouring countries 
such as Thailand, Vietnam and China, Samu people drew from the latter material and 
symbolic artefacts of consumption through which modernity was more perceptibly 
experienced. Ase and his family acted as conveyors of this cross-border appropriation of 
modernity. On their regular trips to China, they often hired DVDs of Chinese films and 
music to bring back to Samu. At night, the house of Ase, the only one in the village with a 
TV and a karaoke set in 2005, turned into a rudimentary cinema. Contributing a few yuan 
for the viewing, villagers came to experience fragments of that Chinese tangible modernity 
by watching episodes of soap operas about Shaolin monks, Chinese historical characters 
from the Tang dynasty or the Communist War of Resistance period. As part of this “kula” 
ring of modem objects (Davis 2003; Malinowski 1953) circulated across the border were 
also DVDs of Akha music produced in China. Perhaps reinforcing an idea of cross-border 
pan-Akha community, the music and the lyrics sung in a language familiar to them fostered 
among Samu villagers the desire to bridge the distance between them and their wealthier 
ethnic fellows.
The economic superiority of their friends and relatives from across the border was a 
common topic in Samu residents’ conversations. Villagers constantly compared then- 
misery and backwardness with China’s augmented wealth and development. Between 2004 
and 2005, the increase in latex price dramatically raised the living standards of rubber 
growers in China. When I illegally crossed the border with Ase’s son, I visited the house of
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an Akha family in a village in Mengrun. The host was a widow, mother of two daughters 
and a son. To my comment about the rapid modernisation process occurring in the village, 
the woman responded by pointing out that such prosperity was quite a new phenomenon. 
When the latex price was low, she lamented, she had faced profound misery and hardship, 
having to pay for education for her two daughters in Kunming and eking out a living for 
herself in the village.
The signs of today’s economic improvement were manifest in the way her large wooden 
house on stilts had been renovated. A functional bathroom with shower and hot water 
operated by solar panels on the roof, only two years earlier a rare luxury in the area, had 
been built next to the kitchen. In line with the current fashion in Xishuangbanna, in 
between the flashy white tiles was set a glazed picture of a blonde western woman posing 
with her breasts uncovered. Appreciation for white skin, blond hair and large breasts 
represented in the Chinese collective imagery symbols of well-being and prosperity. The 
picture of the Western woman was a modem variant of the traditional Chinese three-stellar 
god trilogy (Ch. fulushou) representing happiness, wealth, and longevity found in
most Han Chinese houses. Furthermore, the picture of the naked Western woman was, as 
Schein noted in the Miao ethnic context of the 1980s, “an emblem of the boldness of 
exposed skin, [and] of unconstrained canons of dress” (Schein 1999:375), habits denied to 
an Akha woman in the modernising national discourse of contemporary China. As an Akha 
guy pointed out to me, the picture of nudity referred to liberal and open-minded western 
views that Akha would like to embrace, but could not. In the past, in the Akha etiquette it 
was acceptable for women to show their breasts through their clothes without 
stigmatisation. Since their inclusion into the Chinese nation as Hani nationality, the Akha 
have been an object of an eroticising and romanticising process of “othering” that the Han 
majority has often pursued in the representation of ethnic minorities in art, film and 
literature (Gladney 1994). By objectifying ethnic minorities as female, child-like and 
primitive, the Flan majority constructs itself as male, adult and modem (Gladney 1994). For 
the Akha woman, the nudity of the western woman was perhaps a way of de-eroticising 
herself in the eyes of the Han majority, and of transforming herself from primitive into a 
modem citizen of China. The picture was her embracement of the modem taste that had 
arrived from urban areas of China.
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Figure 55. Rubber plantations on the Chinese side o f the border
Figure 56. The modern fruits o f rubber planting: a new tiled 
bathroom with solar panels in an Akha village on the Chinese side o f the border
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In the Akha village in Mengrun in 2005, motorbikes, mobile phones, TV and VCD sets, 
cars, packaged processed food and clothes made in Kunming were commodities affordable 
for a large number of people. For Samu villagers, such material manifestation of modernity 
seemed unreachable until rubber made its appearance in the village. To them, rubber was 
the tool for that affordability. One of the farmers lamented to me: “our living conditions 
are too backward now. In our village there is nothing of what you see in China”. With a big 
smile on his face he continued: “when you come back to the village in six years time we will 
have started tapping rubber. Then we will be rich, we will have cars, nice houses and eat 
better food, like in China".
In Samu villagers’ imagery, rubber was the only path to escape poverty, the antidote against 
unhappiness and misery. Rubber was the tool to reach social and economic emancipation 
enabling them to be part of the successful Chinese model of modernity Undoubtedly, the 
Chinese model of modernity identified with capitalist consumerism that Samu villagers 
aspire to, may be thought of as a goal to attain. Some may argue that these Akha people are 
far from achieving that goal. To the farmers themselves, the full attainment of that 
modernity still represents a dream. Yet, while the Lao state is unable to provide the 
conditions for the dream to be fulfilled, China with its advanced farming system and 
technologies offers the tools for at least believing in the viability of that modem dream. 
Cross-border social connections, rather than standardised land use practices, are conducive 
to new ideas and knowledge. It is through the peers and friends and relatives’ support that 
the dream may become true.
FLstory will tell whether Samu farmers ever achieve the type of modernity found in 
Mengrun or not. For the time being, it is important to emphasise how Samu villagers 
construct themselves as modem subjects. What is relevant is the process whereby they 
carve a space for their modem existence in the midst of the present’s contingencies (Oakes 
1998:223), where the Lao state-devised disruption of old agricultural practices based on 
opium cultivation has created a gap in their livelihood system. Being modem is 
simultaneously embedded in the desire to be modem, in the reflexive recognition of the 
disadvantaged condition they dwell in as well as in the struggle they engage in to escape 
from the trap of poverty (Oakes 1998:7). Samu villagers were modem in the way they 
dreamed f and also in the way they invented alternative centres of economic and social 
potency to adjust to the abrupt changes occurring in their lives.
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Re-considering the Centre-Margins Relations
What do the alternative centres of potency designed by Ase and his villagers through 
border practices tell us about power relations between centres and margins, lowlands and 
highlands and, more broadly, between states and society in the Upper Mekong region in 
the era of an alleged regional integration?
I have already mentioned at the beginning of this chapter how in theorising state power in 
Southeast Asia, some scholars have conflated the geographic isolation of peripheral 
highlanders with political and social exclusion from the state. However, the above- 
described multi-directional border practices produced by Samu villagers to establish rubber 
planting force us to revise the clear-cut picture of rebellion of the periphery to the centre 
and of the disconnection between the lowland state and the upland margins.
Zones of alternative potency between states cannot be merely described as a mechanism of 
state-repuls ion by unruly populations (Scott 2008, 2009) nor as a product of the decline of 
the nation-state under the pressure of globalisation. Rather, they are an expression of the 
overlapping of pre-modem and modem patterns of governance typical of the borderlands 
of the Upper Mekong. They are the historical legacy of pre-modem highland political 
satellites at the periphery of valley-based principalities, and the product of an “ongoing, 
incomplete process of state formation” (McCoy 1999:130). Sturgeon (2004:464-65) has 
noted that in the borderlands separating China, Thailand and Burma, the process of state­
making has produced over the last century “small polities” similar to the pre-modem 
principalities between major empires and kingdoms that Leach (1960:50) described as 
“political systems” separated by “zones of mutual interest”. Akha leaders of the 
contemporary era, Sturgeon (2000:157-58) argues, “operate as...small border chieffs], 
[much like] the lordfs] o f.. .pre-modem Southeast Asian small border powerfs]”.
Samu village, positioned between the highlands of Laos and China, stands out as one of 
these contemporary intra-state polities of the Upper Mekong. Its existence as a centre of 
Akha potency derives from the overlapping of the pre-modem mandala and the modem 
western-derived nation-state model of governance in which the Lao state rules over its 
margins. It is part of the intersection of centrifugal and centripetal forces that operate at 
the frontier as a consequence of an ongoing decentralised experimentation applied by the 
Lao central leadership to rule over its periphery. This type of governance resonates with
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the Chinese “experimentation under hierarchy” (Heilmann 2008:29) model that the 
Chinese central government has adopted since the early days of the Chinese Revolution to 
manage its interaction with local level administrations. It is a governing mechanism of 
“decentralised experimentation with ad hoc central interference” (Heilmann 2008:29), 
whereby local rulers are allowed to experiment autonomously with policies which are 
ultimately under the scrutiny of central authority.
On the one hand, as during the pre-colonial period, the Lao government allows small 
niches of political autonomy to border chiefs on the hills to control people, resources, land, 
and defend the border on behalf of the centre of power in the valley. On the other hand, 
when experimental autonomy results in the Lao central government’s loss of control over 
the periphery, a territorialising mechanism is put into action. Similarly to any state aspiring 
to realise the Western model of statehood, the Lao government pushes for a project of 
‘major sovereignty. It tries to impose on its border citizens a national language, to define 
citizenship through, identity cards and border passes, to standardise land use practices, and 
to clearly demarcate its borders.
In 2005, the rubber boom in the northern regions of Laos triggered by formal and informal 
investments from China, represented a real threat to the Lao state’s territorial sovereignty. 
Some rubber trees planted in Laos by Chinese investors were very close to plantations on 
the Chinese side of the border. Already in the early 1990s, a Chinese farmer had illegally set 
up a rubber plantation in Lao territory not far from Samu, right adjacent to the border, 
provoking a dispute over the demarcation of the national boundary. Such arbitrary spatial 
appropriations were perceived by the Lao government as undermining its territorial 
dominion. They were against the bilateral agreement between the Lao and Chinese 
governments according to which rubber plantations must be situated at least 500m away 
from the international border to avoid territorial encroachment.
Ase, a multi-connected zom leader at the margins of Laos, fits exactly with Sturgeon’s 
description of a modem small border chief. He emerged from the Lao state formation 
process, while being at the same time a remnant of the pre-modem political order. Ase was 
appointed by the lowland government as mediator between the periphery and the Lao 
centre of power. He brought to the highland village political messages from the lowland, as 
could be observed in his house from some posters from Vientiane in Lao language about 
disease prevention and the upcoming national census in 2006. Ase was co-opted as border
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guardian to defend the territory, resources and people over which the Lao centre claims 
sovereignty—a sovereignty which in the border regions has not yet fully been 
accomplished. Therefore, Ase did not stand outside the modem state, but he was, at least 
institutionally, part of it.
Yet, paradoxically, from within the Lao state, Ase created a semi-independent centre of 
potency of which the Lao lowland government and a few localities on the Chinese side of 
the border constituted the periphery. Airing von Geusau (1988:263) observes that although 
the Akha often portray themselves as “losers”, in some of their oral texts there is mention 
that they “feel themselves very much at the centre of the universe-disc (A. rriXan) [and that 
other majority groups such as the] Chinese, Burmese, and Shan are cast as inhabitants of 
the periphery”. Ase acted very much as if he felt at the centre of the margins of two states. 
He empowered himself as border patron and arbiter of a competition over sovereignty 
between two major political entities. Fluent in multiple languages, he drew on manifold 
alliances on both sides of the border to channel the legal and illegal passage of goods and 
to control resource access for himself, his clan members and some of his villagers 
(Sturgeon 2004). Ase manoeuvred between maintaining allegiances with some factions of 
the Lao local government while declaring disobedience to others, establishing connections 
with private investors, kin and friends in China to gain economic benefits. His actions and 
persona were polyvalent, ambiguous and volatile. They were consistent with the akhazan 
behavioural code that replaces a clear dividing line between binary oppositions, such as 
sacred and profane, or ritual and non-ritual, with a dialectical relation between two 
extremes of behaviour (Airing von Geusau 1988:220). Therefore, if the akhazan dialectical 
mode of behaviour is taken into account, Ase’s dual role of state protector and state defiant 
should not be seen as unconventional.
By acting between legality and illegality, and loyalty and disloyalty to the state, Ase was like 
a bandit within the state (Gallant 1999; McCoy 1999). As Heyman (1999) argues, legality 
and illegality are intertwined components of state-making. In Laos, where the rule of law is 
still more an abstraction than a reality, and corruption looms large at any level of the 
government, the distinction between law and outlaw is as murky as the distinction between 
a (corrupt) politician and a criminal. I have pointed out how some of the Muang Sing 
government officials connived with Ase in his illegal activities by using their positions to 
act outside the law. Indeed, many rulers in Laos, whether in the valleys or in the hills, can 
be considered outlaws within the state. In a global overview of “outlaws” in the early
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modem age, Gallant argues that “bandits helped make states, and states made bandits” 
(1999:25). By co-opting or repressing marginal outlaws, states obtained a “border effect” 
that strengthened their capacity (Gallant 1999:48). The result was that many states emerged 
by manoeuvring between conniving with and condemning outlaws. The way the Lao state 
related to Ase had the same border effect. On the one hand, the Lao state condemned Ase 
for acting outside the law; on the other hand it co-opted Ase to realise its territorialising 
ambitions and resources incorporation.
Samu villagers responded to the Lao state territorialising thrusts with “a project of minor 
sovereignty” (Feuchtwang 2004:17). Similarly to Ase, they positioned themselves both as 
border defenders and border subverters. Since the refugee experience, Samu villagers 
negotiated with the Chinese and Lao state regulations over territory, resource use and 
movement, and definition of people within fixed borders. They crossed the border without 
an identity card or a border pass; they illegally married Akha in China and registered their 
children as Chinese citizens; they obtained tax exemption on goods transacted across the 
border and planted rubber through unofficial contracts with relatives and fellows from 
China; they evaded the land use plan drawn by the lowland government and bypassed the 
official recording of rubber trees. One could use the above border practices to argue that 
Samu villagers rejected the Lao state. Their embrace of rubber from China and dream of a 
Chinese style of modernity seem to confirm this assumption. Nevertheless, Samu villagers 
remained part of the Lao political domain. They were the marginal subjects of a weak state 
who took advantage of their closeness to an emerging economic giant. They drew on 
Chinese agricultural knowledge gained through a cross-border socio-economic network to 
use land under the jurisdiction of the Lao state. They injected into the Chinese market 
resources extracted from Lao territory. Therefore, they did not reject the state in toto, but 
strategically manoeuvred between two states. In sum, Samu farmers were flexible citizens 
(Ong 1999) astride states with a heterogeneous and dynamic sense of belonging.
Conclusion: Strategic Straddling
In the frontier region between Laos and China, the Western-derived notion of modem 
nation-state coexists with the pre-modem model of highland polity (Sturgeon 2004, 2005). 
Old governing patterns are constantly produced and reproduced by peripheral Akha 
residents in interactions with the lowland centres of power. In Muang Sing District along 
the border with China a few powerful Akha political leaders have recently emerged as
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border patrons legitimised by the Lao state. Polyglot Akha chiefs supported by an 
entourage of powerful men in their villages draw on multiple alliances on both sides of the 
border to channel the legal and illegal passage of goods and control local villagers’ access to 
resources (Sturgeon 2004). Both chiefs and their subjects position themselves now as 
border defenders and now as border subverters. In other words, through their border 
practices they come to constitute the border (Flynn 1997; Sturgeon 2004, 2005), negotiating 
with state agents power over sovereignty, citizenship, and resource use and passage.
By analysing the various practices adopted by the residents of Samu village and their chief, 
Ase, to embrace rubber as a novel livelihood strategy I have argued that rather than an 
unruly “zomia” inhabited by people who stand outside and reject the state (Scott 2008, 
2009), the mountain area between Laos and China turns out to be a grey zone of locally 
produced centres of potency under the shadow of the Lao and Chinese state centres of 
power. It is not an area of mere exclusion or inclusion, but a zone of opportunistic 
manoeuvring between states, their people and resources. It is a zone of political, social, and 
economic ‘straddling’, where upland border dwellers strategically choose where they belong 
according to their economic and social needs. Straddling are the connections, alliances and 
loyalties that Akha highlanders create in multiple directions between the hills and the valley 
and between the two nation-states in which they are included. Straddling is the highlanders’ 
manoeuvring between law and outlaw, loyalty and disloyalty, resistance and consensus to 
the state. Movements between these opposed poles of behaviour vary according to the 
social and political positions that the various actors occupy in the frontier domain. I 
conclude that the geographic isolation of highland residents does not translate into 
complete political and economic marginalisation. On the contrary, it results in a socially 
graduated partaking in control, transport and use of valuable resources in zones of mutual 
interest between nation-states.
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Chapter Five
Cross-B o r d er  E t h n ic it y  a n d  N a t io n a l
BELONGING: THE TAI LUE CASE
Figure 57. Tai Lue worshippers circumambulate the 
That Chiangteum in Muang Sing
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O n  T H E  DAY OF TH E FIRST W ED D IN G  CEREM ONY Xiao Hong arrived at his
bride parents' house accompanied by the best man, his friends and close family members. 
As the Tai tradition prescribes, he offered the bride two rmkbuarü as symbol of their union. 
Surrounded by the bridesmaid, her best friends and her sister, Yi Keo welcomed the groom. 
She was dressed in a modem version of a Tai wedding dress, a pink short sleeved blouse 
and a long wrapover skirt.
The marriage ritual took place in the inner-most comer of the living room of the bride's 
house. The couple was joined in marriage through a “binding the spirit” (T. sukhuari) 
ceremony performed by a Tai religious practitioner, assisted by three elders. The officiator 
pronounced the blessing in Pali language, after inviting the spirits to consume the food and 
alcohol offered to them. The offering included black and white steamed glutinous rice, a 
boiled hen and rooster, a bunch of bananas, some sweets and com alcohol. Yi Keo and 
Xiao Hong's “spiritual essence” (T. khmn) were symbolically joined by the tying of 
numerous white threads around their wrists by their parents and other elders.
Two weeks later, the new couple held a second wedding ceremony for Xiao Hong’s Han 
friends and relatives. This time, the celebration took place at his parents' house, in one of 
the township’s state farm settlements. In the morning, Xiao Hong collected the bride from 
her house. For this ceremony, Yi Keo chose a rather different wedding dress— a vermilion 
red material, a distinctive feature of Han brides, had been cut into a Tai style blouse and 
skirt by the skilled hands of the village tailor. When Xiao Hong arrived to collect her, he 
presented his bride with a bouquet of white roses. The couple then got into a sumptuous 
black car decorated with red and pink bows. The crackling of firecrackers to ward off evil 
spirits marked the beginning of the procession of friends and relatives to the groom's 
house.
In accordance with Confucian filial piety, on arrival at his house the couple honoured Xiao 
Hong's parents with a formal greeting. Soon after, they shifted from the Han ritual domain 
to a modified version of a Tai wedding ceremony. Two old Tai men from Yi Keo's village 
re-performed an abbreviated spirit binding rite in the comer of the living room next to the
'. Mukhuan literally means “table for the spiritual essence.” It is in the form of two cones made out of banana 
leaves and decorated with colourful plastic flowers, each laid on a bamboo table. One represents the groom’s 
and the other the bride’s soul or spirit (T. khmn).
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television. No chicken was offered to the spirits, only some sweets, sticky rice and Chinese 
rice wine. Xiao Hong and Yi Keo had their wrists tied by their parents and a few Tai elders. 
In the background, on the wall, stood a photo of the couple dressed in Tang dynasty 
clothes. The photo, which was framed as an old-style Chinese scroll, had been taken in a 
professional photo studio in Jinghong city, following the fashion that has recently arrived 
in the countryside from the metropolitan areas of China.
The first ceremony was held in Xia Jinglong village in the Mengman township centre, while 
the second was held in a state farm settlement near the town. In the weddings, symbols 
drawn from the Han Chinese and Tai cultural worlds were intertwined, sometimes being 
virtually indistinguishable one from the other. This blurring resonates with the cultural 
hybridity that I described in Samu village at the margins of Laos in Chapter Four. Taking 
the cultural complexity of the weddings as a starting point, this chapter seeks to disentangle 
the dynamics of belonging in the south-western frontier of contemporary China, as 
articulated in the Chinese national domain and the cross-border Tai Lue ethnic context.
On her identity card, the ethnicity of Yi Keo, the bride, is recorded as Dai (Ch. daizu). Yet, 
her parents and grand-parents refer to themselves by alternating this official label with the 
term Tai Lue, an ethnic self-designation adopted by many Tai speakers spanning the 
borders of five modem nation-states: China, Burma, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam.2 As 
illustrated in Chapter two, until 1950, the Tai Lue were the politically and demographically 
dominant people of a semi-independent polity, Sipsongpanna, mied by a Tai chief. Being 
part of a horizontal web of interconnected political hubs (Davis 2003:187), Sipsongpanna 
maintained close political and social relations with other Tai principalities in what is now 
northern-western Laos, the Shan states of Burma and northern Thailand (Cohen 2000b; 
Davis 2003; Keyes 1992,1995).
In the countries where they live today, the Tai Lue are officially categorised in different 
ways, according to each government’s ethnic policy, each classification responding to the 
need for legitimacy of the nation-state. While in China the Lue are regarded as a sub-
2. There are thought to be about 450,000-500,000 people identifying as Tai Lue in the Upper Mekong region. 
Approximately half of them live in China and the remaining is scattered among Laos, Burma, Thailand and 
Vietnam.
183
Cross-border Ethnicity and National Belonging
Figure 58. Yi Keo and Xiao Hong’s Tai wedding ceremony in Xia Jinglong
Figure 59. Yi Keo and Xiaohong on their way to the second wedding ceremony
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Figure 60. Yi Keo and her bridemaid at the groom ’s house in Mengman
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branch of the Dai nationality, in Laos they are included in the ‘lowland Lao’ category. In 
China and Laos, state rhetoric emphasizes the separation of the Tai Lue within the state 
boundaries from other Lii groups across the border. But in Thailand the Tai Lue living 
within national borders are often regarded as one of the Tai sub-groups forming the larger 
T(h)ai nation.
Partly in response to nationalist classificatory projects and assimilationist policies, some 
western anthropologists have joined Thai scholars in creating a discourse that stresses the 
cultural similarities of the Lue groups living across the borders. The Lue have come to be 
regarded a paradigmatic people having a strong sense of common identity based on shared 
cultural traits: language, valley-dwelling settlement pattem, wet rice agriculture, a 
combination of Theravada Buddhism and spirit beliefs and common historical roots 
(Cohen 2000a; Hsieh 1989, 1995; Keyes 1992, 1995; Moerman 1965, 1968). More recently, 
resumed social interactions between the Tai Lue across borders have been translated by 
some scholars into the re-emerging of a transnational ethnic community (Cohen 2000a; 
Davis 2003; Keyes 1992; Wasan 2005). “[The] case of the Lue” Keyes (1992:7) writes ‘will 
lead...to a consideration of how transnational linkages which are increasingly 
relevant... may stimulate imaginings of communities which are not the same as those and, 
at times even in conflict with roots in national discourse”. These scholars propose that the 
increase in cross-border movement and exchange since the 1990s, has enabled the Lue to 
develop creative ways to by-pass state nationalist practices and discourses and to revitalise 
an imagined pan-Tai community united by a sentiment of “shared ethnic oppression” 
(Davis 2003:178). Re-connectedness, Davis (2003) argues, follows along the Buddhist path 
and emerges as a combination of ancient ties and global flows to resist hegemonic 
nationalism. Similarly, Wasan (2005) traces elements of a transnational “ethnoscape” 
(Appadurai 1996) in the return of exiled Tai Lue to China and the cross-border journeys of 
Buddhist monks between Thailand, Burma and China. He also envisions a pan-ethnic 
“soundscape” (Wasan 2005:211) in the production and circulation of Tai music across 
national borders. His conclusion is that such forms of transnational connectivity allow the 
Tai Lue to re-emplace themselves within their ancient homeland Sipsongpanna from where 
they had been displaced by Chinese nationalist rule.
This body of scholarship raises two key issues. First, what these scholars share is a focus on 
community as a “structure of feeling” (Appadurai 1996; Williams 1973) rather than with
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community as “actualized social form” based on face-to-face social relations (Amit 2002:3). 
The fact that some people living across modem national borders originate from the same 
region, speak the same language, have occasional social contact across borders, and 
sporadically attend the same rituals seems to be a sufficient condition for constituting a 
community (Hage 2005:468). Moreover, through an emphasis on “imagining” over the 
“social” (Appadurai 1996; Castoriadis 1987) these accounts provide us with limited 
evidence of the lived social practices, enduring social relations and rooted connectedness 
between the members of this transnational community. Davis (2003:195) hints at an idea of 
a transnational public sphere created by the diffusion of videos, floppy disks of Tai script 
and CDs across borders. She remarks that these cultural objects “are circulating through 
face-to-face contact and exchange” between Tai monks and that “[Transnational ethnic 
communities.. .are in many ways social movements, and these are organized as movements 
always have been: by people” (Davis 2003:178). However, we are not provided with any 
sense of the social intensity of such face-to-face interactions or of the socially embedded 
nature of such exchanges. The primary demographic focus of these accounts of Tai Lue 
transnational community is a group of peripatetic monks and a small elite of political and 
cultural activists gravitating around the main Buddhist monastery in Jinghong—the capital 
of Xishuangbanna—and nearby temples. And more importantly, by presupposing a 
categorical unity between their subjects and other Tai Lue people, the scholars of 
transnational connection turn particular findings into universalizing conclusions. What is 
underestimated is that many Tai Lue may not enjoy as much free movement across borders 
as monks and expatriate businessmen do.
Secondly, there is a common assumption that members of the Tai Lue trans-national 
community express their collective identities when they stand at its boundaries by 
distinguishing themselves from the entities of the nation-states with which they come to 
interact. In this case, the boundary which delimits the Tai cultural and social world 
corresponds to the pre-modem spatial geography of the Tai principalities. Across this 
ethnic boundary the Tai are assumed to interact with the national dominant cultures 
marked by modem national borders. In the Chinese context, the “collective cultural 
consciousness” (Amit 2002:6) of the Tai Lue becomes significant at the boundary with the 
Han cultural domain which is identified with the Chinese nation. The conclusion is that the 
nation-state, with its hegemonic cultural and political practices, stands in antagonistic terms 
with marginalized and oppressed ethnic groups living at its periphery. As a corollary, the
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social and cultural practices of transnational communities stand in opposition to and resist 
the bounding power of the nation state (Davis 2003:196-197). Yet perhaps this privileging 
of the transnational over the national ignores the quotidian engagement with the nation 
which marks Tai Lue people’s lives in China.
This chapter seeks to shed new light on ways of belonging to the Chinese national 
community and the Tai Lue transnational community. It seeks to bring the “social” and the 
“imagining” together. In so doing, I endorse Amit’s (2002:18) tenet that “[cjommunity 
arises out of an interaction between the imagination of solidarity and its realization through 
social relations”. Belonging is articulated through a process of cultural and social 
identification with the national community though not excluding a transnational resonance 
in nationally-oriented cultural practices.
The analysis focuses on the first generation of Reform and Open Door Dai youth with 
high school education living in Mengman, at the geographical periphery of China along the 
border with Laos. It is a group aged between eighteen and twenty-five, bom in the 1980s, 
at the beginning of the transition from the Maoist socialist era to the Dengist post-socialist 
period. Far from claiming a universal truth for the Dai as a whole, I intend to provide an 
alternative perspective on how a particular group of Dai articulated their belonging in the 
new political and economic arrangements of modem China. The focus will not be the 
commonly assumed abstract cultural frictions but rather the grounded cultural intimacies 
between the nation and its ethnic subjects (Flerzfeld 1997). I explore these cultural 
intimacies by dwelling upon symbolism, commensality, family, friendship, mobility and 
self-improvement. Similarly to the Akha in Ban Samu, I suggest that sense of belonging of 
these young Dai was not expressed through a cross-border pan-ethnic sentiment of 
resistance to centralising policies. Rather, it was articulated through social and cultural 
identification with the Chinese government’s agenda of development and modernisation. 
The post-socialist cultural, economic, and educational policies of the Chinese state have 
strengthened among young peripheral Dai a sentimental and social realization of inclusion 
into the Chinese national community. At the same time, I argue that the conceptual 
dichotomies ethnicity/nation and national/transnational are solved in practice by Dai 
youth’s embrace of the Chinese state’s category daizu. In the two wedding ceremonies that 
opened this chapter we witnessed this practical resolution.
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Cultivating the Self, Developing the Nation
On the wall of the Mengman township primary school the writing, in red characters, 
admonished the children:
The guiding principles of education: Persist with education that serves the 
construction of socialist modernisation and serves the people. Blend education 
with work and social reality. Cultivate the complete moral, intellectual, physical, 
and aesthetic development of the next generation of socialist citizens.
The official motto exhorted young Chinese citizens to contribute to develop a modem 
socialist nation by coupling social practice with personal improvement. The link between 
personal development and nation building has been a recurrent topic in the Chinese state’s 
rhetoric of the Reform and Open Door era since the 1980s, but it has become a pervasive 
topos in both official and private discourses since the early 2000s (Nyiri 2006). This is 
inscribed within the Chinese Communist Party’s new agenda of building a “socialist 
spiritual and material civilization” and improving the “quality” (Ch. M M  suzhi) of the 
population (Nyiri 2006:86-88) whose ultimate goal is the modernization of China’s society 
and therefore the nation as a whole. While its meaning is impossible to define clearly in 
Chinese— it is generally inadequately translated as “quality” in English) the term suzhi has 
nevertheless become one of those world-making words in contemporary China. It is a 
floating signifier that refers to the “qualities of civility, self-discipline, and modernity” of an 
individual and of the population as a whole (Yan 2003:494). Suzhi is utilized to rationalize 
“social and political hierarchies of all sorts, with those of ‘high’ quality gaining more 
income, power and status than the ‘low”’ (Kipnis 2006:295). As a general rule, rural areas 
and people from rural background are classified in the hierarchy as having “low quality” 
while urban places and people from urban background are defined as having “high quality” . 
In between the two ends are intermediate degrees of low and high quality that might vary 
according to one person’s economic, educational or political achievements.
The concept of quality, which is pervasive in both rural and urban contexts, has played a 
crucial role in mobilising national loyalty. A Han migrant to Laos told me about his strong 
desire to go back and live in his homeland China where his fellow countrymen’s level of 
quality was higher than that of Lao people. Quality was also the social and moral path 
chosen by many members of the first young Dai generation of the reform era in Mengman. 
This occurred not only through the youth’s imagining but also in practice on the hard
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Figure 62. Mengman primary school’s exhortation to its Chinese young citizens
Figure 63. Billboard featuring Deng’s famous saying “development is 
the indisputable truth” in northern Xishuangbanna
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surface of their daily lives. Cultivating quality for oneself was in fact the process whereby 
the abstract feelings for the nation were materialised into grounded social forms and 
embodied by the nation’s members. Mengman Dai Youth’s commitment to the national 
maxim derived from the education they received in state’s schools, the cradle where the 
inborn characteristics of an individual are meant to be nurtured to a full development 
(Kipnis 2006:298). Youth education has already been recognised as an important catalyst of 
nationalism and building of modem nation-states (Anderson 1991). In China’s Reform and 
Open Door era, this has become even more significant with the policy of “education for 
quality” that has as its goal the improvement of the “quality” of the nation’s people 
through an all-around moral, intellectual and physical training (Kipnis 2006:298).
According to my survey, in Mengman town a large number of young Dai aged between 
eighteen and twenty-five completed primary school education; at least half of them, mainly 
girls, obtained a junior secondary school degree at the township school; and a third of them, 
mostly girls, received high school education3. Among these educated youngsters were Yi 
Keo (the bride introduced earlier) and Yi Kham Tip. Both girls completed high school at 
the Normal School in Jinghong and both seemed to have developed those personal 
qualities by which they distinguished themselves from their parents and a farming 
background. For young educated Dai, improving quality became a strategy of social 
positioning towards a middle class status through a rhetoric and practice of separation from 
those of low quality.
Yi Keo and Yi Kham Tip’s mastering standard Mandarin Chinese through higher education 
was one of the markers of their improved quality. That this distinguished them from their 
parents was manifested in the girls’ mocking of their parents’ low level of Chinese. In their 
daily conversations with friends and family the national idiom was alternated with Tai Lue 
language and the local variant of Yunnan dialect. Even in situations when the Tai Lue
3. Two Tai teachers from the Mengman primary school explained that Tai girls are normally more motivated 
than boys in pursuing education in the state schools and are more likely to obtain a junior secondary school 
degree. Among young boys, the school drop-out rate is higher than among girls. Until the mid 1990s, a large 
number of young Tai boys in Mengman followed the Tai custom of entering the temple to receive religious 
education while attending at the same time Chinese state schools. Nowadays, very few of them are willing to 
renounce to the ‘pleasures’ of secular life as prescribed by the novitiate code. Young boys seem to be more 
inclined to stay in their home villages and help their families in farming activities for which they regard 
education unnecessary. Since 2003-2004 the drop-out rate from the primary and secondary school in 
Mengman among both boys and girls has increased. This is a result of the difficult accessibility to jobs in the 
public sector or in the service industry and of the availability of alternative employment in local rubber 
plantations. For a more detailed account on minority education in Xishuangbanna in the mid 1990s see 
Hansen (1999).
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language prevailed, it was often interspersed with phrases or terms in Chinese, to convey 
those modem meanings that the Tai Lue language was not able to express for these young 
people. The girls would use the Chinese words to refer to telephone, television and mobile 
phones. Also when articulating concepts of time such as ‘week7 and ‘minute’ the Chinese 
terms ÜLSJ xingqi and A  fen respectively replaced the Tai terms atbit and natbi. Chinese 
expressions indicating feelings or opinions such as ‘cannot stand, be unable to endure’ (Ch.
7 shou bu liao) ‘stylish’ (Ch. WSfcÄ you kuanshi), and ‘fun, amusing’ (Ch. fb fü  haomn) 
were also extensively used in verbal interactions among Tai Lue.
In conversations, young Dai often brought up the term quality4 When I asked what quality 
meant to them, they were unable to provide me with a clear definition of the term but they 
explained that improving one’s quality is part of becoming a “civilized” person. A person 
of high quality is someone who has good manners, speaks softly, and knows how to speak 
well, never argues with others, is good-hearted, and is willing to help others. Yet physical 
aspect and hygiene, together with dressing style and consumption habits were included into 
their explanation. Ai No, a twenty-year-old Dai man, a primary school teacher who shifted 
from the position of learning how to acquire a high quality, to one of instructing children 
to achieve the same goal, emphasised how quality is also highly valued in the working 
milieu. He and his teacher colleagues were subject to the director’s monitoring of their 
quality within and outside the school. Maintaining a good level of quality also involved 
keeping oneself away from immoral activities such as gambling. Yet, even when 
transgressing the rules of cultivating quality, they did this within a national frame. In long 
overnight sessions of games, the choice was between two of the most popular national past 
times: rmjiang and ‘the landlord’ (a card game mimicking the victory of the peasantry
over feudal lords that led to the building of New China under the Communist regime). The 
social grouping of this addicting past time was also national in scope, including Ai N o’s 
wife and his Han and Dai friends from the same working unit.
Yi Keo pointed out that she saw the cultivation of one’s quality as developing a better 
society. That is why, after graduating from high school, she had decided to combine
4. The equivalent of suzhi in Tai Lue was identified by some Dai informants in the expressions mmhu m  tsang 
which refers to someone with a high level of knowledge and corresponds to the concept of ‘high suzhi.’ The 
expression ai dip ai daeng which refers to an uneducated male-mainly not ordained corresponds to the idea of 
‘low suzhi.’ I am indebted to Roger Casas for this information. All of the young Dai I talked to used the 
Chinese term.
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productive labor with social practice. While still in Jinghong, Yi Keo was employed by a 
Han Chinese company. She worked as a tourist guide in a ‘minority theme park’3 in Daluo, 
a locality in Xishuangbanna near the border with Burma. Like other tourist destinations in 
the area, the park was constructed exploiting the image of Xishuangbanna as a tropical 
paradise and homeland to colorful ethnic minority groups. Dressed up in Dai clothes, Yi 
Keo accompanied Han tourists around the park, illustrating in Chinese language, the names 
and origins of the plants and telling curious anecdotes about the ‘traditional’ culture of her 
own nationality, the Dai, and of the Hani and Bulang. Yi Seng, a friend of Yi Keo, was 
recruited to work in one of the casinos run by a Han Chinese businessman in Xiao Mengla, 
in Burma across the border from Daluo.
Both Yi Keo and Yi Seng talked enthusiastically about their jobs, seeing themselves not 
only as part of a modem and developed nation, but also as contributors to the 
development process. In Yi Seng’s imagery, the casino where she worked was the 
quintessence of Chinese modernity and development transplanted across the border in 
Burma. For Yi Keo, working at the ‘minority park? was a way to bring development, to the 
impoverished border areas of the country. As she put it: “the village where I worked was 
quite poor before the park was established. There was nothing. After we started promoting 
tourism, the area became increasingly developed and local people enjoyed better lives.” In 
acquiring the consciousness of development that the post-Mao Chinese state has been 
striving to inculcate in its citizens since the 1980s (Yan 2003:494), the two girls were 
reaching multiple goals: improving their quality by separating themselves from the low 
farming status, relieving their own homeland from poverty, and contributing to construct a 
modem nation. Their fanciful national development ambitions even spilt beyond the 
nation’s borders, in a transnational celebration of Chinese modernity.
Personal cultivation of quality to assist the nation’s development through social practice 
and productive work was also coupled with the Dai youth’s ideological support of the 
nation’s achievements on the international scene. Defined by Deng Xiaoping as “the 
indisputable truth”, in fact development was not only the path chosen by the Chinese state 
to direct China toward global capitalism but also the necessary endeavour that should be 
undertaken to gain a place in the first world through a highly competitive game with the 
West (Yan 2003:496-514). It is in the nation’s striving for the second goal that the
5 For a critical discussion on “theme parks” in China see Anagnost (1997) and Notar (2006:100-105).
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emotional support of Dai youth was manifested in October 2005, when a Chinese 
astronaut arrived in space. “Stage set for bigger space push”, the China Daily (Li and Jiao 
2005) celebrated. The official statements trumpeted that, after America and Russia, China 
had also made it to space. The newspaper unveiled the future ambitions of the central 
government: “from space walks to docking manouevres; and from orbiting the moon to a 
permanent space lab” (Li and Jiao 2005). Drawn into the nationalist vortex, Yi On, a 
twenty-year-old Dai girl, proudly commented: “China has also made it to space and can 
now compete with the other economic and political powers.” And then she added: “We are 
on the same level as America now”, using an inclusive ‘we’ to indicated that she felt part of 
the conquest of space too. Even her grandmother, who was bom under the rule of 
Xishuangbanna’s former Tai chief, participated in this national jubilation, describing in 
detail the arrival in space by the motherland’s astronaut to one of her friends who had 
missed the report on the national news.
(Trans)national Pilgrimages
Pilgrimages are a particular form of mobility considered by some authors to be pivotal in 
spurring the imagining of communities in both national and transnational contexts 
(Anderson 1991). Paul Cohen (2000a) constructs the idea of a transnational Tai Lue “moral 
community” around religious pilgrimages of Chinese Lue from townships in southern 
China to a nearby Buddhist reliquary across the Lao border in Muang Sing. In the 1990s, a 
particularly important role was played by the Tai Lue ‘saint’ Khuba Bunchum who initiated 
the construction of reliquaries throughout the border regions. Cohen maintains that 
pilgrimages transcend the rigidity of today’s political boundaries, reconstituting a pre­
modem “sacred topography” that articulated with the political topography of the former 
Tai principalities (Cohen 2000a: 152). Yet, pilgrimages are not immune to historical changes, 
nor to the political agendas of the nation-states they are often assumed to bypass.
In premodem times, Mengman and Muang Sing shared the same status of muang within the 
web of Tai principalities in the upper Mekong region. Their geographical proximity 
fostered the formation of a social network that was maintained through intermarriages, 
trade, and religious ties. I estimate that approximately one out of five Dai families in
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Figure 64. Transnational pilgrimages: a group of Tai Lue from Mengman 
take part in the That Chiangteum Festival in Muang Sing
Figure 65. National pilgrimages: two Tai Lue boys enjoy the 
school holidays back in Mengman from Jinghong
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Mengman town in 2005 had at least one relative who had fled to Laos during the repressive 
campaigns of the Great Leap Forward in 1958 and during the Cultural Revolution. Many of 
these lived around Muang Sing and other towns in northern Laos. Nevertheless, the 
impression I got from comparing the current situation with the past is that the nature of 
contact between ethnic fellows across the border had changed since Paul Cohen made his 
observations. Interaction persisted through visits across the border to attend weddings, 
funerals, and rituals for worship of ancestors, as well as trade and lucrative joint ventures in 
rubber plantations. However, in 2005, these interactions remained embedded in narrower 
nationally-designed economic and ethno-religious mappings.
Likewise, cross-border religious fervour had waned, replaced by a more pragmatic credo: 
wealth accumulation. Khuba Bunchum’s departure from the public scene might have 
contributed to a declining sense of transnational spirituality. In 2005, when, with friends 
from Mengman I attended the annual Buddhist festival held in Muang Sing, we could only 
count twenty or thirty Tai Lue people from China participating in the celebration. Many of 
them were cross-border rice traders who had temporarily left their cargo at the borderline 
to take the chance to make merit by performing the triple circumambulation of the 
reliquary. Elders I interviewed back in Mengman said they were too old to travel to Laos. 
Middle-aged women from Mengman were discouraged by the high fees charged by Lao 
authorities and the arrogant attitude of Lao officials at the border check-point. Young Dai 
did not express any particular interest in the pilgrimage. Yi Seng, who had made it for the 
first time to the reliquary, was accompanied by her Han Chinese friends. She confessed that 
her intention was simply to come and have fun and tryout some exotic food in Laos. She 
did not engage in the circumambulation, as she was worried that her Chinese companions 
might interpret it as an expression of superstition. A similar situation was evident at two 
other events I attended on the Chinese side of the border in Mengman: a ritual at an 
important Buddhist reliquary said to contain fingerprints of the Buddha and an annual 
merit-making festival celebrated at a temple where relics of Khuba Bunchum are kept. My 
informants could only count four Lue from Laos at the former in 2005, and none at the 
latter in 2005, 2006 or 2007.
Keyes (1992:23) maintains that Buddhist schooling “contributes to Lue being able to 
imagine themselves as part of a larger Tai world”. Yet, this view of a transnational “Tai 
religious and political geography” deemed to having been re-created through the
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educational pilgrimages of Chinese Tai Lue monks to temples in the Upper Mekong region 
(Davis 2003:182), was belied across the China-Laos frontier by the ongoing enforcement of 
state discipline and increasingly lax Buddhist teaching practices. In fact, while Tai Lue 
monks from China and Laos did not engage in any transborder teaching programs because 
these were prohibited by the Chinese authorities, only a few novices from Tai Lue villages 
in Laos near the border were ordained in China. None of the young Dai in Mengman were 
eager to endure the novitiate hardship in what they consider a backward country like 
Laos—where food was bad and the people were stingy. Interestingly, the main purpose of 
the four Lao novices studying at the temples in Mengman Township in 2005 and 2006 was 
not so much to gain Buddhist knowledge at a temple in China—where the level of religious 
teaching has declined enormously since the Buddhist revival in the 1980s and the early 
1990s— but to leam Chinese language in state schools. The utilitarian purpose of 
improving Chines language competence— likely invaluable for the conduct of lucrative 
cross-border trade with China after they disrobe—was as important as the spiritual end of 
making merit for their parents.
An intense network of pilgrimages to Chinese national centers made the actual social and 
cultural geography of Dai youth in Mengman town prevalently national in scale. 
Educational pilgrimages spanned Mengman, the junior high school in the nearby town of 
Mengla and as far as the teacher-training school and the technical school in the capital of 
the prefecture, Jinghong. In these institutions, teaching was mainly in Chinese6. In a few 
cases, the educational paths also extended to the universities in Kunming. The job-seeking 
trajectory of young Dai after graduation was also nationally oriented. Many girls unable to 
get employment in the home town, or refusing to engage in farming, turned to low paid 
temporary jobs in malls, shops and bars in national centres, despite the exploitative 
treatment of them by their employers. Such inner mobility for educational and 
occupational purposes fostered a nationally territorialized web of friendships that linked 
Mengman to Mengpeng, Mengla, Menghai and Jinghong, and encompassed youth from 
Dai and Han ethnic backgrounds. And when youthful socialising culminated in marriage, it 
rarely or ever transcended the national border. In the Mengman township centre, I was told 
there were only two older Dai who had married Lao women. Two or three more Lao Tai
6. Some young Dai I talked to in Mengman had learned the Tai modem script in primary school for only one 
week. Some others had studied it at the teacher-training school in Jinghong. However, most of them were not 
able to read and write Tai script.
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Lue women married Dai men in nearby villages. Among the young generation of Dai, there 
was not a single case of Lao cross-border marriage.
Leisure pilgrimages to urban areas of China were also enticing experiences to leam “higher 
quality” urbanity and lifestyle. Dai youth’s stories about their metropolitan experience in 
Shanghai or Beijing were filled with excitement about magnificent buildings, fashionable 
shops and exotic food. At the top of the hierarchy of cities where the highest level of 
quality was to be found was Shanghai, defined by Dai youth as the most ‘stylish’ city in the 
country. On their return to Mengman, young Dai girls could not help defining their home 
town as a backward border place in contrast with the most developed and modem national 
centres they visited. Discussing Chinese nationalism among Elan teenagers in Dalian, in 
north-western China Fong (2004) proposes the concept of “filial nationalism” to solve the 
apparent contradiction between the youth’s sense of loyalty to the motherland and their 
longing to become part of a wider global community identified with wealthier Western 
societies. For the Han teenagers, it is the West that inspires dreams and desires for self- 
improvement. But for young Dai at the margins of the country, the developed cities within 
China, such as Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong, are the primary points of orientation to 
shape their aspirations towards a better lifestyle and gain a higher personal quality. Through 
their nationally oriented travelling, young Dai express primary loyalty to the Chinese nation 
and only secondarily to the wealthier outside world, seemingly adhering more strictly than 
their Flan counterparts to the state-sponsored discourse of nationalism.
Transporting National Tropes across Borders
Although pre-modem economic and social ties were partly resumed through cross-border 
trade, the mid-2000s economic growth on the Chinese side of the border, deriving from 
the southern Chinese boom in rubber production, resulted in a profound economic 
discrepancy between the former principalities of Muang Sing and Mengman. The far- 
reaching rhetoric of development from the Chinese national centre contributed to the 
creation of a rupture between the “affective power” (Gupta and Ferguson 1997:7) of the 
Tai Lue transnational community and the actual social and spatial relations that used to 
constitute its cohesion. Chinese Tai Lue were not immune to internalising the intertwined 
discourse of foreign development and the Chinese domestic emphasis on constructing a 
material and spiritual civilization and improving the quality of the population (Nyiri
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2006:86). The “shared sense of oppression” that Davis (2003) attributes to Tai Lue re­
connectedness across borders seemed to have been replaced by a sense of unequal levels of 
civilisation and quality.
In the Chinese popular discourse, the hierarchy of quality and civilisation is extended from 
the people within China to those beyond its boundaries in an evolutionary competition for 
survival between races and nations (Nyiri 2006:93-94). People from Anglo-American and 
Western European countries are ranked at the top of the hierarchy, for their high degree of 
modernization, development, white skin colour and low reproduction rates. At the bottom 
are people from developing countries, especially Africa, whose ‘backward’ economic and 
cultural status is coupled with an idea of racial inferiority related to their dark skin colour 
(Nyiri 2006:103). In between are the Chinese people, striving to achieve their “rightful 
place in the world” (Anagnost 2004:190) next to the first world countries. While it is 
normally assumed that China must acquire the “advanced technology and management 
methods of developed Western countries”, it is often remarked that it can also offer its 
(apparently) disinterested prodigality to assist those in a disadvantaged position in the 
development contest (Nyiri 2006:94). Among others, the Burmese and Lao, who have an 
inferior level of quality compared to that of the Chinese, deserve help and civilisation. This 
view was clearly articulated in the civilising and colonising discourse of the Chinese 
companies that I discussed in Chapter Three.
A local expression of this rhetoric was also manifested when Yi Oi, a 22-year-old Dai girl, 
came to visit me in Muang Sing. The first signals of her disappointment and alienation 
started to emerge as we walked to the guest house from the old French market. She had 
imagined that Muang Sing would be similar to Mengman in terms of size, development and 
urbanisation because of the short distance separating the two places, and because of the 
shared past history as Tai Lue townships. “This place is so small! There is not much to do 
around here! In one hour you can see all of it. And there is no chance for fun”, she 
commented, only starting to realise that the border she had crossed in the morning was not 
only a line on the map, but also a concrete marker of separation between different political 
agendas and degrees of modernization. “This place looks so underdeveloped and poor. 
There is nothing here! Look at the houses; they seem to be so run down and old! In 
Mengman, the houses of us Dai are much bigger and look nicer.” Her ideas of 
development, informed by the new Chinese urbanizing model associated with
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Figure 66. Signs of Chinese “modernity” in Mengman township
Figure 67. Signs of Laos’ “lack of modernity” in Muang Sing
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tall buildings equipped with modem luxuries, was opposed to the seemingly decrepit 
wooden houses on stilts. The ecotourism projects that we discussed (promoted by aid 
organizations in Laos to meet western tourists’ preferences) were devalued by Yi Oi in 
relation to the ‘theme parks’ in China, where a commodified version of her own culture 
was packaged for Chinese tourists. Her perceptions about Muang Sing corresponded with 
the stereotypical image, widespread among the Chinese, about Lao underdevelopment and 
economic malaise.
The lack of development became coupled in Yi Oi's speech with a necessity for 
development. She was struck by the abundance of land and the copious wild forests in 
Muang Sing as opposed to the scarcity of these resources in China. China's large population 
was contrasted with Laos' small crowds. Her reflections on the quantity of the population 
soon shifted to the ‘quality’ of the population and the place. In her view, China was 
associated with cultivated, urbanised and highly humanised/civilised values, whereas Laos 
was uncultivated, rural and savage. Yi Oi's remarks on Laos’ lack of development were 
projected into a general criticism of Lao peoples' laziness, backwardness, and of the Lao 
government’s inability to carry out good policies for its citizens. Echoing large Chinese 
rubber investors, she came to the conclusion that Lao people need to develop (Ch. kaifa) 
their land to improve their lives. And the Chinese could assist them in this necessary 
endeavour.
Yi Oi's alienation was further expressed in her lack of cultural affinity with the people in 
Muang Sing, despite her parents and her grandmother having told her they had many Tai 
Lue friends and relatives in Laos with whom they had good and long-term relationships. 
Interestingly, in her speech the Tai Lue of Muang Sing came to be automatically referred to 
as Lao. Her cultural bewilderment became more obvious when we went to visit a Tai Lue 
friend of her father. Yi Oi struggled to follow the conversation that I was having with the 
man in a mixture of Tai Lue and Lao. She said she could not make sense of the tones of 
the language and could not understand many words that were being used.
In summary, Yi Oi represented the replacement of the cross-border ethnic connectedness 
established in the past between her family and the Tai Lue in Muang Sing with a strong 
sense of Chinese national pride. It was her sense of belonging to China and not to any 
translational Tai Lue-ness that became significant in her encounter with the otherness of
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Laos. The next day, Yi Oi expressed the urge to cross the border and go back home. She 
could not bear being in Muang Sing anymore. She could not find anything thrilling about 
the place. Even the sun was stronger than in Mengman, she lamented. “That’s why Lao 
people have such a dark skin!” The initial curiosity mixed with the excitement of an 
adventure beyond the border turned into boredom only twenty-four hours later. Outside 
the market, she accepted a lift with a Han trader from Mengman. She got on the truck and 
traveled towards the mountains that separate her Chinese modernity from the 
backwardness of Laos.
Being Daizu: Reconciling the National with the Transnational
Yi Oi’s experience in Laos suggested that, for many young individuals, being Dai and 
Chinese was increasingly more culturally and socially salient than being Tai Lue, in both 
national and transnational contexts. Like her, young Dai in Mengman normally referred to 
themselves in Tai Lue language as “Tai people” (T. khim tai), or in Chinese as Dai (Ch. 
daizu) and, at the same time, as Chinese people (Ch. T ffl A zhon^icmi). Clifford (1983:119) 
points out that ethnic identity is increasinlgy marked by “heteroglossia” whereby “people 
interpret others, and themselves, in a bewildering diversity of idioms”. The case of the Dai 
in China bears out this assertion. Daizu became a category of “ascription and identification 
by the actors themselves” whereby the Dai organized their interaction with the Han and 
other ethnic groups in China (Barth 1969:10). Certainly, the state’s prescriptive ethnic 
rhetoric was still reflected in the way young Dai in Mengman spoke of themselves. For 
example, Yi Keo defined her ethnicity thus: “The daizu group is made up of three different 
Dai speaking groups: the water Dai, to which I belong; the dry Dai and the flower-waisted 
Dai”. It was just as she has learned it by heart from a school book on minority groups. 
Nevertheless, such identification with the state-sponsored ethnic classification should not 
be equated with the passive acquiescence of a marginal subject to the centre’s integrationist 
practices. In contemporary China, daizu, as a mode of identification, cannot any longer 
simply be considered as a label superimposed by the Chinese state. Daizu should be 
interpreted as the result of a contingently constructive and dynamic process of identity­
making in which the Dai themselves play an active role7.
7 Bai (2007) makes a similar argument for the Bai nationality in Dali.
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The feasting the village spirit ritual (T. liangphibari) in Shang Jinglong village in Mengman 
was a manifestation of the active participation of the Dai people in the construction of 
their identity while subscribing to the state-designed codes of ethnic classification. Banned 
by the Communist regime until the early 1980s as a vestige of the feudal past, the rite was 
rehabilitated under Deng’s reforms. Tanabe (1988:3) sees the spirit cults of premodem 
Sipsongpanna as an expression of the antagonistic relation between the local village 
communities and the “illusory community” of the premodem state. But the ceremony that 
I attended in March 2005 spoke more of connection than of disconnection between the 
state and its citizens. It resembled a garish public television show in full Chinese style than 
an intimate village celebration. The village members had for the occasion invited a team 
from the Mengla County television station to immortalise their revitalization of Dai culture 
in video format, and thereby convince the authorities that the plaque of ‘civilized village’ 
granted to them the year before by the Mengla government was richly deserved. In front of 
the state’s camera, the village spirit was called and feasted with copious offerings.
The feasting the village spirit ritual was at once a performance of identity and an invocation 
to state blessing. Young girls decided to display their Dai-ness by wearing the Dai 
traditional costume and they enjoyed being filmed while striking poses at the verge of 
erotism and romanticism. The staging of Dai-ness reproduced the visual paradigm of 
ethnicity created by state-promoted tourism brochures and cultural shows. Keyes (1992:37) 
has described such conscious subscription to the Han majority’s discursive model as a 
subdued act of ethnic assimilation, which is, nevertheless, conducive to a Tai Lue 
“marketable identity” whereby the ethnic subject reaps economic benefits in the tourism 
industry. In the feasting the village spirit ritual context, perhaps there was some economic 
benefit to be gained. The Dai girls, despite being tamed objects of sexual desire became the 
main directors of the scene. Guided by the head of the village Women’s Association, they 
had rehearsed the dancing repertoire for days, having a say on what and how to perform. 
In addition to seeking a marketable identity they were also carving a niche of existence as 
Tai in modem China, where expression of ethnic identity is increasingly uttered through 
and intertwined with the state’s rhetoric.
Daizu has become a social and cultural category marking the belonging of Dai youth to the 
Chinese nation, while also connoting a mode of belonging that encapsulates the 
transnational field. Such inclusion occurs through the blending of Tai cultural elements
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with nationally-oriented cultural practices. And it is in relation to daizu as a synthesis of 
these two cultural fields that I would like to shift attention back to the two wedding 
ceremony described at the beginning of this chapter. The tying the spirit rituals that 
sanctioned the marital union between Yi Keo and Xiao Hong, were undoubtedly clear 
references to the Tai cultural tradition in terms of structure (call of the spirit, offering to 
the spirit, blessing, binding the spiritual essences) and content (the language used in the 
blessings and nature of the offerings). In this sense, Yi Keo can be interpreted as being 
situated within a Tai transnational cultural sphere. At the same time, if the rituals and their 
settings are examined, we notice the clear presence of Chinese cultural symbols within the 
Tai domain. Like the feasting the village spirit ritual, the tying the spirit ceremonies can be 
termed as Dai, a mode of doing things that epitomises what it is to be Tai in China. 
Confucian filial piety was merged with the Tai ritual code. The Tai blouse and skirt was 
designed by Yi Keo in a vermillion red typical of a Han bride to meet the national taste. Yi 
Keo dressed up as a Tang dynasty princess for the nuptial photograph to fit herself within 
the national history. Likewise, the banquet menu of both weddings included not only 
stereotypically Tai dishes (glutinous rice, minced pork stirred with garlic and chilly, grilled 
fish and sticky rice sweets), but also Chinese-style non glutinous rice and dishes and made- 
in-Guangdong multi-flavored candies and biscuits.
In the wedding, we witnessed the simultaneous presence of mixing and the marking of 
boundaries. Here, the daizu category not only reflected identification with the state’s 
cultural agenda but also expressed a relation of difference with other ethnic groups within 
the national context. At the second wedding held at Xiao Hong’s house in the state farm, 
Yi Keo pointed out that the “the Dai and the Han are all together”. Nevertheless, when the 
guests were invited to sit, an ethnic, gendered, and generational separation occurred. The 
few Dai invitees, Yi Keo’s close relatives and friends from the village, formed four table 
groups: one of middle-aged men, one of middle-aged women, one of old men and women 
together and another of young men and girls. The overwhelming crowd of Han guests sat 
separately from the Dai, forming mixed table groups of young, middle-aged and elders. 
One of the Dai relatives of Yi Keo commented that “the Dai and the Han have different 
cultures and do things differently, so we Dai sit with the Dai and the Han sit with the Han”. 
Despite Yi Keo and Xiao Hong’s weaving through the tables to invite the guests for a toast, 
which simulated an act of social gluing, the group boundary remained clearly marked. 
However, such boundary demarcation between the Dai and the Han should not be equated
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Figure 68. Fitting within the national history 1:
picture of Yi Keo and Xiao Hong dressed in Tang Dynasty costumes
Figure 69. Fitting within the national history 2: pictures of Mao and 
Zhou hung at the house of a newly married young Tai Lue couple in a village in
Mengla county. Photography: Andrea Pellegrini
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with a boundary drawing process between the Dai and the Chinese state or between the Tai 
transnational community and the Han national community. Rather, it should be seen as an 
expression of multiple modes of belonging coexisting under the national umbrella.
Conclusion: Global, National and Communal
With China’s increased participation in the global economy, conciliation with development 
governance replaces resistance to Communist authoritarian policies. As the state's 
aspirations reach space through advanced technologies and expand on land through 
spectacular skyscrapers, convoluted highways and monumental dams, the Chinese national 
community reinforces its image outside and inside its boundaries. The opening of national 
borders and the economic liberalisation which has accompanied China’s modernisation 
have spurred debates about re-connectedness between marginalized groups within the 
Chinese nation and their ethnic fellows in neighbouring countries. Yet, young generations 
of ethnic Dai living on the borders of the country feel less connected to people with whom 
they are commonly assumed to share the same ethnic background across national borders. 
Instead, by coupling personal improvement with social practice, and adhering to state- 
sponsored ideas of developmment, education, and consumerism, they increasingly imagine 
and socially include themselves within a modem and developed Chinese nation. The 
orientation of Dai youth to the new political and economic context of globalisation is 
informed more by a sense of belonging to the modem Chinese national community than it 
is by transnational ethnic commonality.
Resistance is a trope often adopted by social scientists to explain the reactions of the local 
to the global, of the subjects to state power and of the margins to the centre (Gupta and 
Ferguson 1997). In China, resistance is also the term preferred by many western scholars to 
interpret the relationship between minority ethnic communities and the state. It has been 
argued that the ethnic minorities have been exposed throughout the Chinese history, from 
pre-modem to modem times, to an ineluctable “civilizing project” (Harrell 1995b) of 
acculturation irradiated from the centre of power out to the margins. Ethnic minorities 
react to the state’s hegemonic projects through open or concealed modes of resistance 
(Blum 2001; Blum and Jensen 2002; Harrell 1995a; fdsieh 1995). By contrast, this chapter 
has argued that senses of communal belonging are a result of dialogue with the Chinese 
state. The state’s projects of national integration and economic development intersect with
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individual aspirations for prosperity, education and social mobility. We cannot assume that 
the actions of the Chinese state necessarily spur belligerant reactions by seemingly 
marginalised residents of the national periphery.
Giersch (2006:3-4) argues that frontier regions of south-western China have been, since 
pre-modem times, a place of “fluid cultural and economic exchange where acculturation 
and the creation of hybrid political institutions were contingent on local conditions”. The 
post-socialist global era seems to reproduce such premodem cultural hybridity. Dai youth’s 
sense of belonging is articulated through a process of intimate cultural and social 
engagement with the national community. But there is also a transnational resonance in 
nationally oriented cultural practices. Daizu, once an ascriptive label by the state, has today 
been turned into a cultural and social field that provides a place for Tai cultural practices 
within the Chinese nation. Through daizu identity, ethnic agents reconcile— albeit not 
without tension—apparently conflicting sentiments of national and transnational belonging. 
The contemporary Chinese experience of nation building and economic globalisation is 
creating new forms of modem communal belonging for these residents of the China-Laos 
frontier.
207
The Binding and Unbinding of Trans-border Mobility
Chapter Six
The Binding and Unbinding of Cross- 
Border Mobility
Figure 70. Regulating mobility: a Lao man waits at the check-point in Boten 
to cross the border into China
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A.T 10.30 P.M. O N  A N IG H T  IN  LATE JULY 2005, the stars that habitually dot the
sky of Mengman were hiding behind the leaden clouds of the rainy season together with 
the waning moon. In the pitch darkness, only the silhouette of the palm trees along the 
main road could be distinguished. The shutters of the shops were closed. The vendors had 
withdrawn from the fatigue of public business into the intimacy of their family domain. 
Mae Yi Keo and I were standing on the side of the road, waiting for a load of com to be 
delivered by a trucker. Her porters were waiting on the other side of the road and were 
killing time by playing cards outside the rattan furniture workshop. Mae Yi Keo’s high tech 
mobile phone rang with the tune of one of the latest Chinese pop hits. It was her husband, 
who, while at home entertaining a com buyer, was phoning to ask about the load. “It has 
not arrived yet”, she responded with some disappointment. She then called the trucker to 
inquire about the load’s delivery. There was still a long way to go, the trucker informed her. 
He was still queuing at the quarantine station, waiting for the com to be dried.
During the long wait, I felt I had to sympathize with hen “you traders have a tough life”, I 
said. “It’s not tough. In the past, it was much worse!”. She proudly countered. She then 
turned her defensive tone into a passionate confession. She and her husband had started as 
rice farmers during the years of the collectivization campaigns in the 1960s, and both 
strove to find other strategies of survival under the socialist regime. “Life was tough then”, 
the woman emphasized. Mae Yi Keo was the first woman in the whole Mengman Brigade, 
under the Mengpeng Commune, who had learned how to drive a tractor. She put her 
driving skills at disposal of the Commune, ploughing rice fields for the teams. This earned 
her not only a fixed salary of 35 yuan 'per month, a rare achievement for a Dai farmer in 
the Spartan collectivization years, but also the epithet of The most capable’ Dai women in 
the area. Her husband was able to escape the rigid schedule of collective farming by 
becoming the carpenter of the Mengman Brigade, and produced furniture for the 
collectivity. In the 1980s, Mae and Phoh Yi Keo’s lives had taken a turn for the better. 
Deng Xiaoping’ Reforms and Opening Up had allowed them to leave behind the socialist 
utopia and take the pragmatic path of individual farming and private business. The official 
resumption of cross-border trade with Laos between the 1980s and early 1990s marked 
their official entrance as entrepreneurs in the regional economy. Yet the long wait in the 
dark that night was the result of an abrupt regulatory backlash by the Chinese authorities. A
1 The conversion of this amount into US$ is omitted since the exchange rate between yuan and US$ at 
that time is unknown.
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few weeks before, newly introduced state rules had put an end to one and a half years of 
economic prosperity for the traders.
This chapter discusses the shifting exercise of state regulatory constraints on border 
citizens’ economic and physical mobility in the context of trans-border petty trade. It traces 
the multiple strategies adopted by a group of Tai Lue (Dai) traders from China to assert 
themselves as flexible subjects in the regional market and elucidates how these strategies 
remain circumscribed by nationalising impetuses and locally embedded power inequalities. 
To analyse the traders’ strategies I adopt the “rhizomatic model” put forward by Deleuze 
and Guattari as well as the way they oppose rhizomes to the “arborescent” practices of the 
nation-state (1988). I examine the rhizome model in relation to the French philosophers’ 
opposing arborescent notion to describe the constraining practices of the nation-state. 
Before detailing the interaction between traders and the state in the trans-border com and 
rice trade field, I will give a brief introduction of the rhizomatic and arborescent models.
Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction between rhizome and tree is part of a more general 
framework of knowledge production that tries to make sense of the interrelation between 
individual-psychology and socio-politics through a schizophrenic mind-set, which the 
authors also refer to as “schizoanalysis”, “nomadology”, or “pragmatics” (Rumsey 2001:21). 
The intellectual agenda of the two French philosophers is to break with Cartesian-derived 
modemist (and structuralist) Western thinking based on binary or dichotomous logic, 
exemplified by the image of the root-tree. Rather than fixed points and definite lines of 
structures, trees or roots, they propose the interconnected and infinite lines of a rhizome 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1988:8). The image of the rhizome, or a tuber, is advocated to think 
of the world and all the phenomena that animate it in terms of heterogeneity, multiplicity 
and asignifying rupture. One of the characteristics of rhizomes is that they are “acentered 
systems” in which there is no hierarchical ramification but only the possibility for 
reconnection (Deleuze and Guattari 1988:17; Rumsey 2001:22). In this rhizomes differ 
from trees, which are “centered systems” with a fixed hierarchical ordering of units and 
subunits linked at successive levels of ramification (Rumsey 2001:21). The multiplicity 
generated by an infinite number of lines of flight connected to one another replaces the 
tree-like modernist view of self-contained hierarchical units (such as discrete nation-states). 
An instance of such reconnectedness can be seen in the rhizomes designed by ants, in 
which lines of segmentarity and territorialisation can explode into a line of flight to create 
interconnected circuits of deterritorialisation (Deleuze and Guattari 1988:9).
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The two French authors associate specific types of deterritorialisation and its counterpart, 
territorialisation, with different types of “libidinal-cum-social ‘machines’” (Rumsey 2001:21). 
One of these is what Deleuze and Guattari (1988:351-423) call the “war machine”, a 
mechanism that inhibits the development of centralised organs of power in the state. This 
anti-state, otherwise defined as a nomadic mechanism, has always existed in any type of 
society and phase in history, coexisting with sedentary state-base forms. In fact, following 
the ethnologist Pierre Clastres, the two post-modem thinkers do not see the state as “the 
product of an ascribable economic development” in different stages in history, but as being 
“defined by the perpetuation or conservation of organs of poweT’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1988:357). Even in primitive societies, often described by evolutionist thought as lacking a 
state, centralised forms of power existed, although they were inhibited by the presence of 
nomadic mechanisms.
Like rhizomes, a war machine or nomadic social forms can ward off and prevent the state 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1988:357). The spatiogeography of the nomad is, similar to that of 
the rhizome, smooth, “marked only by ‘traits’ that are effaced and displaced with the 
trajectory” of movement (Deleuze and Guattari 1988:381). The nomad spatiality is open, 
indefinite and noncommunicating (Deleuze and Guattari 1988:380). The space of sedentary 
social forms, in contrast, is like that of the state, “striated”, limited by walls and enclosures. 
Through trajectories across space, nomads deterritorialise themselves, for they move always 
in between points and travel beyond closed spaces, and therefore beyond the limits (i.e. 
borders) of the state.
The nomadic-rhizomatic model, with its liberalising spirit is associated by Deleuze and 
Guattari with the East, while the sedentary-tree like model, with its constraining character, 
is associated to the West. Their writing is a nostalgic appeal to embrace the former rather 
than the latter. “Here in the West, the tree has implanted itself in our bodies” the two 
authors lament, “rigidifying and stratifying even the sexes. We have lost the rhizome, or the 
grass” (1988:18). On the contrary, the Orient is characterised by rhizomes and immanence 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1988:19). An example of this is China, portrayed through Flenry 
Miller’s words as “the weed in the human cabbage patch” (1988:18), where the weed fills 
open, smooth, unhumanised spaces in between rigid points of civilisation. In the East, the 
two philosophers maintain, “the State does not act following a schema of arborescence 
corresponding to pre-established, arborified, and rooted classes; its bureaucracy is one of 
channels.. .in which the State engenders channeled and channelizing classes” (1988:18).
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The bureaucracy of the Western state, instead, has agrarian and cadastral origins. It is based 
on roots and fields; on “trees and their role as frontiers” (1988:19). In sum, the East is 
rhizomed, open, fluid, smooth and free of constraints. The West is arborified, delimited, 
rigid and hierarchically ordered.
Although suggestive, this approach presents some limitations. Firstly, by drawing a 
distinction between rhizomatic/nomadic and sedentary/arborescent models Deleuze and 
Guattari themselves “fall victim of the ‘arborescent’ mode of thinking” for they still 
emphasise binary oppositions such as the “rhizome” and the “tree”, the “nomad” and the 
“sedentary”, and the “East” and the “West” (Rumsey 2001:22). Secondly, by relating the 
“rhizomatic model” to the East and the “arborescent model” to the West, and advocating a 
return to the former, they are succumbing to orientalist romanticism. They underestimate 
the fact that “arborescent” processes of enclosure, disconnection, hierarchy and “binary 
oppositions” have been internalised by the East, not only since the colonial endeavours but 
also with the formation of modem-nation states which was informed by Western thinking 
(Rumsey 2001:22). Today, the arborescent model, with its enclosed spaces and rigid 
hierarchy has also become part of the governing of the East.
Despite its flaws, I consider that Deleuze and Guattari’s framework is still useful to make 
sense of the contemporary dynamics of cross-border trade on the Sino-Lao frontier. I 
embrace the “rhizomatic model” by stripping it from the dualism that it intends to 
dismantle and into which it falls. I replace the nomadic-sedentary and rhizome-tree 
antitheses with the synthetic notion of “tree-zomatic”. Within this framework, I compare a 
group of Tai Lue traders from China to semi-nomadic subjects that move between the rigid 
grids of two nation-states. In riding the crest of the trading wave in 2004 and early 2005,1 
suggest, traders adopted “tree-zomatic” strategies. When dealing with Chinese authority 
they drew on the state’s “striated space” marked by the border and defined by trading 
regulations and national agendas; when dealing with Lao authorities they bypassed state 
rigidity by designing lines of flight across the smooth space of the frontier. These lines 
spanned the gender, ethnic, social and economic domains. Mobility was therefore not only 
an anti-state “war machine” but also a mechanism enabling a personal and economic 
assertion reliant on and circumscribed by the state. The traders strategically adopted one or 
the other aspect of mobility for economic gain.
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Yet, these “tree-zomatic” strategies were only successful until the strong “arborescent” 
model of the Chinese nation-state and of rigidified ethnic and social hierarchies re-emerged. 
The temporary border regulatory flexibility put forward by the Chinese government in 
2004 and early 2005 was terminated by a new wave of regulatory authoritarianism. The 
pattem of centralised-decentralisation typical of the governing of this frontier region of 
Asia has re-asserted itself enmeshed in local power structures.
From the experience of the Tai Lue traders I worked with, two main conclusions can be 
drawn. First, unlike what some defenders of globalisation and transnational theories 
maintain (Appadurai 1990, 2002), the alleged individual flexibility and increased mobility of 
the global age remain subject to state scrutiny. The Transnational movement of people and 
goods continues to occur within national power structures. It is deeply embedded in 
national regulatory policies related to mobility, taxes, and citizenship. A peculiarity of the 
governance of the frontier between China and Laos is that it does not always follow the 
rigid application of law, especially in relation to mobility. Rather states operate according to 
an alternating “binding and unbinding” model. Second, this flexibility remains entangled in 
locally generated class and ethnic power differentials.
Developments and Trajectories of Trans-border Com and Rice Trade
Cross-border movement between China and Laos was officially re-authorised in the early 
1990s. The re-opening of the border put an end to a decade of frontier economic and 
social interaction mainly characterised by smuggling and illegal crossings. In 1993, an 
agreement on bilateral cooperation between Laos and China was developed by the Asian 
Development Bank as part of the broader GMS scheme to boost and liberalise cross- 
border commercial transactions (Anonymous 1994). Mindful of the repressive border 
crossing regulations in the 1980s, only a few local residents started to engage, with some 
hesitation, in petty trade between Mengman and Muang Sing through the Pangthong- 
Chahe border crossing in the first half of the 1990s. On bicycles or small tractors, traders 
from the Chinese side of the border transported vegetables, fruit and other Chinese 
consumer goods to be sold in Muang Sing. At the reanimated Lao market they would 
purchase Thai products to sell back in China as far as Mengla and Jinghong. However, 
trade through the minor Pangthong-Chahe check-points remained quite small in scale as 
the Lao customs still imposed high tax on large volume of goods.
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During the same period, some com and rice commerce between China and Laos was 
officially allowed. Cross-border commercial flow of these products was coupled with an 
agriculture cooperation plan between China and Laos2. According to the new agreement, 
the prefecture government of Xishuangbanna would supply rice hybridized seeds to 
farmers of Laos’ northern provinces of Oudomxai and Luang Namtha. In return, the Lao 
administration would allow China to import surplus rice from Laos’ frontier provinces. The 
increase in rice production and market supply due to the use of Chinese high yield seeds 
encouraged, in 1996-1997, manyMengman residents to engage in rice commerce. In 1996, 
Mae and Phoh Yi Keo bought a small tractor to import rice and com from Muang Sing. At 
the end of the harvest period in October, the couple was able to make one transaction per 
day, buying rice in Muang Sing and re-selling it at retail prices to Mengman people or to 
consumers in other locales in Mengla County.
Nevertheless, a discrepancy between the flexible narrative of bilateral cooperation and the 
actual Lao governments’ protectionist agenda restricted this trade in rice. Fearing that 
allowing too much Lao rice into China would cause a shortage among the Lao population, 
rice was, along with com, listed among the “sensitive products”3 subject to import-export 
restrictions between the two neighbouring countries. The volume of rice transported to 
China via the minor border crossings was limited to one or two tons per load in 1996, 
which was increased to a few tons in 1998. The rice flow into China was thus dependent on 
the tax regulatory swings of the Lao authorities. Volume was low in the 1996-1998 period, 
and higher between 1998 and 2002. In 2003, a new wave of flexibility allowed a larger 
volume of exports at lower tax, which kindled in Mengman residents the hope of good 
profits. It was in this new setting of liberalisation that Mae and Phoh Yi Keo abandoned 
trade in other produce to mainly engage in com and rice commerce.
At the beginning of my fieldwork, in January 2005, the largest volume of com and rice 
traded from Laos into China went through the secondary regional border check-points of 
Pangthong-Chahe and Man Zhuang-Ban Bun Neua. Smaller quantities were shipped via 
other small crossings between Phongsali and Shangyong and at the Mom-Mengrun 
crossing4. Transactions at the Boten-Mohan international check-point were discouraged by
2 Personal communication with the Head of the Mengla Government Bureau for Foreign Affairs.
3 Products classified as “highly sensitive” included cooking oil, white sugar, milled rice, beer, cigarettes, 
gold and silver.
4 My status as foreigner and Western researcher unfortunately prevented me from having access to com and 
rice import-export figures on either side of the border.
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complex clearance procedures and more rigorous application of fiscal regulations by both 
Lao and Chinese officials. The majority of produce injected into the Chinese market via 
these minor crossings comprised non-milled rice and dried com. The import-export of 
milled rice was bilaterally forbidden by the Chinese and Lao authorities. Non-milled rice 
included glutinous and non-glutinous types, and both paddy and mountain varieties were 
imported. Imported glutinous rice ranged from small to big grain, the former being more 
valuable than the latter.
Spanning the borders of several countries in the Upper Mekong area, the economic 
trajectory of this rice and com trade was intrinsically transnational and, therefore, 
rhizomatic. A large quantity of rice transported via the Pangthong-Chahe crossings was 
produced in various localities in northern Laos5, with a high percentage of the glutinous 
paddy variety coming from the wide and fertile plain of Muang Sing6. A minor amount 
arrived from as far away as Luang Phrabang, Vientiane, and Pakse. A small quantity of 
perfumed jasmine Thai rice was shipped on cargo boats from the Thai ports of Chiang 
Khong and Chiang Saen across the Mekong to the Lao ports of Houayxay and Xiangkok 
respectively and subsequently transported by truck to Muang Sing. Xiangkok was also the 
port through which small quantities of Burmese “soft” rice, highly valued for its good 
quality and originating from Chiang Lap, reached Muang Sing. While Lao rice was mostly 
available soon after the harvest in October up until February-March, the export of Thai 
and Burmese rice was allowed by their respective governments later in the year, in June and 
July, before the following harvest.
The largest volume of com arrived at Muang Sing from Pakbeng and Muang Hun in 
Oudomxai Province. Small quantities came from from Muang Sing and Muang Long in 
Luang Namtha Province, where it was grown by Akha, Yao, Tai Neua and Tai Lue farmers, 
and from Luang Phrabang, Bokeo, Vientiane and Xaignabouri. Com imports to China 
occurred during the period of peak production from September until late January.
5 These localities included Muang Long in Luang Namtha Province, various villages in Oudomxai, and 
Houayxay in Bokeo Province.
6 In 2002, the volume of paddy rice produced in the Muang Sing plain amounted to 16,290 tons, of which 
4,300 tons were exported to China (Lyttleton et al. 2004:19-20). In 2005, well-off lowland households residing 
in the Muang Sing plain produced an average of 10 to 15 tons of paddy rice per year. The paddy land area of 
a low land Tai landlord in Muang Sing ranged between 2 ha and 10 ha. Typically, one ha of paddy land 
yielded 2.5 tons of rice per harvest, depending on the soil fertility and on whether fertilizers were utilized.
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Com and rice from distant localities was collected by local brokers from the growers and 
shipped to Muang Sing town where it was sold to local traders who, in turn, acted as 
suppliers for the Chinese dealers. In some cases, brokers from localities far from Muang 
Sing sold the produce directly to Chinese traders. However, by and large, Muang Sing 
traders had a monopoly on the com and rice commerce with China in north-western Laos. 
The majority of Lao dealers were from villages located near the border and included people 
of Tai Lue and Tai Neua ethnicity7. Once the com and rice reached Mengman it was 
dispersed within China’s national borders, where due to insufficient internal production, 
these two products were in high demand. Com was sold by Tai Lue traders to piggery 
owners in Mengla territory or to Han Chinese wholesalers and commercial agents who in 
turn sold it to animal feed factories or to alcohol breweries across Yunnan8. Rice buyers 
included both local Mengman and Mengpeng residents and Han wholesalers from other 
parts of Yunnan. While the former consumed the produce as a staple food, the latter would 
further trade it with food processing factories9. Both rice and maize imports thus travelled 
from Mengman to other places in Xishuangbanna prefecture, and reached other areas of 
Yunnan such as Simao, Mojiang, Pu’er, Kunming, and Dali or destinations as far away as 
Shanghai to the south-east and Beijing to the north-east.
The “Tnee-zomed” Strategies of Trade
In early 2005, the trans-border com and rice trade at the Pangthong-Chahe crossings was, 
on the Chinese side of the border, mostly dominated by Tai speaking people who made up 
fifteen of the eighteen family-run-enterprises in Mengman Township that conducted com 
and rice trade with Laos. Ten of the Tai families were from Shang Jinglong and Xia 
Jinglong and five were from two villages located near the border with Laos. The three 
remaining enterprises were run by Han families that had recently migrated to Mengman.
Between early 2004 and July 2005, the fifteen Tai Lue enterprises rode the crest of a 
thriving rice and com business wave. None of them was able to quantify or willing to 
reveal their annual returns to me. According to Yi Oi, one of the female traders, during the
7 Most rice and com traders in Muang Sing were from Ban Nakham, Ban Donchai, Ban So, Ban Jengjai, Ban 
Jaengying, Ban Nam Keo Luang and Ban Nam Keo Noi.
8 For an exhaustive description of the com market chain between China and Laos in 2005-2006 see Fujita 
(2006).
9 Traders remarked that, normally, the cheaper and lower quality rice was sold to Han buyers from distant 
locations for industrial food processing. Best quality rice was reserved for local customers who were ready to 
pay higher prices for better quality produce.
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months of rice and com availability, she and her husband could reap 200-300 yuan (=26-39 
US$) from each truck load of eight/ten tons. The couple would bring two or three loads a 
day from Laos. In a month, the revenues could be as high as 10,000-12,000 yuan (1315- 
1580 US$), a fortune when compared with the 100-200 yuan (=13-26 US$) monthly income 
of a large number of Tai residents in Mengman. The other enterprises’ income reached 
similar figures, depending on the type and the extent of their connections with suppliers 
and buyers. The official re-opening of the border with Laos had, therefore, created for 
these frontier petty traders opportunities for significant economic advancement. Yet such 
mobility was dependent on the shifting local and national power structures that sometimes 
enabled and sometimes constrained profits.
The Chinese Tai traders’ economic success between 2004 and mid 2005 relied on a 
combination of two factors: the Chinese state’s implementation of favourable regulations 
on cross-border goods and human mobility, and the traders’ use of a series of what I call 
“tree-zomed” strategies. The term “tree-zomed” refers to a mixture of “arborescent” and 
“rhizomed” modes of action, the former being related to a rigid, territorialised, and 
homogeneous national scheme, the latter being related to a more fluid, deterritorialised, 
and heterogeneous transnational/frontier space. “Tree-zomed” strategies include a gender- 
balanced organisation of trade, the instrumental deployment of trans-border ethnicity, the 
appropriation of a Han ethnic style of business, the opportunistic reliance on the Chinese 
administration’s temporary flexibility, and the enactment of a “war-machine” against Lao 
state agents. In the following section I will explore each of these strategies.
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Figure 71. A Tai male trader consumes lunch at his home 
in Xia Jinglong on return from Laos
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Balancing gender roles
As in the case of Mae and Phoh Yi Keo introduced at the beginning of this chapter, the Tai 
trading firms were normally organized around the nuclear family model of independent 
enterprise. One firm included a husband-wife team occasionally assisted by unmarried 
children waiting for employment. While husbands mostly acted as drivers, negotiated with 
border authorities, and found and communicated with buyers, wives were the managers of 
the firms. Accompanying their husbands on trading trips, women were in charge of 
scheduling deals with suppliers and buyers, keeping a record of the transactions and 
collecting money. In writing about long-distance truckers in north-western Laos, Walker 
(1999:119) notes that the chauffeurs are often accompanied by their wives on their trips. 
The latter “provide companionship and supervision”, protecting their husbands from 
“health and financial risks” and discouraging extra-marital sexual pleasures and gambling. 
Similar motivations drove Tai female traders to follow their husbands on their trips. Yet, 
while trucking remains a predominantly masculine business, rice and com trading can be 
described as a gender-balanced activity, where women and man undertake equally 
important commercial roles. Tai women even went on long-distance trips to Laos or to 
other parts of China without their husbands on trucks driven by Han drivers to sell or buy 
merchandise. By not following the rigidly defined gender stratification that corresponds to 
an equally rigidly marked division of labour, these activities seemingly reproduced the 
“rhizomatic model” proposed byDeleuze and Guattari.
Tai women’s active participation in cross-border trade contrasts with the inflexible gender 
division often found among Han Chinese whereby women are in charge of the domestic 
sphere, while men dominate the public domain. This is captured by the Chinese saying 
“men in charge of the outside, women in charge of the inside” (Kipnis 2008:147). In his 
analysis of gender structures in a Christianised rural area of northern China’s Shangdong 
Province, Kipnis (2008) confirms such a distinction. While not excluding the possibility of 
more balanced gender role in other contexts, he emphasises that participation in Christian 
activities in Zouping County is predominantly female, while public banquets are “almost 
exclusively male affairs” (Kipnis 2008:146). Female participation in banquets, whether at 
home or in restaurants, retains the above-mentioned “inner” and domestic character, for it 
is mostly confined to family rituals. Male dominance in the public sphere spans the political 
domain—the vast majority of cadres are men— and business, for which men travel far 
from home where they leave their wives and children (Kipnis 2004:146). The case of
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Zouping presents some similarities with other parts o f rural China where it is quite 
com m on for wom en to be excluded from trading activities that involve leaving home. 
Long-distance trade is dom inated by men.
Figure 73. A Tai trader (right) engages in weaving 
with her niece during idle time in Xia Jinglong
Figure 74. A group of Tai traders from Xia Jinglong with the author
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Women’s confinement to the domestic or village sphere is also a common topos in 
literature on trade in Southeast Asia. It is widely assumed that women dominate small-scale, 
local trade, particularly in village markets (Alexander 1987; Firth 1966; Ireson 1992; Kirsch 
1982). As in the case of Han Chinese, long-distance, large-scale, and wholesale trade is 
usually defined as the domain of men (Chandler 1984:105,121,125; De Young 1966:105-06). 
In Theravada Buddhist societies of Southeast Asia, religious values are said to hamper 
women’s participation in long-distance trade. Kirsch (1982:29) suggests that Buddhist 
valorisation of the role of wife and mother limits women’s economic activity to “petty and 
localised” trade. Keyes (1984:229) takes the argument even further by stressing that the role 
of the rme kha or female seller is related to the Buddhist idea of the “nurturing mother”, 
and that petty trading is an extension of the domestic economy.
Mengman Tai women’s involvement in cross-border rice and com trade contrasts with 
these commonly held views on the gender division of labour in Southeast Asia. Rather, 
their active role, entrepreneurial attitude and economic success in trading echoes WalkeTs 
(1999) analysis of long-distance female trading in north-eastern Laos in the mid-1990s. 
Debunking the conventional views of female traders in Theravada Buddhist societies, 
Walker (1999:160) emphasises that “[a]n identity as long-distance trader is not inconsistent 
with an identity of nurturer and provider, and. ..it reinforces a longstanding feminine role 
of household economic manageT’. Similarly, the women of the Tai firms in Mengman 
swung in between these two identities, successfully utilising their skills as family nurturers 
in business affairs and in becoming crucial generators of family finances.
Mostly in their forties or early fifties, all the women and men involved in the cross-border 
rice and com trade in Mengman had, like Mae and Phoh Yi Keo, a farming background 
and had made their way up to com and rice commerce by previously conducting legal and 
illegal petty trade with Laos in other products. Although these Tai trading families had not 
formed an association, they established some form of cooperation among each other in 
setting fixed prices on produce imported from Laos. Some of the teams also created 
occasional partnership alliances to open up new trading opportunities or to better direct 
profits.
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Instrumental use of trans-border ethnicity
The temporary economic success of Mengman Tai Lue was further determined by the 
strategic deployment of trans-border ethnicity. In Chapter Five I have pointed out how the 
cultural, educational and economic policies of the Chinese nation-state have fostered a 
sense of disconnection from a Tai Lue transnational community and an increasing 
attachment to the Chinese national community among the Dai youth in Mengman. Yet, 
inter-ethnic interactions between the middle-aged generations of Tai Lue in China and 
Laos persisted in certain domains. Ethnic connectivity, I argue, was still instrumentally 
mobilised by this generation to conduct cross-border business. Borderlands, it has been 
argued
confront peoples with sometimes poignant ambiguities of identity that evoke 
polyvalent senses and possibilities of being.. .[but] the ambiguities of identity in 
the borderlands can also be strategically played upon to forge, reformulate, and 
even mobilize ethnic identity to advantage” (Alvarez and Collier 1994:607).
In their trading dealings with Lao partners, Tai Lue from Mengman prioritised Tai identity 
over Chinese citizenship, resuming old or establishing new ties with people of their same 
ethnicity beyond the border. They capitalised on belonging to a pre-modem frontier 
spatiality and a regional Tai cultural sphere. In so doing, they deterritorialised the fixed 
ethno-cultural prescriptions of the Chinese nation-state.
Ethnicity has been said to be pivotal to the understanding of border practices in various 
parts of the world. For instance, in discussing long haul trucking across the domestic 
market borders in the US and international borders between the US and Mexico, Alvarez 
and Collier (1994:607) underscore
the emergent and culturally productive processes through which different 
groups of entrepreneurs [from Northern and Southern Mexico] deploy and 
extend ethnicity in their borderlands. [While Northern Mexican truckers] draw 
upon characteristically Mexican interpersonal reciprocities and patronage to 
meet the challenges of transnational business, [Indigenous Mayas from the 
south] tap their repertory of [ethnically defined] corporative ideology for 
organizing community as a response to risk and as strategy for gain.
In both cases, business is defined as an “ethnic enterprise” (Alvarez and Collier 1994:606) 
because it relies on the adoption of particular ethnic styles of trading and ethnically marked 
social networks. Similarly, I suggest, a particular ethnic style underpinned the business 
interactions between Muang Sing suppliers and Mengman buyers. In the following section I
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will examine the features of this ethnic style: cultural commonalities, mateship and kin 
networks, trust and reciprocity (Alvarez and Collier 1994).
A first commonality in trading transactions with Lao suppliers is language. Both parties 
spoke two intelligible variants of the Tai Lue language spoken in the borderlands of 
Thailand, Laos, Burma, Vietnam and China. The similarity between Lao and Tai Lue 
languages also allowed traders from Mengman to easily communicate with Lao partners 
from other ethnic backgrounds. Indeed, many of the Mengman Tai entrepreneurs had also 
become fluent in Lao through their cross-border business transactions in the 1990s. Such 
cultural and language affinity facilitated verbal communication with their Lao partners, 
which translated into enhanced understanding and negotiating power in their business 
transactions. Verbal miscommunication with Lao suppliers was, for instance, given as a 
factor underpinning the low trading performance of Han Chinese buyers from Mengman. 
A Han trader lamented to me that his rice and com business had not been able to take off 
because of his inability to speak Tai and Lao and establish close personal ties with Lao 
suppliers.
Cultural commonality was a conduit for social connectedness. Particularly relevant were 
ties between Tai traders and Lao suppliers based on mateship, which in Tai language was 
expressed through the terms phchseo (male peer) and rmeseo (female peer). I observed that 
the phohseormeseo relation was defined by shared age, friendship, drinking and hanging out 
together in non-business settings such as parties, festivals and travelling. Ethnic mateship 
was often extended beyond the Tai Lue label to people from lowland Lao background such 
as Tai Neua and Lao, who were considered to be part of a broader Lao/Tai ethnic circuit. 
Commercial links were often based on pre-existing male/female peer ties. In some cases, 
traders perpetuated the phohseormeseo connections which their parents had established with 
members of Lao families before the incorporation of Sipsongpanna into modem China. 
For instance, one of the best business partners of Phoh Ai Kham, the most experienced 
trader in Mengman, was a man of Tai Neua ethnic background from Ban Nam Keo Long, 
a village located near the border with China. The two men had become peers, drawing on 
friendship ties that their parents had developed in the 1940s. By virtue of such bonds, 
when exporting his com and rice to the Chinese market, the Tai Neua man privileged Po 
Ai Kham and his wife as his main customers among the many competing firms in the 
frontier. Furthermore, the Lao man helped Phoh and Mae Ai Kham with logistics or to
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obtain low exchange rates between Chinese yuan and Lao kip on the black market in Muang 
Sing.
Trans-border kinship ties were equally important in obtaining preferential treatment for 
com and rice supply. Some of the most loyal business partners of Phoh Ai Kham were 
relatives from Ban Hun and Ban Tinthat, two villages to which had fled from China during 
the Great Leap Forward campaign in 1958 and the Cultural Revolution period (1966-1977). 
After the re-opening of the border, Phoh Ai Kham revitalised those social links that had 
been weakened by a few decades of nation-building processes.
The peer and kin bonds engendered reciprocal trust between trading partners, a value that 
was particularly important in commercial transactions. Although payment for com and rice 
normally occurred at the time of sale, when lacking cash liquidity, Tai traders from China 
could buy their merchandise on credit from Lao suppliers. Equally, the Lao could borrow 
money from Tai partners to buy produce from growers or brokers from other provinces. 
Trust guaranteed that the debt would be repaid.
To strengthen trust in business and cultivate personal bonds, suppliers and buyers 
maintained a reciprocal cross-border exchange of favours. Chinese Tai entrepreneurs 
assisted their Lao business partners to access medical care or banking in China, two 
services poorly provided in Laos. On one occasion, Mae Yi Keo abandoned her trading trip 
to Laos to take a male peer from Muang Sing with whom she did trade to the hospital in 
Mengla. A few months later, another Lao male peer helped her to lease land in an Akha 
village in Muang Sing to establish a rubber plantation.
Performing laoban’
In pursuing business on the Chinese side of the border, the Tai firms drew on their identity 
as Chinese citizens. They relied on the tree-like cultural-economic-political model defined 
by the Chinese state and by the Han ethnic majority. As seen in Chapter Two, the Tai Lue 
have engaged in trade with Han Chinese since pre-modem times when the former 
constituted the politically dominant group of Sipsongpanna (Maxwell Hill 1989). 
Incorporated into China’s political sphere for half a century as an ethnic minority, the Tai 
have recently turned their Chinese citizenship into a vantage ground to manage commercial 
interactions with the Han ethnic majority.
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While the phohseo-rmseo-ship was still crucial in interactions with Tai buyers in China, social 
connections (Ch. guanxi) were the social mechanism at the basis of trade with Han 
customers. Yet, there was a difference in the way these two forms of socio-economic 
relations were linked to the sphere of human feelings. Relations between peers were 
created and maintained through a combination of social ties with material obligation and 
human feelings (Ch. iSfit ganqing) of friendship mediated by ethnic and cultural proximity 
(Kipnis 1997:23). As such, they were more similar to the explanation of gmnxi provided by 
Kipnis (1997:23) which, rather than seeing economic relationships as severed from 
emotional relationships and the production of the self, unifies feeling and instrumentality 
into a totality. Yet, as Kipnis (1997:156) himself points out, social connections are 
constituted by a variety of practices that can vary according to the context where they are 
produced. In the milieu of the long-distance trade between Tai and Han, I suggest that 
guanxi was more a social instrument to reach economic ends where feelings of love and 
friendship were feeble, absent or cooled by the ethnic boundary. Therefore, the way social 
connections were established in the Tai Lue/Han context resonates with the definition that 
Fried gives for ganqing. “a relationship between two individuals who are not on precisely 
the same social plane” (Fried 1953:103) and which “differs from friendship in that it 
presumes a much more specific common interest, much less warmth and more formality of 
contact, and includes a recognized degree of exploitation” (Fried 1953:226-227). Formality, 
distance and a little reciprocal exploitation was characteristic of the socio-economic 
relations between Han and Tai.
The Tai traders established social connections with Han buyers in different ways. In some 
cases the guanxi was the private perpetuation of connections mediated by the state in the 
1980s when Mengman residents sold rice surpluses through the old state’s cooperative 
system in Mengla. In other cases, trading networks were generated ex now through friends 
in Jinghong and Mengla or through local brokers who acted as mediators between Flan 
buyers and Tai suppliers in Mengman. Social connections could also be initiated by the 
Han partners themselves when, during the peak season of com and rice collection, they 
temporarily settled in Mengman together with their workers and truckers.
Due to the large scale of commerce they managed and their acceptance of lower quality 
produce, Han wholesalers, who originated from various locales in Yunnan, were a more 
profitable source of business than local Tai retailers or consumers from Mengpeng or
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Mengla. For this reason the Tai trading teams in Mengman competed with each other to 
gain the largest volume of trade with Han Chinese by deploying different stratagems. Social 
connections were produced by regularly inviting the Han customers to their homes for 
dinner or to partake in special celebrations such as weddings or religious festivals. When 
based on long-term interactions, social connections were occasionally turned into 
friendship. In these cases, the guanxi was strengthened by merging material obligation and 
feelings of friendship (Kipnis 1995).
Ironically, the Tai Lue’s ability to deal and negotiate business with Flan Chinese traders lay 
in their appropriation of the Flan “boss” (Ch. laobari) trading style. In the Tai Lue’s view, 
one quality of a boss is the capacity to “cheat others”. Only Han Chinese could have this 
quality and so only they could perform the role of hwbaru As Phoh Yi Keo put it “the Tai 
cannot be ‘bosses’, because their Theravada Buddhist morality dissuades them from 
cheating people”. Calling themselves bosses was thus seen as inappropriate for the Tai, 
since in doing so they would convey a sense of arrogance and superiority. Yet, when I saw 
a few Tai addressed as bosses by either Han or their fellow Tais, a mixture of pleasure and 
pride was visible in their eyes. In Mengman’s agriculture-based economy, trading allowed 
individuals to spend their days “standing up right” rather than “bent down to the soil” as 
Phoh Yi Keo pointed out. For Tai Lue people, becoming a laoban like the Han therefore 
had the connotation of having achieved social mobility.
As a result of his economic success, Phoh Yi Keo had gained the status of boss. This 
appellation derived from his ability to establish good trading connections, to set high prices 
and, at times, to cheat buyers, suppliers and authorities at the border crossing. Phoh Yi 
Keo’s boss qualities were overtly displayed one day when a Flan man from Mengpeng came 
to Phoh Yi Keo’s house to buy some com. Phoh Yi Keo tried to foist off a load of low 
quality com on the man despite the latter’s reluctance to accept the unfair deal. The Tai 
trader merely had to invite the Plan customer for dinner and pour him a couple of glasses 
of rice wine for the latter to eventually agree to purchase the merchandise. “This boss is 
frightening!” commented the Fian man to me as he mounted his truck to return home 
aware of having purchased poor quality com. Phoh Yi Keo had not only adeptly used the 
FFan boss’ art of cheating but also subverted Fdan-Tai ethnic hierarchies.
Chinese cultural hegemony certainly continued to inform and define the status of boss. 
Becoming a boss entailed acquiring a set of symbols introduced by the Plan which granted
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a certain degree of distinction (Bourdieu 1984) and earned respect from others. Among 
these symbols were expensive commodities used in trading. Both the wives and husbands 
of each firm were equipped with high-tech mobile phones. Although the traders described 
these as simply an indispensable tool of communication that had radically changed their 
trading patterns— from slow and haphazard door-to-door rice hunting to more structured 
and planned arrangements— cellular phones were also markers of high status, especially 
when they were Nokia, a very expensive western brand.
The ownership of a truck also helped to guarantee prestige to the Tai laoban Mengman 
traders drove trucks of Nongyong, FAW, Lanjian and Dongfang brands, the same as those 
preferred by their Han counterparts. On the trucks, Han and Tai signs of prosperity were 
mixed together. Phoh and Mae Yi Keo had decorated the front of their Nongyong truck 
with two stickers featuring two rampant tigers facing each other, Tai symbols of might and 
invincibility. Above them, three Chinese characters indicated “the prosperity god” (Ch.
S’ Tl] zhifushen). While the tigers were supposed to protect them from adversity and 
accidents on the road, the characters, Phoh Yi Keo hoped, would assist him to accumulate 
wealth.
The high economic value of the vehicles (5,000-10,000 yuan = 657-1315 US$ for a second 
hand truck, 50,000 to 80,000 yuan = 6,578-10,525 US$ for a new one) was translated into 
spiritual value on occasions when the traders put the trucks at the disposal of the 
collectivity for religious festivals. On the day of the Phabat ritual, which celebrates the 
arrival of Buddha in Mengman during his wandering around Southeast Asia, Phoh Yi Keo 
offered to drive about thirty believers from his village to the top of the mountain where the 
important Mengman reliquary is located10. Having been spared a lengthy and tiring walk in 
the dark, the pilgrims in the back of the truck commented: “the boss will receive big merit 
today!” asserting in one sentence, Phoh Yi Keo’s Tai spiritual achievement and his prestige 
as a wealthy boss.
Further important occasions of status display for the Tai bosses were the banquets held for 
the Dai New Year or for the wedding parties of their children. Both types of feasts took 
the form of ceremonial giving away whereby the Tai hosts re-mapped their ties with mates, 
relatives and Flan and Tai trading partners. Between 2005 and 2007,1 was invited to a few
10 The Phabat Festival is held yearly on the day of the full moon of the fifth month of the Tai Lue calendar 
(Februar)).
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of these banquets in Mengman held by households of different social strata. The feasts 
organized by Tai traders surpassed by far, both in terms of number of people and amount 
of food, the ones given by families with a farming background. The parties of the Tai 
bosses lasted three days and involved the slaughtering of one water buffalo and two pigs, 
and the preparation of copious vegetable and meat dishes. Phoh Yi Keo remarked that 
such banqueting lavishness had emerged only since the early 2000s. It had coincided with 
the increased fluidity of cross-border trade with Laos and reverberated with the economic 
boom from China’s coastal provinces in the south-western peripheral areas. Mae Ai 
Sengzai, another of Mengman’s female bosses, emphasized that to organize such events 
was about keeping one’s “face”, deploying a concept that in the Han social discourse is a 
“measure of one’s social respectability” (Anagnost 1997:103) or refers to “a directly 
constitutive social underpinning of power” (Kipnis 1995:128)11. In the case of the Tai 
bosses, protecting face ensured social respect and assertion of power while at the same 
time amplifying friendship links and strengthening commercial ties.
Figure 75. Performing laobatr. the truck of Phoh and Mae Yi Keo
11 On the various connotations and interpretations of the concept of “face” see also Smith (1890), Hu (1944), 
Yang (1989), and Zito (1994).
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Drawing on the Chinese state’s experimental flexibility 
To explain the success of Chinese Tai Lue in cross-border business dealings between 2004 
and half of 2005 by solely emphasising personal capabilities would indicate agreement with 
the argument that globalisation is producing a new type of flexible subjects whose actions 
are freer from the structuring forces of a state system than in the past. However, I maintain 
that it is also important to point out the ongoing significance of institutional and local 
power structures in fostering such a temporary, yet extraordinary, assertion of human 
agency. In fact, the Tai traders’ ‘rhizomatic’ endeavours were defined by policies designed 
by the Chinese and Lao states and were dependent on how local state agents applied these 
policies. The traders’ lines of flight beyond the border were regulated, and therefore 
circumscribed, by what Wang (2004:352) calls “a regime of mobility”, a mechanism 
whereby the state controls the movement of people across states through the use of 
identification papers, passports and visas. Passports and visas, Wang (2004:355) argues, 
“are an institutional interface that links macro structures (the state) and micro actors 
(individuals) to each other.” Passports assert the sovereignty of the issuing state while 
defining the citizenship of the bearer (Wang 2004:355). Identification documents and 
border passes linked Tai traders to the Chinese state, confirmed their Chinese citizenship 
and regulated their mobility across the frontier space.
According to Chinese legislation, any Chinese citizen of Yunnan with permanent residency 
in a border area at the time of my research had the status of border dweller (Ch. Ü fC  
brnwiri) and was therefore entitled to obtain a special border crossing pass from the local 
police. Following the bilateral agreement between the Chinese and the Lao governments, 
border residents of Mengla County holding the document were authorized to travel and 
trade beyond the international border with Laos from the Chahe, Manzhuang and Mohan 
check-points. However, Chinese citizens’ movements within Lao territory were restricted 
to Luang Namtha, Oudomaxai, Phongsali and Bokeo Provinces. To travel and trade 
further south, Chinese citizens had to obtain a special stamp on their documents and pay 
an extra fee to the Lao authorities at inter-provincial check-points12.
12 Lao citizens’ border crossing was regulated by the use of an ID card or by a short-term travelling permit 
issued at the border check-point. Their movement beyond the border with China was limited to the territory 
of the Xishuangbanna Prefecture.
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In their movements, Tai traders from China were daily confronted with icons of state 
authority. Along the road leading from Mengman to the border, the rows of lavish trees 
were interrupted by markers of territorializing technologies dating back to the nation­
building period in the 1950s: two settlements of the Mengman state farm, a state rubber 
factory, a frontier guard station, and an epidemic prevention station. On the walls of these 
state buildings, writing reminded the by-passers to “construct socialism for a better 
construction of the state”. Outside the frontier guard station, a sentinel in a green uniform 
was silhouetted motionless on a rounded pedestal against a tall enclosing wall where the 
writing, in red characters, warned the reader, “zone of high security for the safety of the 
state. Off-limits to unauthorized people”. The parade of Chinese state icons culminated at 
the Chahe border check-point where the police and customs officials ordered the border- 
crosser to STOP! If allowed to traverse no man’s land, the crossers would be further 
confronted with Lao customs and police officers at the Pangthong check-point.
Nevertheless, although funnelling mobility through regulatory channels, the Chinese state, 
contrary to its Lao counterpart, had since 2004 put into practice an experimental flexible 
regime of cross-border movement inscribed within a graduated application of “citizenship” 
(Ong 1999, 2000). By distinguishing between “border residents” and “non border 
residents” for the issuing of cross-border passes it had created a “regime of graduated 
mobility”, whereby the former enjoyed a wider span of movement across the frontier space 
than the latter13. Non border residents could only cross the border into Laos via the 
international check-point at Mohan and by using a passport. Such regulations worked to 
the economic advantage of the border residents. Discouraged by the lengthy and costly 
procedure for acquiring a passport, many non-resident traders renounced trans-border 
business or relied on local Tai traders to import goods from Laos.
13 The “regime of graduated mobility’ was also efficaciously applied on me. As a foreigner and non-border 
resident I was not only forbidden to cross the border at the Chahe-Pangthong check-points but also to get 
close to the frontier stations. The only time I dared to visit the Chinese check-point at Chahe I was sent back 
to Mengman town straight away and told that “according to the Chinese law, a foreigner is not allowed to 
spend too long in a border area without authorization” (sic!). Hence, my descriptions of the interactions 
between Tai traders and officials at the border are based on the numerous accounts that the traders gave me 
during the daily conversations we had on their return to Mengnman in the evenings.
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Figure 76. Documents regulating cross-border mobility 
on the Lao side of the border
Figure 77. Documents regulating cross-border mobility on the
Chinese side of the border
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The Yunnan provincial government simplified procedures for the border residents to 
obtain the border pass and reduced the cost from 200 yuan (=24 US$) in 2000 to free of 
charge in 2005. These preferential policies put the border residents and other citizens of 
China on two different levels. They allowed Chinese Tai Lue traders to be “flexible 
citizens” (Ong 1999). Ong (1999:6) explains flexibility as a strategy serving the purpose of 
capital accumulation in the global age. It is related, she argues, to a regime of
graduated sovereignty.. ..whereby citizens in zones that are differently 
articulated to global production and financial circuits are subjected to different 
kinds of surveillance and in practice enjoy different sets of civil, political and 
economic rights (Ong 1999:215-216).
Yet such an analysis cannot be fully applied to the China-Laos frontier milieu. What Ong 
(1999:72) refers to as a “rescaling of state power across the national landscape and the 
differential scales of regulatory effect on the rights and privileges of different segments of 
the population” should not be simply attributed to neo-liberal practices. Rather, as I have 
pointed out in Chapter One, they are inscribed within a long term model of graduated 
sovereignty and a differential treatment of minority ethnic areas that was initiated in pre­
modem China and later sanctioned by the PRC Constitution. Since the early period of its 
mle, the PRC government has managed the territory under its sovereignty according to a 
model of graduated administration that guarantees autonomy in cultural, economic and 
political matters to areas inhabited by ethnic minority groups mainly located at the 
periphery of the state. This pattern of governing can be traced back to the system of 
indirect mle introduced in Yunnan by the Ming dynasty (1368-1644).
Certainly, one can argue that the differential treatment granted to the border population in 
the current era serves the economic and political purposes of the Chinese state. By 
facilitating the movement of the border residents across the frontier and enabling them to 
use links with ethnic fellows beyond the border to trade, the Chinese state guarantees 
import of key resources, two of which are rice and com, to feed the national economy. By 
permitting a type of mobility “contained” by a border pass, the state ensures control over a 
segment of the population that, residing at the margins of its territory, represents a threat 
to its own sovereignty. Allowing transnational, regulated mobility could be therefore seen 
as instrumental to prevent social unrest at the periphery.
Nevertheless, within this framework of Machiavellian calculations, there is, perhaps, also a 
kernel of social sensibility in the government’s designs. As demonstrated by some recent
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Chinese language publications on China-Southeast Asia links—which have had to pass the 
scrutiny of CCP censorship—the Chinese state seems to have increasingly appreciated the 
socio-economic importance of cross-border movement for ethnic populations straddling 
the borders of China and neighbouring countries (Zhou 2002). This aspect is supported by 
the tolerance that Chinese authorities showed for border-crossings on unofficial trails. A 
police officer at the Chahe check-point told me that although it was forbidden by the law, 
the Army still allowed many border dwellers to cross the border from mountain paths to 
visit friends and relatives.
Local politicians in Mengman explained to me that the newly applied flexible cross-border 
regulations reflected the Chinese government’s intention to produce “development” in the 
“poorer border regions and support the border residents in increasing their living 
standards”. At the peak of their economic success between 2004 and mid 2005, Tai traders 
shared this view with government agents. When discussing their trading performances in 
early 2005 with me, the Chinese state came across as caring for its peripheral citizens. One 
of the Tai traders saw an instance of such benevolence in the Yunnan administration’s 
decision to exempt the border residents from paying an import-export tariff on goods 
whose market value did not surpass 5,000 yuan (658 US$) per transaction. Furthermore, in 
early 2005, the Chinese government had abolished the cross-border toll fee for both people 
and vehicles.
This institutional flexibility was coupled with the personal flexibility of border officers. 
Although utilizing trucks with a capacity ranging between 4 and 10 tons, all Tai laoban 
overloaded their vehicles with almost twice as much as this. In most cases traders shipped 
up to 7,000 to 10,000 yuan (=920 to 1300 US$) worth rice or com per load. However, at 
the Chahe check-point, Chinese customs and police officers would usually “close an eye”, 
as Phoh Yi Keo said, winking at me, to express the loose application of the law on him and 
other traders. He described a typical customs’ clearance at the check-point as follows:
My truck has a 4 ton capacity, but I normally load it with 6-7 tons of com or 
rice. Therefore the merchandise I carry has a value ranging between 7,000 and 
9,000 yuan depending on the type of rice and com I transact. When the 
customs inspect the load, they have a quick look at the truck and, even if they 
know that I am carrying more than I am allowed to, they do not fine me. They 
say to me: ‘go, go, it’s fine’.
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This 2005 account contrasts with the traders’ stories of their commercial interactions with 
the authorities in the late 1990s when a stricter regulatory regime was in place. Mae Yi On, 
one of Mengman’s trading pioneers summarized the past trading dynamics with the 
expression tax avoidance (Ch. {iff#, toushm) described her experience with the Chinese 
officials at that time thus:
One night, it was probably 15 years ago, I was in a van at the outskirts of 
Jinghong with four other people from Mengman. In the dark, we were 
transporting stuff smuggled from Laos to be sold to wholesalers in Jinghong. 
We had Thai shoes and thongs that my younger sister had smuggled across the 
mountains with the help of Akha people from Laos. We stopped the van on 
the side of the road and waited for it to get light to arrive in Jinghong 
unnoticed. All of a sudden, a car went past us. It was the customs’. The car 
turned back Then the customs men got out and came to us. They asked for 
our ID cards and ordered us to show what we had in the car. They found out 
immediately it was smuggled stuff. So they wanted to fine us 2000 yuan (which 
at that time was quite a lot of money!). I begged for their mercy and refused to 
pay. Desperately I tried to think of a way to find some guanxi. When they took 
us to the customs station in Jinghong, I said I wanted to make a phone call. At 
that time my elder sister’s husband was a policeman, so I called him and asked 
to intercede for me with the customs. After long negotiations the customs were 
convinced to reduce the fee and charged me only 300 yuan. Everybody else on 
the car with me had to pay 2000 yuan.
And then, laughing, she mentioned a second smuggling caper with a happy ending:
Another time, at one o’clock at night, three people and I were hiding in the 
dark near Jinghong. We were carrying smuggled blankets and shoes. When I 
saw the police pass by, I ran out and threw my stuff into the open fields. I hid 
it in the grass. By the time the police turned around, the stuff was out of the car.
My heart was beating so fast! I was not afraid though.. .1 was able to bear up.
One of the ladies with me was so scared that she peed in her pants. When the 
police came, I boldly said we were taking a rest and were waiting for it to get 
light before going to Jinghong the next day. That time we were spared. We had 
no fine. We duped them!
Mae Ai Kham Jaen, who had temporarily diverted her smuggling activity from the Laos- 
China border to the Burma-China border during the same period, drew a similar picture of 
the authoritarian attitude of the officials at that time:
I used to buy smuggled Thai facial creams that arrived from Burma to Daluo 
[across the border from Xiao Mengla in Burma] and then fill up my clothes 
with them. I put them in the pockets or in any spot available and covered 
myself with a blanket. Sometimes I had so much stuff on me that I could not 
even sit in the car! I would take the goods from Daluo to Jinghong and sell 
them to shopkeepers. When the customs or the police stopped me and my 
friends, we always said we had nothing to declare. The police would then touch
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our bodies to check whether we had anything on us. We would scream, saying 
they were not allowed to touch women! So the policeman would use a stick to 
check our bodies. At other times they would ask us to run around so that the 
stuff we were carrying on us would fall to the ground. The moisturizer 
containers would break and the contents would spill all over the ground. In 
those cases we would not get fined, but the merchandise would be lost.
Mae Ai Kham Jaen concluded by saying that traders now had more trust in the Chinese 
authorities than they did in the past. “Today things are different. The Chinese government 
wants to support people who do cross-border business. The majority of traders now go 
through the state channels as they are not charged high fees.” Therefore, by reducing tax 
payments, the Chinese state encouraged its citizens to operate within its “arborified” 
channels. As a result, flexibility translated into increased control over goods and people 
moving across the border. It corresponded to increased regulation (Walker 1999).
Putting in place a ‘war machine dealing with Lao state agents 
The traders’ interactions with Chinese officials in early 2005 noticeably diverged from then- 
dealings with the Lao authorities. The institutional and personal flexibility of the Chinese 
side contrasted with the stricter regulatory policies and unpredictability of the Lao 
counterpart. Regardless of the GMS and ASEAN’s trade agreements, Lao central and 
provincial administrations continued to maintain a protectionist barrier on cross-border 
mobility to prevent too many low cost Lao products flowing into the Chinese market and 
to limit the influx of Chinese people into Laos. Protectionism aimed to safeguard Lao 
producers, traders and the coffers of the state, or even better, of a wide range of 
government agents involved in regulating cross-border trade.
A major issue was the regulatory unbalance in fees and tax payment imposed on the traders 
at the Chinese and Lao border crossings. Table 1 clearly shows that the types and amount 
of fees charged by the Lao authorities surpassed by far the fees applied by the Chinese side. 
A total amount of 264 yuan (=34.73 US$) paid to Lao border officials contrasted with 47 
yuan (=6.18 US$) levied by their Chinese counterparts for a transaction of 6 tons of com.
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Fees and/or tax Fees and/or tax
paid to the Lao paid to the Chinese
border officers border officers
Person’s toll to  the Border 
Police Office
5,000 kip  (0.56 US$) N o  fee
Vehicle toll to  the B order 
Police Station
15,000 kip  (1.67 US$) 2 yuan (0.26 US$)
Individual fee to  the Epidem ic 2,000 kip  (0.22 US$) N o  fee
prevention station p er person
Individual fee to  the Custom s 3,000 kip  (0.33 US$) N o  fee
Office p er person
Vehicle fee to  the Customs 
Office
15,000 kip  (1.47 US$) N o  fee
Individual fee to  the 5,000 kip  (0.56 US$) N o  fee
Agriculture and Forest Office p er person
Individual insurance fee 5,000 kip  (=0.56 US$) N o  fee
Fee to  the Q uarantine Station 5,000 kip  (=0.56 US$) 40 yuan (5.26US$) per 
load plus 5 yuan (0.65 
US$) daily fee
E xtra fee to  the B order Police 
Station if crossing the border 
on  weekends o r between 5 
p.m. and 7 p.m.
5,000 kip  (=0.56 US$) N o  fee
Im port-export tax to  the 25% F o r a 6 to n  load N o  fee
Custom s Office fo r a load the authorities charged
sm aller than  6 tons 300,000 kip  (33.33 
US$) (negotiable)
Total 360, 000 kip  (40 US$) 47 yuan(6A$  US$)
Table 1. Border-crossing fees and tax paid to the Lao and Chinese authorities at the Pangthong-Chahe 
Check-points in May 2005 (calculated on a 6 ton load of com)
A second factor was the unpredictability and corruption of Lao border officers. In their 
accounts of border clearance at Pangthong, the Tai bosses depicted Lao officers at the 
check-point as frightening and unpredictable. “They levy tax at their will. There is no rule. 
Taxing depends on their mood on the day.. .and contrary to the Chinese authorities, they 
keep both eyes open”, Phoh Yi Keo lamented. Moreover, Lao officers were said to be 
corrupt. Despite the Lao national anti-corruption measures, minor border check-points 
such as Pangthong were the loci where customs and police agents made large fortunes. 
Away from the monitoring of their superiors they could arbitrarily suspend or manipulate 
the law to serve their personal interests14. When receiving a tax payment, Phoh Yi Keo 
pointed out, customs agents would often record only part of the actual amount in the 
official financial books and pocket the rest. “I never dare to request a receipt for payment. 
To ask for it is to look for trouble” Phoh Yi Keo confessed.
14 For a discussion of the typologies and socio-political ramifications of corruption in Laos see Stuart-Fox 
(2006).
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Chinese Tai traders managed this protectionism by activating what Deleuze and Guattari 
call “a war-machine”, a series of stratagems that inhibited the regulatory-adborescent 
practices of the Lao state. One way to do this was to manoeuvre within the customs 
officers’ arbitrary application of law to obtain a fiscal pardon, i.e. the officers would 
exceptionally suspended law in the traders’ favour13. At times, when the customs agents 
were in a good mood and small in number the pardon could be immediate. Traders would 
be only charged 5-8% tax or, on exceptional occasions, they would be allowed through 
without paying any duty. When granting full exemption, the officials would ask the traders 
for “favours”. In his next crossing, the Tai dealers had to bring a case of beer, a pack of 
washing powder or a blanket. At other times, negotiations over the amount to be paid 
could be lengthy and exhausting, and did not always result in positive outcomes for the Tai 
merchants. The latter would offer the customs a certain amount. If the customs refused 
this proposal, the traders would suggest a lower sum and wait in the hot sun for up to three 
or four hours for a second decision. “In such cases”, Phoh Yi Keo claimed, “there is not 
much we can do. We have to be patient and wait. It is no use getting angry as it does not 
work”. If, at the end of the negotiations, the result was still a high payment, the Tai traders 
would leave the load at the check-point, travel back home and try again the next day, 
hoping to be luckier.
A further way to obtain a fiscal pardon was to invite Lao customs officials to the Tai 
traders’ houses in Mengman for lunch, deterritorialising in this way the tax negotiating table 
from the Lao to the Chinese national sphere. The merchants organised lavish banquets that 
included Tai Lue and Han food. Unfortunately, stratagems of culinary enticement were not 
always efficacious. When, the day after the banquet, the traders arrived at the border 
crossing, it was not unlikely that the customs would still apply the maximum fee on the 
goods imported. In these cases, the arborescent model was impossible to eradicate.
15 In the pamphlet “The Thanksgiving Turkey Pardon, the Death of Teddy's Bear, and the Sovereign 
Exception of Guantanamo”, Magnus Fiskesjö (2003) uncovers the horrors of the rituals connected with the 
power of pardon exercised by the president of the United States, from the annual sparing of a turkey on 
Thanksgiving Day to the pardoning of the original Teddy Bear. Through these ritualized and continually 
remembered acts of mercy, Fiskesjö maintains, we might come to understand the exceptional status of the 
prisoners being held by the United States at Guantanamo Bay. In explaining the meaning of sovereign power 
as being related to the “state of exception” (Agamben 2000, 2003; Schmitt 1985) Fiskesjö further maintains 
that the corruption of politicians can be interpreted as one of the manifestations of exceptionality in the 
Schmittian and Agambenian sense. It is in this last connotation that I use the concept of exception in the case 
of Lao customs officials. Customs officers empowered themselves to suspend the law at their will and 
decided on pardoning or condemning traders to pay tax at the check-points.
237
The Binding and Unbinding of Trans-border Mobility
If trade was unsuccessful at the Lao check-point a different type of deterritorialisation was 
put into practice. Trade operations were diverted from Lao territory to the liminal space 
between the Lao and the Chinese states. Refusing to cross the border into Laos, Tai traders 
from Mengman asked their Lao suppliers to load and unload the goods in no man’s land so 
that the Lao would be in charge of the customs’ clearance with the Lao officials. To be able 
to sell their merchandise the Lao had no choice but to accept these conditions. The traders 
from China then had to pay the low fees to the Chinese authorities. By mid-2005, this 
deterritorialising method had become widely applied, sparing the Tai traders much financial 
anxiety.
A fond stratagem was smuggling, a widely celebrated topos in literature on borders (Porter 
1997). When traders went through the Lao check-point they would normally declare at 
least two tons less than what they actually carried. Unable to check the real weight of the 
load, Lao customs calculated tax payments based on the potential capacity of the truck. 
Therefore, even when forced to pay full duty, the traders still paid less than they should 
have.
An additional smuggling practice included transporting across the border products 
classified as ‘highly sensitive’ by the bilateral trade agreements between China and Laos and 
therefore forbidden to be traded across the border. In 2004, some Tai firms from 
Mengman had for instance imported from Muang Sing some milled rice that the American 
and Japanese governments had donated to poor Lao farmers as part of the World Food 
Program. Unable to eat it because of its unpalatable taste, Lao upland farmers chose to sell 
the generous gift of rice to traders in Muang Sing so that they could earn some cash to buy 
other types of food. Despite the restrictions imposed by the Lao authorities, Mengman 
traders were still able to smuggle a few tons of the aid rice. The illegal smuggling of rice 
ended only after a Han trader, caught with a large load of aid rice, was charged an onerous 
fine of a few thousand yuan
In 2005, Tai traders still engaged in some smuggling but only of minor volumes of other 
products such as vegetable oil and white sugar. Hiding them either inside the cab or in 
between rice and com sacs in the back of the truck, these products were sold for a high 
price on the black market in Mengman. To avoid being caught by the authorities, Tai 
traders would at times hire Akha farmers to carry the merchandise across the border via 
mountain paths. State control was hence bypassed, not only by designing a line of flight
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from the centre of power marked by the check-points but also by splitting the smuggling 
line into two or more connected smuggling segments.
The Re-emerging of ‘ArborifiecT Constraints
This golden age of trade was ended in July 2005 when the Chinese authorities imposed new 
regulations which reversed one and a half years of flexible policies. The “arborescent” 
model based on rigid rules, authority and territorialisation was re-asserted.
The regulatory turn was a protectionist measure considered necessary to safeguard the com 
and rice producers of Yunnan and to control the flow of imported agricultural goods into 
China’s domestic markets. The more competitive prices of com and rice coming from Laos 
had negatively affected Chinese growers. In addition, animal feed factories and breweries 
had lamented that com imported from Laos did not meet the quality standards for the 
production of feed and alcohol because it had high moisture content. Therefore they had 
appealed to the Chinese government to regulate quality standards for imported com. An 
outbreak of Avian Flu further legitimised the protectionist shift. Stricter regulations to 
quarantine products coming into the country possibly carrying the virus were considered 
necessary to avoid the spread of the disease.
The Yunnan government resolved to set import quotas on com from Laos. From the 
Pangthong-Chahe check-point a maximum quota of 40,000 tons per year was allowed 
(Fujita 2006:15). Additionally, it was decided that all grain products entering the country 
had to undergo a drying and a pest control process at the check-point. The Xishuangbanna 
authorities contracted the management of the import and quarantine procedures to a 
private company run by a Flan man. The contract involved buying the import rights from 
the government and allowed the company to keep all the revenues from the drying and 
disinfesting payments imposed on the traders. Rumours in Mengman said that the boss of 
the firm had been in the past a government officer himself or part of the frontier 
intelligence services.
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Figure 78. Sign of the corn and rice drying station near the Chahe 
border crossing on the Chinese side of the border
Figure 79. The corn and rice drying station set up near the Chahe
border crossing in July 2005
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The new regulatory regime resulted in substantial financial losses for the Tai traders due to 
a combination of factors. First, the company imposed on them a 40 yuan (=5.26 US$) fee 
for each load of produce imported. Second, the slow pace of the drying and disinfesting at 
the quarantine post reduced the traders’ cross-border shipping operations from two or 
three to one per day. Third, com and rice underwent significant loss of weight during the 
drying operations, which translated into a loss of money. Fourth, Lao suppliers refused to 
reduce the prices of produce, and buyers in China were reluctant to buy the produce for a 
higher price than previously.
The situation escalated in June 2006, when the manager of the drying operations imposed 
an extra payment of 25,000 yuan (3290 US$) per firm to cover the cost of the quota 
vouchers that he had bought from the government. The Tai traders started to describe 
their business as ‘unstable’ and Very unprofitable’. Despite feelings of powerlessness 
against what the Han boss had justified as ‘a state rule’, all the Tai firms in Mengman united 
against the man, whom they had nicknamed ‘malevolent ghost-head’ and refused to make 
the extra payment. The dispute between the traders and the boss resulted in the 
interruption of rice and com shipments from the Pangthong-Chahe crossings for six 
months. Although the Flan boss challenged the traders by claiming strong guanxi with 
people in high positions at the prefecture and county government level, the traders pursued 
their protest. They attached a petition to a letter of complaint which they personally took to 
the prefecture and the county customs offices. A few weeks later the traders were notified 
that an official enquiry had concluded that the Han boss had abused his power and had 
levied charges on the traders to pay a debt he had run up with a business partner. Chinese 
authorities found the Flan man guilty and sentenced him to an onerous fine.
However, since the crisis provoked by the new regulatory measures, traders had started to 
stretch their span of action within and beyond the international border in a multidirectional 
way and to undertake both legal and illegal trading activities. They attempted to put into 
action another “war-machine”, this time reaching beyond the rigid legal and territorial grid 
of both the Chinese and the Lao states. Drawing on friends on both sides of the border, 
the Tai dealers started to divert com and rice import from Chahe-Pangthong to another 
minor border crossing between Man Zhuang, a locality at the south-eastern tip of Mengla 
county, and Ban Bun Neua, a village in Laos’ Phongsali Province. The border crossing 
consisted of a narrow dirt road through mountainous terrain. Mobilizing suppliers among 
their friends in Oudomxai, traders took advantage of the absence of customs and police
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posts on the Lao side of the border and of a drying plant on the Chinese side to ship large 
volumes of com and rice into China tax free. The war-machine was successful for two or 
three months. When, at the end of 2005, a drying station was set up at Man Zhuang and at 
other minor official crossings, the multi-rhizomed impetus was again suppressed.
As a further strategy to cope with the crisis, Tai entrepreneurs attempted to diversify cross- 
border commerce by expanding it from com and rice to other products. One of these was 
broomcom. Another commodity was silver, which despite being listed among the ‘highly 
sensitive products’ whose import-export was forbidden, some Tai traders could buy for 
lower prices in Laos through a friends network and resell in China to Han goldsmiths. 
However, the best economic alternative to com and rice was envisioned to be timber. In 
late 2006, a few Tai firms from Mengman allied with a Han trader to initiate timber imports 
from Laos. The search for timber suppliers or people having connections with them 
reached beyond Luang Namtha Province. Wives and daughters of some of the Tai dealers 
went on timber hunting missions as far as Pakse and Savannakhet in southern Laos. 
However, they soon realised that the highly lucrative timber commerce was more entangled 
in strict regulations and high echelons of power than rice and com.
Rhizomatic strategies to overcome the crisis expanded from the secular to the religious 
domain. In early 2007, a Tai Lue travelling monk from Muang Yong in Myanmar arrived in 
Mengman to distribute talismans to attract wealth to people involved in trade (T. yam ka 
khai) (Tambiah 1984). Each talisman was a piece of white cloth on which was printed a 
magic spell in Tai Lue old script that said: “may you accumulate silver and gold, may your 
trade be prosperous again”. In addition to the image of Nang Kok, the prosperity goddess, 
the cloth also included the figures of a nude man and a woman clinging together during 
sexual intercourse as a wish for fertility. Hearing of his arrival in town, a few Tai female 
traders went to see the monk They presented the holy man with an offering of money 
bundled up together with two yellow candles and a flower. After receiving a blessing in Pali 
language, each trader was given a talisman on which the monk had written the name of the 
offerers. The ladies departed with the monk and hid the talisman against their chests.
Nevertheless, the magic power of the talisman was not sufficient to restore the flourishing 
trade of the previous years. In February 2007, traders were able to ship only small volumes 
of com and rice from the Pangthong-Chahe crossings by paying a fee of 1.3 yuan (0.17 US$) 
per kilo to the Chinese company at the quarantine station. In early 2008, the boss of the
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company became one of the most influential and wealthiest businessmen in the Lao-China 
frontier. Skilfully manoeuvring between the private and state sector, he controlled trade in 
various products in partnership with other Lao private enterprises. He obtained a 
monopoly on imports of rice and com produced in Laos. Traders not only had to pay for 
the drying operations but were also forced to sell their produce to the company for low 
prices. As a result, almost all the Tai entrepreneurs had abandoned the rice and com trade. 
Some had turned to less profitable, alternative forms of commerce. Others had completely 
renounced trading. The “war machine” had been inhibited by state-devised “arborified” 
constraints entangled with the personal aspirations of the powerful Han man.
Conclusion: Foot Binding and Unbinding
...don’t you dare to think that all is well, now that bound feet are no more.
Feet may be unbound, but there still can be bound hands, bound eyes, bound 
ears, bound heads, bound tongues. There are still some people crying, some 
people laughing, some preferring to live, and some preferring to die. There is 
still all that bind bind release release release release bind bind, release release 
bind bind bind bind release release (Feng 1994:2-3).
The above is an excerpt from Feng Jicai’s The Three-Inch Golden Lotus, a novel that narrates 
the politics of legitimising foot-binding in Qing China and of ending this practice during 
the early 20lh century. The author adopts the process of foot binding and unbinding as an 
allegory of the power shifts and the social contradictions brought about by revolution in 
modem China. However, Feng’s bewildering “bind bind release release release release bind 
bind” sequence can be taken as a broad meditation on two aspects of power: its relative 
and ephemeral essence and its historically and socially contingent nature. Foot-binding 
could be interpreted as a patriarchal custom that in Qing China relegated women to a lower 
position in relation to men. For many women it symbolically and physically limited their 
freedom of movement. Yet, as the protagonist of the book, Fragrant Lotus demonstrates 
foot-binding could also be an avenue for female social mobility. It could be disempowering 
for some women and empowering for others. The ban on the custom marked by a change 
of regime did not subvert the mechanisms by which power can be gained or lost. Changes 
in the ruling body did not erase the existence of power inequalities between rulers and 
mied and between the various strata of the mied. Under transformed historical and social 
conditions some people were still more powerful than others. Maoism disempowered 
landlords but empowered farmers and workers, some of whom were in turn disempowered 
by revolutionary cadres. The expressions ‘power5 and ‘lack of power5 contain the same
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amount of subtle nuances that Feng (1994:24) attributes to the terms ‘truth’ and ‘falsehood’. 
Between the opposite poles lies a wide range of political and social possibilities that defines 
these terms.
The case study of rice/com trade on the China-Laos frontier provides an example of the 
political and social nuances underpinning power. I have elucidated how the economically 
profitable mobility of the Tai traders between 2004 and mid 2005 relied on two intertwined 
processes: the Chinese state’s experimental flexibility on trade and citizenship, and the 
traders’ ability to devise what I have called “tree-zomatic” strategies. Taking advantage of a 
temporary unbinding of their feet the traders attempted to create a spatiality that stretched 
beyond nationally defined limits. Tai traders reached for a transnational trade with multiple 
social, gender, and ethnic lines of flight. Yet state authoritarianism re-emerged, redrawing 
experimental policies and enmeshed in corruption, nepotism and local power structures. 
The traders’ multiple deterritorialising impetuses were dissolved by individual counter- 
territorialising thrusts. Their “tree-zomatic” mobility across the trans-national frontier 
space was again inhibited by the re-assertion of the “arborescent model” of the nation-state 
and its rigid, hierarchical social structure. As even the two advocates of the “rhizomatic 
model” maintain, the notion of unit and dualism embodied by the tree resurfaces “when 
there is a power takeover in the multiplicity by the signifier or a corresponding 
subjectification proceeding” (Deleuze and Guattari 1988:8). The Tai traders’ feet were 
rebound by a new power takeover by the state and an influential Han man.
Therefore, the quote by Feng captures the intertwine me nts of mobility with various forms 
of power structures in the Upper Mekong region. Firstly, it indicates that mobility is neither 
an absolute condition nor a practice accessible to all. It is contingent on the frontier’s social 
and ethnic hierarchies. The unbinding of feet by the state does not translate into the same 
degree of mobility for all social and ethnic strata of border residents. I have pointed out 
that during the period of economic success the Tai firms represented a restricted number 
of privileged people in Mengman with well-developed social networks on both sides of the 
border and able to confront or manoeuvre within state regulatory policies. Yet, those 
whose feet are unbound today can have their feet rebound tomorrow. It was sufficient that 
a powerful Flan man well-connected with the local government emerged on the trading 
scene for the Tai traders to lose their privileged economic status. Therefore, border 
residents able to penetrate political structures and belonging to ethnically powerful groups
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are more successful than others in moving, physically and economically, throughout the 
frontier space.
Secondly, Feng’s statement tells us that mobility across the Upper Mekong frontiers occurs 
within a volatile state regulatory framework Appadurai (2002:173), one of the most 
prominent proponents of the notion of global flows argues that a peculiarity of the post­
modern age is that a more fluid mobility of migrants and communities of imagination are 
challenging conventional political and social boundaries. Yet, as even Ong (1999:11), a 
fervent advocate of flexibility maintains, it is in doubt “whether imagination as social 
practice can be so independent of national, transnational, and political-economic structures 
that enable, channel, and control flows of people, things and ideas.” Cunningham and 
Heyman (2004) have pushed the argument even further by arguing that mobility across 
borders can only be defined in conjunction with its opposite: enclosure. Tai traders, I have 
shown, moved across the border with their goods by drawing on state-devised channels of 
identification, citizenship differentials and import-export regulations. A peculiarity of the 
governance of the China-Laos frontier is that state regulatory practices on mobility have an 
unpredictable character. Socialist states such as Laos and China release their grip on human 
and goods mobility across borders as a form of economic and political experimentation. As 
soon as such experimentation turns out to be detrimental for national interests, release is 
replaced by binding. Transnational mobility of subjects and objects is therefore conditional 
on a national process of binding and unbinding, re-binding and re-unbinding.
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Conclusion: Roses & Rifles
I n  TH IS  TH ESIS I HAVE USED TH E BORDER to analyse governing in the Upper
Mekong in the past and outline its developments in the present. I have asked how 
contemporary governing, borders and sovereignty should be conceptualised since 
impetuses of regional economic integration have emerged in the Mekong region. I have 
questioned whether these new shifts should be accounted for with a theory that emphasises 
the waning of state power and disappearing of national boundaries, as advocates of 
globalisation argue. More generally, I have explored the relationship between state and 
society in the contemporary politico-economic and social transformations of Mainland 
Southeast Asia. I have provided answers through a multidisciplinary approach that 
combines the empirical power of ethnography with anthropological, political and social 
theory.
The driving idea of the thesis is that governing does not come into being merely along a 
top-down vector of hegemony, but in a common field of action between centres and 
margins. Drawing on Foucault’s (1982) concept of the “conduct of conduct”, I have 
assumed that the actions of the myriad of border actors coalesce with the actions of the 
central state and also influence the centre’s actions. I have presented the China-Laos 
frontier not as a battle field between state and society but as a “middle ground” (White 
1991), a space of socio-cultural and politico-economic experimentation where centres meet 
the margins to produce heterogeneous scenarios of manoeuvring, negotiation, 
collaboration, and resistance.
My investigation of frontier governing has revolved around four main issues raised in the 
globalisation literature: “graduated’ sovereignty, unconstrained cross-border mobility, 
cross-border ethnic re-connectedness, and resistance to the centre of power.
I have questioned Ong’s (1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2003) claim that the sovereignty of 
developmental states in Asia has become “graduated” and “flexible” or, in the case of 
China, “variegated” purely to accommodate global capital in the age of high-modernity. I 
have suggested that such graduation is not simply the outcome of neo-liberal or globalising 
shifts but has roots in “centralised decentralisation”. This is a governing model which,
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despite considerable change from pre-colonial to colonial and post-colonial times, 
continues to typify the contemporary governing of the frontier.
In Chapter Two, I have illustrated that in the pre-colonial era, the interactions between 
small polities and large kingdoms, and between the centres of power in the valleys and the 
hills in the Upper Mekong were regulated by a diversified range of borders, some of which 
were fluid, some more fixed, and others that defined ambiguous zones of contestation and 
exchange. Sovereignties were flexible and overlapped. More powerful political entities 
managed their relationships with marginal subjects by appointing indigenous leaders who 
enjoyed semi-autonomous ruling power. Peripheral residents, migrants, traders and 
bureaucrats all participated in maintaining, disrupting or negotiating borders through their 
socio-economic and cultural practices.
Colonial maps brought about a notion of fixed borders and defined sovereignties but 
without erasing pre-existing cross-border dynamism. The new modem geography remained 
un-realised until the formation of the modem Chinese and Lao nation-states. Through 
revolutionary movements and nation-building projects, borders became permanent lines 
separating discrete sovereignties and people. Nevertheless, the newly established Chinese 
and Lao Communist leaderships perpetuated, with varying degrees of central control, a 
model of decentralisation at the periphery. Since the early days of its rule, the PRC 
government managed the territory under its sovereignty according to a model of 
“graduated administration". It granted autonomy in cultural, economic and political matters 
to areas inhabited by ethnic minority groups mainly located along China’s national borders. 
This policy persists until today. In Laos’ north-western border provinces, contemporary 
decentralisation is more the result of failed centralising control than of a devised ruling 
strategy.
I have described the current graduation in sovereignty along the frontier as inscribed within 
a framework of “experimentation under hierarchy” (Heilmann 2008). This is a mechanism 
whereby the margins are allowed to experiment autonomously under the scrutiny of the 
Lao and Chinese centres. Local experimentation flourishes like roses. When this blooming 
turns out to be detrimental to the survival of the state, it is contained by an authoritarian 
backlash. In extreme cases, authoritarianism resorts to the ‘use of rifles’.
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The boom of rubber planting in north-western Laos described in Chapter Three and 
Chapter Four was a monumental experimental undertaking that involved a myriad of 
frontier dwellers in the 2004-2008 period. Chinese large and small investors, Lao 
government agents, entrepreneurs and farmers all experimented with the centrally-designed 
“Poppy Replacement Program”. Nevertheless, the large investors’ hazardous testing of 
central policies with land concessions and contract farming did not turn into a Chinese 
economic seizure of Laos, as the most pessimistic commentators have argued. It did not 
produce what Sassen (1996:xn) has referred to as “a partial denationalization of national 
territory and a partial shift of some components of state sovereignty to other institutions 
[or] the global capital market”. Rather, rubber investments were entrenched in the 
convergence of economic interests between the Lao bureaucrats and the foreign companies. 
Politico-economic collaboration between these bureaucrats and companies involved 
sharing the exercise of pastoral power to guarantee the salvation of the Lao populace from 
poverty (Foucault 1982:213-215). This did not result in a complete loss of power for the 
Lao state agents. Chinese experimentation was in many cases hampered by the Lao 
bureaucrats’ application of authority. The Lao Army also experimented with foreign capital 
by planting rubber along the border. Paradoxically, in this case, the flexibility of governing 
that aimed to house foreign capital was twisted to secure the sovereignty of the Lao state. 
Consequently, the influx of global capital in Laos maintained a power status quo. Lao 
farmers’ experimentation with rubber in collaboration with the foreign investors also 
flourished, with varying degrees of risk, but always under the scrutiny of the Lao authorities. 
In one extreme case, this blossoming was suppressed with the use of weapons by the Lao 
Army.
Similarly, as I have shown in Chapter Four, Akha residents of a village at the margins of 
Laos experimented with initiatives that oscillated between legality and illegality, and 
expanded in multiple directions between the hills and the valleys, and astride the Chinese 
and Lao states. They crossed the border without identification papers and illegally married 
and shared the use of resources with ethnic fellows in China. Frontier practices engendered 
semi-autonomous “centres of Akha potency” that were, nevertheless, connected to the 
lowland states. Therefore, marginal experimentation was not an effect of zomia (Scott 2009; 
van Schendel 2002), a mechanism whereby recalcitrant peripheral ethnic subjects resist 
central power. It was an expression of an incomplete process of the modem Lao state 
formation which overlapped with pre-colonial patterns of decentralisation. This process 
entailed the alliance of some elements of the low land state with marginal frontier dwellers.
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When experimental border practices threatened central power, they were suffocated by the 
territorialising thrust of the state through military intervention.
I have also used the concept of experimentation under hierarchy to explain the mechanics 
of mobility across the border. The theorists of globalisation have argued that in the 
contemporary era the state is losing the capacity'to regulate the transnational movement of 
subjects and objects. My discussion of cross-border petty trade in Chapter Six has belied 
this view. Between 2005 and mid 2006, a group of Tai traders experimented with flexible 
state regulations on cross-border commerce and reaped considerable economic benefits. 
Experimentation occurred by putting in place trading strategies that spanned gender, ethnic, 
social, and economic boundaries. To meet the challenges of trade in the global era, traders 
balanced gender participation in commercial transactions normally dominated by men; they 
revitalised trans-frontier Tai ethnicity and relied on Han Chinese styles of business and 
social networking. The mobility of the traders and their goods was ‘tree-zomed’. On the 
one hand, it drew on the Chinese government’s preferential policies of personal 
identification, citizenship differentials and import-export regulations; on the other hand, it 
confronted the Lao bureaucrats’ unpredictable application of the rule of law. Eventually, 
the roses of trade wilted with the re-emerging of hard state regulation on both sides of the 
border. Thus the transnational mobility of subjects and objects in the era of regional 
economic integration remains conditional on national practices of border control.
Yet frontier experimentation is not always suppressed by state centripetal thrusts. It can 
also be aligned with nationalising policies, producing conciliatory outcomes. In Chapter 
Five, I have described how China’s rapid economic growth and modernisation influenced a 
group of educated young ethnic Tai Lue living on China’s borderlands. In the mid-2000s 
they came to articulate their sense of communal belonging through identification with the 
Chinese government’s agenda of modernisation. The state’s projects of national integration, 
education and economic development intersected with individual aspirations for prosperity, 
and social mobility. This view contrasts with a widely accepted tenet that in the global age 
ethnic groups continue to construct their identities through sentiments of shared trans- 
border ethnicity which are antagonistic to the nation-state’s hegemonic cultural and social 
agendas. I have proposed that through the ethnic category Daizu, an ascriptive label applied 
by the Chinese state, young Tai reconcile apparently conflicting sentiments of national and 
transnational belonging.
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Throughout the thesis, I have shown that the fluidity of the frontier space accommodates 
and encourages peripheral experimentation. At the same time, I have highlighted the on­
going fixity of the border. Even in the alleged global age, borders remain technologies of 
governing through which states regulate mobility and immobility and define citizenship. 
Borders still mark national identities and determine sovereignty over territories. They 
continue to act as lines of cleavage between national projects and different degrees of 
modernisation between states. In the context of the frontier I studied, the border is a 
marker of separation between Lao’s slow development and China’s faster modernisation. 
Poor Lao farmers look beyond to China for ways to improve their livelihoods. Chinese 
citizens draw on Lao ‘backwardness’ on the other side of the border to assert themselves as 
modem individuals within the Chinese nation.
As I write this conclusion in June 2009, the world is in the midst of a deep global economic 
recession. Even the EU, celebrated in the 1990s as a successful example of a borderless 
supra-state entity constructed on political and economic liberalisation, is being undermined. 
The state members of the EU are enacting national withdrawal. State protectionism, 
xenophobia, repression of dissent, right wing political extremism, and national 
fundamentalism have been embraced as defensive responses to confront the economic 
downturn. Borders are being re-erected to sift the flow of alleged terrorists, unwelcome 
migrants and competitive foreign goods. My ethnographic account suggests that the states 
in the Upper Mekong might be reacting to the crisis with a similar mechanism of national 
enclosing. It can be argued that this new trend is consistent with the oscillation between 
flexibility and fixity which has characterized the history of governing in this frontier of Asia. 
The growing presence of Chinese capital and migrants in North-western Laos might 
represent a challenge to this model. In particular, the vast Chinese-funded rubber 
plantations along the border of Laos (and Myanmar) have a politically destabilising 
potential which has so far been contained, but could detonate into chaos once the rubber 
trees have reached productive age in the 2010s. The future of governing on the China-Laos 
frontier lies in the management of these plantations. Future research on borders in the 
Upper Mekong region will need to continue to focus on the dialectic of roses and rifles in 
relation to the economics of rubber.
250
Glossary
GLOSSARY
C h in ese  T erm s
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f t f t  hao im n fu n , am using
f t  P  h u ko u h o u se h o ld  reg is tra tio n
f t  f t  ka ifa  
lijin  
laoban
o p e n  u p  an d  d ev e lo p  (land) 
a fo rm  o f  local tax a tio n  in  C h in a  
b o ss , p ro p rie to r
Idopian ‘o ld  c h e a t’ (n eo lo g ism  co in e d  b y  L ao  p eo p le  
in  M u an g  Sing to  re fe r  to  C h inese  investors)
d & f t  la o rn i fo re ig n er
f t ' j f r  rm jiang  
K B ;  rrinzu
a th re e -fo u r  gam e o f  C h inese  o rig in  
nationality , e th n ic  g ro u p
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if f  rru C hinese  u n it o f  lan d  area; 0 .0667 hectares
fA ilk  neidi in n e r  te rrito ries
shaoshu m n z u m in o rity  n a tio n a lity
'x i T '  T  shoubu liao c a n n o t s tan d , be u n ab le  to  en d u re
fA  si private
i f t M  suzhi q u a lity  (o f th e  p o p u la tio n )
tongyi u n ified
im bP  ta ß h m tax  avo idance
z h if ]  tusi native officials
% A  w d remrin fm m ‘serve th e  p e o p le ’, it w as a s logan  co in ed  b y  
th e  C h inese  C o m m u n is t  P a r ty  in  th e  1940s
% xiaag sm all to w n sh ip  o r  village
M M }\& ify fH  jiAf §  '/n j'H D a izu  Z izhizhou X ish u a n g b an n a  D a i A u to n o m o u s  P re fec tu re .
M .M  xingqi w eek
ill ^  Ü!j ®  yaichan daom an ‘p ro ceed in g  f ro m  p o in t  to  su rface ’, a m o d e  o f  
g o v ern an ce  a d o p te d  b y  th e  C C P  since the  
1930s
you krnnshi stylish
7n  yuan C hinese  u n it o f  c u rre n c y
fIf  zhen large to w n sh ip
zhichi bianjiang C hinese  settlers to  th e  fro n tie r . T h e  te rm  is 
o f te n  a b b rev ia ted  as S Ü  zhibian
S ' S t t  zhifushen T h e  P ro sp e r ity  G o d
^ I A  zhongguorm C hinese  p eo p le
th  i  zoudouqu ‘to  go o u t’, a fo re ig n  p o lic y  im p lem en ted  b y  
th e  C h inese  g o v e rn m e n t in  th e  2000s to  
p ro m o te  C h inese  in v es tm e n t a n d  m ig ra tion  
a b ro a d
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Lao Terms
k ip
la o lu m
L ao  c u rren cy  
lo w lan d  L ao
laosung
kw tkeung
m iban
h ig h lan d  L ao  o r  L ao  o f  th e  m o u n ta in  to p s  
m id lan d  L ao  o r  L ao  o f  th e  m o u n ta in  slopes 
village leader
phinong relatives a n d  friends
sensai social c o n n ec tio n s
su krn n ty ing  th e  sp irit c e re m o n y
253
Glossary
Tai Lue terms
a i dip di daemg a p h rase  u se d  to  re fe r  to  a n  u n e d u c a te d  m a le -  
m ain ly  n o t  o rd a in e d — w h ich  c o rre sp o n d s  to  
th e  C h inese  c o n c e p t o f  lo w  suzhi, “ low  
quality”
dtbit w eek
bdn village
khd lit. ‘s lave’ o r  ‘se rv a n t’, te rm  u se d  to  re fe r  to  
hill a n d  m o u n ta in  dw ellers speak ing  M on- 
K h m e r, M iao -Y ao  a n d  T ib e to -B u tm a n
languages
khudn sp iritua l essence , sou l
k h m  tdi T ai p eo p le
Hang phibdn feasting  th e  village sp irit ritual
rme m o th e r
rm e k h d fem ale v e n d o r
rmeseo fem ale p e e r
rme thdo o ld  w o m an , o r  g ra n d -m o th e r
mudng
m ukhuan
sm all p r in c e d o m , principality , to w n , coun try , 
‘tab le  f o r  th e  sp iritu a l e ssen ce ’. A  gift th a t th e  
T a i g ro o m  o ffers to  th e  b rid e  o n  th e  d ay  o f  
th e  w ed d in g . I t  is in  th e  fo rm  o f  tw o  cones 
m ade o u t o f  b a n a n a  leaves a n d  d e c o ra te d  w ith
m m  hu m  tsang
co lo rfu l p lastic  flow ers, e ach  laid o n  a 
b a m b o o  tab le . O n e  rep re sen ts  th e  g ro o m ’s 
a n d  th e  o th e r  th e  b r id e ’s k h m n  (sou l o r  spirit) 
th e  T ai eq u iv a len t p h rase  fo r  th e  C h inese 
c o n c e p t o f  a p e rso n  w ith  h ig h  suzhi, o r  “ h igh  
quality”
m th i m inu te
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pamia lit. ‘a thousand  rice fields’, was an 
adm inistrative unit o r  region in w hich the 
Sipsongpanna principality  was subdivided in 
the pre-colonial period
phinong relatives and  friends
pbobseo male peer
sukhuan binding the ‘spirit’ ce rem ony  perfo rm ed  to  
m ark  life cycle events such as weddings, 
funerals, birth , the building o f a new  house. 
H ow ever, the  sukhuan  can also be perform ed 
any  o th er tim e it is believed th a t the spiritual 
essence of an individual has left the  bo d y
tsaomuang prince, ruler o f  a muang in pre-colonial 
S ipsongpanna
tsao phaendin lit. ‘the lord  o f the  land’, king of the 
principality o f Sipsongpanna.
yarn ka  khai talism an wishing p rosperity  to  traders
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Akha Terms
akhazan
dzorm
A kha custom  o r  w ay o f life 
spiritual village leader
gM?
m X a n
p o tency
A kha universe-disc
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